A framework for re-thinking learning in science from recent cognitive science perspectives

Recent accounts by cognitive scientists of factors affecting cognition imply the need to reconsider current dominant conceptual theories about science learning. These new accounts emphasize the role of context, embodied practices and narrative-based representation rather than learners’ cognitive constructs. In this paper we analyze data from a longitudinal study of primary school children’s learning to outline a framework based on these contemporary accounts, and to delineate key points of difference from conceptual change perspectives. The findings suggest this framework provides strong theoretical and practical insights into how children learn and the key role of representational negotiation in this learning. We argue that the nature and process of conceptual change can be re-interpreted in terms of the development of students’ representational resources.

Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Cognitive Science

What would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of the use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology to be. In this article I suggest an answer to this question through a discussion of certain claims made in connection to the “post-cognitivist” approach to cognitive science by Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher and Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. I suggest that these claims are indicative of an appropriation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought that he would have welcomed as innovative science. Despite this, I argue that he would have viewed this use of his work as potentially occluding the full philosophical significance that he believed his phenomenological investigations to contain.

From the 'mad' poet to the 'embodied' poet: reconceptualising creativity through cognitive science paradigms

 Written by the author of three collections of poetry, this paper contests the enduring stereotype of the ‘mad’ poet, present in Romantic, psychoanalytic and psychological theories of creativity. Mobilising theories of embodied cognition, it offers a demystified and de-pathologised vision of poiesis and poetry. The paper focuses on three traits typically associated with the ‘mad’ poet in popular representations and theoretical understandings of that figure: extreme emotionality; divergent thinking; and a tortured unconscious. Using findings in the cognitive sciences, the essay demonstrates how emotional experience, divergent thinking, and the unconscious are integral parts of brain functioning, rather than traits exclusive to psychopathology. Poiesis is not informed, in any essential way, by madness but rather by the normal conditions of embodied cognition.

Information and mechanical models of intelligence: What can we learn from cognitive science?

The impact of new advanced technology on issues that concern meaningful information and its relation to studies of intelligence constitutes the main topic of the present paper. The advantages, disadvantages and implications of the synthetic methodology developed by cognitive scientists, according to which mechanical models of the mind, such as computer simulations or self-organizing robots, may provide good explanatory tools to investigate cognition, are discussed. A difficulty with this methodology is pointed out, namely the use of meaningless information to explain intelligent behavior that incorporates meaningful information. In this context, it is inquired what are the contributions of cognitive science to contemporary studies of intelligent behavior and how technology may play a role in the analysis of the relationships established by organisms in their natural and social environments. © John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Cognitive neuroimaging: Cognitive science out of the armchair

Cognitive scientists were not quick to embrace the functional neuroimaging technologies that emerged during the late 20th century. In this new century, cognitive scientists continue to question, not unreasonably, the relevance of functional neuroimaging investigations that fail to address questions of interest to cognitive science. However, some ultra-cognitive scientists assert that these experiments can never be of relevance to the Study of cognition. Their reasoning reflects an adherence to a functionalist philosophy that arbitrarily and purposefully distinguishes mental information-processing systems from brain or brain-like operations. This article addresses whether data from properly conducted functional neuroimaging studies can inform and Subsequently constrain the assumptions of theoretical cognitive models. The article commences with a focus upon the functionalist philosophy espoused by the ultra-cognitive scientists, contrasting it with the materialist philosophy that motivates both cognitive neuromiaging investigations and connectionist modelling of cognitive systems. Connectionism and cognitive neuroimaging share many features, including an emphasis on unified cognitive and neural models of systems that combine localist and distributed representations. The utility of designing cognitive neuroimaging studies to test (primarily) connectionist models of cognitive phenomena is illustrated using data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigations of language production and episodic memory. (C) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A Cognitive Science Reasoning in Recognition of Emotions in Audio-Visual Speech

In this report we summarize the state-of-the-art of speech emotion recognition from the signal processing point of view. On the bases of multi-corporal experiments with machine-learning classifiers, the observation is made that existing approaches for supervised machine learning lead to database dependent classifiers which can not be applied for multi-language speech emotion recognition without additional training because they discriminate the emotion classes following the used training language. As there are experimental results showing that Humans can perform language independent categorisation, we made a parallel between machine recognition and the cognitive process and tried to discover the sources of these divergent results. The analysis suggests that the main difference is that the speech perception allows extraction of language independent features although language dependent features are incorporated in all levels of the speech signal and play as a strong discriminative function in human perception. Based on several results in related domains, we have suggested that in addition, the cognitive process of emotion-recognition is based on categorisation, assisted by some hierarchical structure of the emotional categories, existing in the cognitive space of all humans. We propose a strategy for developing language independent machine emotion recognition, related to the identification of language independent speech features and the use of additional information from visual (expression) features.

Diderot’s body and cognitive science: sensation, impulse and action in performer training

This essay places Diderot's materialist philosophy articulated in Paradox of the Actor in the late Nineteenth century, alongside emerging thinking from neurobiology. Taking Diderot’s pursuit for the recognition acting as an art as a point of departure, it reflects on the labour of the actor as awareness within multiple cognitions: impulse, sensation, and action. The discussion maps various examples including Stanislavsky in the early 1900s through to contemporary more regulated techniques like Susana Bloch’s Alba Emoting method and Phillip Zarrilli’s psychophysical approach. It considers the language of neuroscience in explicating the nuances of technique in acting and proposes that good acting requires a mastery of self at a neural level. ​

An exploratory study of creativity, personality and schooling achievement

International audience

The “handwriting brain”: a motor/linguistic network with specialized “writing-specific” areas?

International audience

The writing brain. Functional neuroanatomy of written language production

International audience