Iowa Department of Commerce - Credit Union Division, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Audit report on the City of Mount Union, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the City of Mount Union, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2006

Improving Transition Outcomes: Youth Leadership Forum Alumni Survey

Results from a survey conducted in cooperation with Iowa's Youth Leadership Forum.

Leadership in cardiac surgery.

Despite the efficacy of cardiac surgery, less invasive interventions with more uncertain long-term outcomes are increasingly challenging surgery as first-line treatment for several congenital, degenerative and ischemic cardiac diseases. The specialty must evolve if it is to ensure its future relevance. More importantly, it must evolve to ensure that future patients have access to treatments with proven long-term effectiveness. This cannot be achieved without dynamic leadership; however, our contention is that this is not enough. The demands of a modern surgical career and the importance of the task at hand are such that the serendipitous emergence of traditional charismatic leadership cannot be relied upon to deliver necessary change. We advocate systematic analysis and strategic leadership at a local, national and international level in four key areas: Clinical Care, Research, Education and Training, and Stakeholder Engagement. While we anticipate that exceptional individuals will continue to shape the future of our specialty, the creation of robust structures to deliver collective leadership in these key areas is of paramount importance.

Audit of the Memorial Union Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology (Iowa State University) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit of the Memorial Union Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology (Iowa State University) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiatedproducts and determine endogenously which of the players will lead andwhich will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that,consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten(1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose towait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.

How political parties, rather than member-states, are building the European Union

Political party formation and coalition building in the European Parliament is being a driving force for making governance of the highly pluralistic European Union relatively effective and consensual. In spite of successive enlargements and the very high number of electoral partiesobtaining representation in the European Union institutions, the number of effective European Political Groups in the European Parliament has decreased from the first direct election in 1979 to the fifth in 1999. The formal analysis of national party¹s voting power in different Europeanparty configurations can explain the incentives for national parties to join large European Political Groups instead of forming smaller nationalistic groupings. Empirical evidence shows increasing cohesion of European Political Groups and an increasing role of the European Parliament in EU inter-institutional decision making. As a consequence of this evolution, intergovernmentalism is being replaced with federalizing relations. The analysis can support positive expectations regarding the governability of the European Union after further enlargements provided that new member states have party systems fitting the European PoliticalGroups.

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the highcost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the countrylevel, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.