Endogenous price leadership
| Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
|---|---|
| Data(s) |
15/09/2005
|
| Resumo |
We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with di®erentiatedproducts and determine endogenously which of the players will lead andwhich will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that,consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten(1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose towait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader. |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Direitos |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a> |
| Palavras-Chave | #Microeconomics #price leadership #endogenous timing #risk dominance |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
