Gestão Documental: Gestão de Processos de Aposentação usando a Plataforma IBM FileNet na Direcção Geral de Administração Pública

Ainda, nos nossos dias, o papel como sendo base de suporte das informações, é o maior problema operacional na maioria das empresas, órgãos governamentais e instituições. A administração pública cabo-verdiana lida anualmente com um grande volume de documentos e, a dificuldade de se lidar cada vez mais com os documentos produzidos é crescente. Daí, a necessidade de estabelecer princípios de racionalidade administrativa, a partir da intervenção nas etapas do ciclo de produção, utilização, conservação e destinação dos documentos de arquivo - a Gestão Documental. Com a evolução das Tecnologias da Informação e Comunicação (TIC) é contínua, igualmente a gestão da informação precisa adaptar-se a cada nova onda de mudança. A utilização de sistemas de gestão de conteúdos e de processos constituem ferramentas indispensáveis para o desenvolvimento de modernos sistemas de informação, agilizando assim os processos críticos nas instituições, de forma a optimizar o binómio produtividade - qualidade. Este trabalho faz referência à utilização da IBM FileNet, para modelação do processo de pedido de aposentação na Administração Pública. Ficou comprovado que o sistema de gestão de Workflow - Bussiness Process Management (BPM) da IBM, é capaz de automatizar o procedimento dos processos, gerir a sequência de actividades de trabalho e chamar (ou invocar) os recursos humanos e electrónicos apropriados, associados aos vários passos de actividades numa instituição. As evidências da plataforma FileNet como solução de Gestão de Conteúdos, e Gestão de Processos na nossa Administração Pública, demonstram vantagens consideráveis em todos os níveis. Para além de dinamizar e automatizar os processos críticos, o FileNet BPM pode permitir a optimização das operações e melhorar a capacidade de tomar decisões rápidas e acertadas, capacitando a instituição, para tomar decisões atempadas, baseadas na mais rigorosa informação disponível.

Nova espécie de Anatrichobius Wenzel, 1966 (Diptera, Streblidae) do Brasil meridional

New species of Anatrichobius Wenzel, 1966 (Diptera, Streblidae) from Southern Brazil. Anatrichobius passosi sp. nov. collected on the vespertilionid bat Myotis nigricans, from southern Brazil is described. Habitus, gonopod and hipoproct are illustrated and a key for the species of Anatrichobius is given.

Additive utility with intransitive indifference and without independence: A homogeneous case

In the homogeneous case of one type of goods or objects, we prove theexistence of an additive utility function without assuming transitivityof indifference and independence. The representation reveals a positivefactor smaller than 1 that infuences rational choice beyond the utilityfunction and explains departures from these standard axioms of utilitytheory (factor equals to 1).

Quotient spaces of boundedly rational types

By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level li about the state of nature coincide, weobtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topologicalproperties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our Bayesian Nash(li; l-i)-equilibria capture players inability to distinguish types belonging to the same equivalence class.The case with uncertainty about the vector of levels (li; l-i) is also analyzed. Two examples illustratethe constructions.

Choice by sequential procedures

We propose a rule of decision-making, the sequential procedure guided byroutes, and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalentlyunderstood as special cases of this rule. In addition, the sequential procedure guidedby routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related. We showthat choice with a status-quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees, which, inturn, is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability. Thus, we provide a sharp taxonomyof these choice models, and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequentialprocedures.

Are self-regarding subjects more rational?

Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relatesto concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games anda guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the selfregardingtype. When performing a comparison within the same degree of rationality,self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than othersubjects.

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

Is the person trade-off a valid method for allocating health care resources? Some caveats

The Person Trade-Off (PTO) is a methodology aimed at measuring thesocial value of health states. The rest of methodologies would measure individualutility and would be less appropriate for taking resource allocation decisions.However few studies have been conducted to test the validity of the method.We present a pilot study with this objective. The study is based on theresult of interviews to 30 undergraduate students in Economics. We judgethe validity of PTO answers by their adequacy to three hypothesis of rationality.First, we show that, given certain rationality assumptions, PTO answersshould be predicted from answers to Standard Gamble questions. This firsthypothesis is not verified. The second hypothesis is that PTO answersshould not vary with different frames of equivalent PTO questions. Thissecond hypothesis is also not verified. Our third hypothesis is that PTOvalues should predict social preferences for allocating resources betweenpatients. This hypothesis is verified. The evidence on the validity of themethod is then conflicting.

Simple models for multi-attribute choice with many alternatives: When it does and does not pay to face tradeoffs with binary attributes

Working Paper no longer available. Please contact the author.

Effect of Emotion and Personality on Deviation from Purely Rational Decision-Making

Human decision-making has consistently demonstrated deviation from "pure" rationality. Emotions are a primary driver of human actions and the current study investigates how perceived emotions and personality traits may affect decision-making during the Ultimatum Game (UG). We manipulated emotions by showing images with emotional connotation while participants decided how to split money with a second player. Event-related potentials (ERPs) from scalp electrodes were recorded during the whole decision-making process. We observed significant differences in the activity of central and frontal areas when participants offered money with respect to when they accepted or rejected an offer. We found that participants were more likely to offer a higher amount of money when making their decision in association with negative emotions. Furthermore, participants were more likely to accept offers when making their decision in association with positive emotions. Honest, conscientious, and introverted participants were more likely to accept offers. Our results suggest that factors others than a rational strategy may predict economic decision-making in the UG.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments

"Beauty-contest" is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in [0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK, Spain, and Germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them, despite the uncontrollability of these experiments. These results are then compared with lab experiments involving undergraduates and game theorists as subjects, in what must be one of the largest empirical corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried. We claim that all observed behavior, across a wide variety of treatments and subject pools, can be interpretedas iterative reasoning. Level-1 reasoning, Level-2 reasoning and Level-3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples, while the equilibrium choice (Level-Maximum reasoning) is only prominently chosen by newspaper readers and theorists. The results show the empirical power of experiments run with large subject-pools, and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich platform offered by newspapers and magazines.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Property enforcement as organized consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that makeproperty rights viable, ensuring their enforcement, mobilizing thecollateral value of assets and promoting growth. In contrast tocontractual rights, property rights are enforced in rem, being affectedonly with the consent of the right holder. This ensures enforcement butis costly when multiple, potentially colliding rights are held in thesame asset. Different institutions reduce the cost of gathering consentsto overcome this trade-off of enforcement benefits for consent costs:recording of deeds with title insurance, registration of rights and evena regimen of purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies with the numberof transactions, the risk of political opportunism and regulatoryconsistency. The analysis also shows the rationality of allowingcompetition in the preparation and support of private contractswhile requiring territorial monopoly in recording and registrationactivities, this to ensure independence and protect third parties.

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.