Are self-regarding subjects more rational?


Autoria(s): Arruñada, Benito; Casari, Marco; Pancotto, Francesca
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa

Data(s)

26/11/2012

Resumo

Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relatesto concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games anda guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the selfregardingtype. When performing a comparison within the same degree of rationality,self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than othersubjects.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/10230/19922

Idioma(s)

eng

Direitos

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

<a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a>

Palavras-Chave #Business Economics and Industrial Organization #steps of reasoning #other-regarding preferences
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper