Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Cournot model with investments to change the market size

We present a new deterministic dynamical model on the market size of Cournot competitions, based on Nash equilibria of R&D investment strategies to increase the size of the market of the firms at every period of the game. We compute the unique Nash equilibrium for the second subgame and the profit functions for both firms. Adding uncertainty to the R&D investment strategies, we get a new stochastic dynamical model and we analyse the importance of the uncertainty to reverse the initial advantage of one firm with respect to the other.

Cournot duopoly with competition in the R&D expenditures

We present a new R&D investment in a Cournot Duopoly model and we analyze the different possible types of Nash R&D investments. We observe that the new production costs region can be decomposed in three economical regions, depending on the Nash R&D investment, showing the relevance of the use of patents in new technologies.

Caracterização funcional do neutrófilo na esteato-hepatite alcoólica e não alcoólica

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Genética Molecular e Biomedicina

Assessing the impacts of land use and land cover change on hydrology of watershed: a case study on Gigel-Abbay Watershed, Lake Tana Basin, Ethiopia

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies.

An existence result for discontinuous games

We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together with a weak form of payoff security, is enough to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in compact, quasiconcave normal form games. We show that our result generalizes the pure strategy existence theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and that it is neither implied nor does it imply the existence theorems of Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) and Reny (1999). Furthermore, we show that an equilibrium may fail to exist when, while maintaining weak payoff security, weak upper semicontinuity is weakened to reciprocal upper semicontinuity.

On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games

Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is typically regarded as a criterion to evaluate how appropriate is the corresponding formalization of large games. In contrast, we argue that such evaluation is pointless. In fact, we show that, in a precise sense, all the above existence results are equivalent. Thus, all of them are equally strong and therefore cannot rank the different formalizations of large games.

Mercury exposure and malaria prevalence among gold miners in Pará, Brazil

Economic development, including resource extraction, can cause toxic exposures that interact with endemic infectious diseases. Mercury is an immunotoxic metal used in the amalgamation of gold, resulting in both occupational exposures and environmental pollution. A cross-sectional medical survey was conducted in 1997 on 135 garimpeiros in Para, Brazil, because of their risks of both mercury exposure and malaria transmission. Mean levels of blood and urine mercury were well above non-exposed background levels. Twenty-six subjects had malaria parasitemia: Health symptoms consistent with mercury exposure were reported, but neither symptoms nor signs correlated with mercury levels in blood or urine. We did not find a dose response relationship between mercury exposure and likelihood of prevalent malaria infection, but there was a possible reduction in acquisition of immunity that may be associated with conditions in gold mining, including mercury exposure.

How to promote and enhance communication between a big retailer's after-sales department and its suppliers

W is the biggest electronic goods retailer in Portugal accounting with almost fifty percent of market share in its area. During the last years, many small W suppliers had to close their doors, and many others are in huge troubles. Among the reason for this situation, the huge bargaining power of W in the relationship seems crucial. The focus of the directed research will be in the after sales department where I did an internship from September 2014 to January 2015.

Períodos de Fidelização

This dissertation aims to study the loyalty clauses present in most of the long lasting service contracts. We introduce its main features and the consequences that arise from breaching of contract. We analyze the presence of loyalty periods in the Portuguese legislation. In this sense, we discuss Decree-Law 446/85, Law 24/96, Decree-Law 57/2008 and Decree-Law 56/2010. The loyalty period is the minimum period of time for which the contract should be maintained. In most cases, when this obligation is not fulfilled a penalty clause is set, intending to push the weaker party to comply with the contract or sanction it when the party fails to do so. We conclude that the contractual relationship where there is a loyalty period is usually an unbalanced relationship because it only protects the interest of one party. The penalty clause should not be admitted between parties with unequal bargaining powers. The contractual imbalance is not limited to consumer contracts.

O abuso de informação privilegiada (insider trading)

In the stock market, information takes on special relevance, due to the market’s permanent updating and the great fluidity of information existent therein. Just as in any other negotiations, the party with the better information has a bargaining advantage, as it is able to make more advantageous business decisions. However, unlike most other markets, the proper functioning of the stock market is greatly dependent on investors’ trust in the market itself. As such, if there are investors who, due to any condition they possess or office they hold, have access to relevant information which is not accessible to the general public, distrust is bred within the market and, consequently, investment is lessened. Thus, there is a need to prevent those who hold privileged information from using it in abusive ways. In Portugal, abuse of privileged information is set out and punished criminally in Article 378. of the Portuguese Securities Code (‘Código dos Valores Mobiliários’). In this dissertation, I have set out, firstly, to analyze the inherent conditions for there to be a crime of abuse of privileged information; secondly, to analyze two well-known cases, which took place and were decided in other jurisdictions, and attempt to understand how these cases would fall under Article 378. of the Portuguese Securities Code. Whereas the first case, Chiarella v. United States, was scrutinize under Article 378 of the Portuguese Securities Code, in the second, Lafonta v. AMF, the conclusion arrived at was that the crime taken place was different. This analysis allowed, on one hand, the application to a particular case of prerequisites and concepts which were explained, at a first approach, from a more theoretical perspective; on the other hand, it also allowed the further development of specific aspects of the regime, namely the difference between an insider and a tipee, as well as to more clearly set out the limits to the precise character of the information at hand.

The implications of mandatory low-cost fuel provision

This work studies fuel retail firms’ strategic behavior in a two-dimensional product differentiation framework. Following the mandatory provision of “low-cost” fuel we consider that capacity constraints force firms to eliminate of one the previously offered qualities. Firms play a two-stage game choosing fuel qualities from three possibilities (low-cost, medium quality and high quality fuel) and then prices having exogenous opposite locations. In the highest level of consumers’ heterogeneity, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists in which firms both choose minimum quality differentiation. Consumers’ are worse off if no differentiation occurs in medium and high qualities. The effect over prices from the mandatory “low-cost” fuel law is ambiguous.

Transition modes and institutional outcomes in El Salvador and Guatemala

Institutions affect key dimensions of the political process –policy, stability, and conflict. The choice of institutions is thus consequential. I argue that transition modes affect the choice of institutions in predictable and systematic ways. The more balanced power is between the two main bargaining forces –regime elite and opposition– the likelier that the resulting institutions will be pluralistic. Contrarily, the more unbalanced power is in favour of regime elites vis a vis the opposition, the likelier that institutions will be majoritarian. The argument is tested for El Salvador and Guatemala.

Capitalism, unemployment and the transition to the contemporary pattern of growth

A new model of unemployment based on an idea of Marx is presented and used to interpret the development of the British economy from the beginning of capitalism to the present. It is shown that unemployment may be created purposely by capitalists in order to weaken the bargaining position of the workers. This mechanism leads to complex temporal pattern of unemployment and can explain why wages took almost a century and a half to react to the growing capital to labour ratio that characterised early British capitalism.

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.