A Salience Theory of Choice Errors

We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality of the agent (his general propensity to consider all alternatives). The model turns out to include a logit formulation as a special case. In general, it has a rich set of implications both for exogenous parameters and for a situation in which alternatives can a¤ect their own salience (salience games). Such implications are relevant to assess the link between 'revealed' preferences and 'true' preferences: for example, less rational agents may paradoxically express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents.

Off-the-Record Target Zones: Theory with an Application to Hong Kongs Currency Board

This paper provides a modelling framework for evaluating the exchange rate dynamics of a target zone regime with undisclosed bands. We generalize the literature to allow for asymmetric one-sided regimes. Market participants' beliefs concerning an undisclosed band change as they learn more about central bank intervention policy. We apply the model to Hong Kong's one-sided currency board mechanism. In autumn 2003, the Hong Kong dollar appreciated from close to 7.80 per US dollar to 7.70, as investors feared that the currency board would be abandoned. In the wake of this appreciation, the monetary authorities finally revamped the regime as a symmetric two-sided system with a narrow exchange rate band.

Still More On Why We Should Bury The Marginal Productivity Theory Of The Price Of Capital: A Supplementary Note

The purpose of this note is to supplement the author’s earlier remarks on the unsatisfactory nature of the neoclassical account of how the return on capital is determined. (See Strathclyde Discussion Paper 12-03: “The Marginal Productivity Theory of the Price of Capital: An Historical Perspective on the Origins of the Codswallop”). The point is made via a simple illustration that certain matters which are problematical in neoclassical terms are perfectly straightforward when viewed from a classical perspective. Basically, the marginalist model of the nature of an economic system is not fit for purpose in that it fails to comprehend the essential features of a surplus-producing economic system as distinct from one merely of exchange.

Cyclical and Welfare Effects of Public Sector Unions in a Real-Business-Cycle Model

Motivated by the highly-unionized public sectors, the high public shares in total employment, and the public sector wage premia observed in Europe, this paper examines the importance of public sector unions for macroeconomic theory. The model generates cyclical behavior in hours and wages that is consistent with data behavior in an economy with highly-unionized public sector, namely Germany during the period 1970-2007. The union model is a signifi cant improvement over a model with exogenous public employment. In addition, endogenously-determined public wage and hours add to the distortionary e ffect of contractionary tax reforms by generating greater tax rate changes, thus producing signi ficantly higher welfare losses.

The Effects of Experience on Preference Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics for Public and Quasi-Public Environmental Goods

This paper develop and estimates a model of demand estimation for environmental public goods which allows for consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences. We develop a theoretical model of Bayesian updating, perform comparative statics over the model, and show how the theoretical model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model. We then estimate the model using data collected for two environmental goods. We find that the predictions of the theoretical exercise that additional experience makes consumers more certain over their preferences in both mean and variance are supported in each case.

On a size-structured two-phase population model with infinite states-at-birth

In this work we introduce and analyze a linear size-structured population model with infinite states-at-birth. We model the dynamics of a population in which individuals have two distinct life-stages: an “active” phase when individuals grow, reproduce and die and a second “resting” phase when individuals only grow. Transition between these two phases depends on individuals’ size. First we show that the problem is governed by a positive quasicontractive semigroup on the biologically relevant state space. Then we investigate, in the framework of the spectral theory of linear operators, the asymptotic behavior of solutions of the model. We prove that the associated semigroup has, under biologically plausible assumptions, the property of asynchronous exponential growth.

A Theory of Wage Setting Behavior

Concerns for fairness, workers' morale and reciprocity infuence firms' wage setting policy. In this paper we formalize a theory of wage setting behavior in a simple and tractable model that explicitly considers these behavioral aspects. A worker is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences and displays loss aversion when evaluating the fairness of a wage contract. The theory establishes a wage-effort relationship that captures the worker's reference-dependent reciprocity, which in turn in uences the firm's optimal wage policy. The paper makes two key contributions: it identifies loss aversion as an explanation for a worker's asymmetric reciprocity; and it provides realistic and generalized microfoundation for downward wage rigidity. We further illustrate the implications of our theory for both wage setting and hiring behavior. Downward wage rigidity generates several implications for the outcome of the initial employment contract. The worker's reference wage, his extent of negative reciprocity and the firms expectations are key drivers of the propositions derived.

Migration and trade: Theory with an Application to the Eastern- Western European Integration

The remarkable increase in trade flows and in migratory flows of highly educated people are two important features of globalization of the last decades. This paper extends a two-country model of inter- and intraindustry trade to a rich environment featuring technological differences, skill differences and the possibility of international labor mobility. The model is used to explain the patterns of trade and migration as countries remove barriers to trade and to labor mobility. We parameterize the model to match the features of the Western and Eastern European members of the EU and analyze first the effects of the trade liberalization which occured between 1989 and 2004, and then the gains and losses from migration which are expected to occur if legal barriers to labor mobility are substantially reduced. The lower barriers to migration would result in significant migration of skilled workers from Eastern European countries. Interestingly, this would not only benefit the migrants and most Western European workers but, via trade, it would also benefit the workers remaining in Eastern Europe. Key Words: Skilled Migration, Gains from Variety, Real Wages, Eastern-Western Europe. JEL Codes: F12, F22, J61.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Generalized descriptive set theory and classification theory

Descriptive set theory is mainly concerned with studying subsets of the space of all countable binary sequences. In this paper we study the generalization where countable is replaced by uncountable. We explore properties of generalized Baire and Cantor spaces, equivalence relations and their Borel reducibility. The study shows that the descriptive set theory looks very different in this generalized setting compared to the classical, countable case. We also draw the connection between the stability theoretic complexity of first-order theories and the descriptive set theoretic complexity of their isomorphism relations. Our results suggest that Borel reducibility on uncountable structures is a model theoretically natural way to compare the complexity of isomorphism relations.

A New open economy macroeconomic model with endogenous portfolio diversification and firms entry

This paper provides a new benchmark for the analysis of the international diversi…cation puzzle in a tractable new open economy macroeconomic model. Building on Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Heathcote and Perri (2009), this model speci…es an equilibrium model of perfect risk sharing in incomplete markets, with endogenous portfolios and number of varieties. Equity home bias may not be a puzzle but a perfectly optimal allocation for hedging risk. In contrast to previous work, the model shows that: (i) optimal international portfolio diversi…cation is driven by home bias in capital goods, independently of home bias in consumption, and by the share of income accruing to labour. The model explains reasonably well the recent patterns of portfolio allocations in developed economies; and (ii) optimal portfolio shares are independent of market dynamics.

Macroeconomics of extensive margins: a simple model

How do monopolistically competitive industries react to shocks in the context of a New Keynesian macro model? I bridge macroeconomics and trade theory by considering market dynamics. I use an analytically tractable closed-economy model with endogenous entry of firms and show the implications of markets structure for the transmission of real shocks on aggregate variables and welfare. Shock sources become crucial for the results: traditional productivity shocks cause an extensive effect on production; shocks on innovation cause an intensive impact. More patient populations bring the economy to a richer market, although it cushions the extensive effect after an innovation shock.

Using group role-playing games with gifted children and adolescents: A psychosocial intervention model

Gifted children develop asynchronously, often advanced for their age cognitively, but at or between their chronological and mental ages socially and emotionally (Robinson, 2008). In order to help gifted children and adolescents develop and practice social and emotional self-regulation skills, we investigated the use of an Adlerian play therapy approach during pen-and-paper role-playing games. Additionally, we used Goffman's (1961, 1974) social role identification and distance to encourage participants to experiment with new identities. Herein, we propose a psychosocial model of interactions during role-playing games based on Goffman's theory and Adlerian play therapy techniques, and suggest that role-playing games are an effective way of intervening with gifted children and adolescents to improve their intra- and interpersonal skills. We specifically targeted intrapersonal skills of exercising creativity, becoming self-aware, and setting individual goals by raising participants' awareness of their privately logical reasons for making decisions and their levels of social interest. We also targeted their needs and means of seeking significance in the group to promote collaboration and interaction skills with other gifted peers through role analysis, embracement, and distancing. We report results from a case study and conclude that role-playing games deserve more attention, both from researchers and clinical practitioners, because they encourage change while improving young clients' social and emotional development.

Instrumental leadership: Measurement and extension of transformational-transactional leadership theory.

Leaders must scan the internal and external environment, chart strategic and task objectives, and provide performance feedback. These instrumental leadership (IL) functions go beyond the motivational and quid-pro quo leader behaviors that comprise the full-range-transformational, transactional, and laissez faire-leadership model. In four studies we examined the construct validity of IL. We found evidence for a four-factor IL model that was highly prototypical of good leadership. IL predicted top-level leader emergence controlling for the full-range factors, initiating structure, and consideration. It also explained unique variance in outcomes beyond the full-range factors; the effects of transformational leadership were vastly overstated when IL was omitted from the model. We discuss the importance of a "fuller full-range" leadership theory for theory and practice. We also showcase our methodological contributions regarding corrections for common method variance (i.e., endogeneity) bias using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression and Monte Carlo split-sample designs.

Why do scientists migrate? A diffusion model

The article is intended to improve our understanding of the reasons underlying the intellectual migration of scientists from well-known cognitive domains to nascent scientific fields. To that purpose we present, first, a number of findings from the sociology of science that give different insights about this phenomenon. We then attempt to bring some of these insights together under the conceptual roof of an actor-based approach linking expected utility and diffusion theory. Intellectual migration is regarded as the rational choice of scientists who decide under uncertainty and on the base of a number of decision-making variables, which define probabilities, costs, and benefits of the migration.