789 resultados para Penalty clauses
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Tese de Doutoramento em Ciências Jurídicas (área de especialização em Ciências Jurídicas - Públicas)
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Tese de Doutoramento em Engenharia Industrial e de Sistemas (PDEIS)
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Dissertação de mestrado integrado em Psicologia
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This paper addresses the challenging task of computing multiple roots of a system of nonlinear equations. A repulsion algorithm that invokes the Nelder-Mead (N-M) local search method and uses a penalty-type merit function based on the error function, known as 'erf', is presented. In the N-M algorithm context, different strategies are proposed to enhance the quality of the solutions and improve the overall efficiency. The main goal of this paper is to use a two-level factorial design of experiments to analyze the statistical significance of the observed differences in selected performance criteria produced when testing different strategies in the N-M based repulsion algorithm. The main goal of this paper is to use a two-level factorial design of experiments to analyze the statistical significance of the observed differences in selected performance criteria produced when testing different strategies in the N-M based repulsion algorithm.
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Tese de Doutoramento em Ciências Jurídicas - Área de Ciências Jurídicas Públicas
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Dissertação de mestrado em Direito Judiciário
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Dissertação de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa
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"Series title: Springerbriefs in applied sciences and technology, ISSN 2191-530X"
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"Series: Solid mechanics and its applications, vol. 226"
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Dissertação de mestrado em Direitos Humanos
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Dissertação de mestrado em Ciências da Linguagem
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The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.
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Informe de investigación elaborado a partir de una estancia en el Laboratorio de Diseño Computacional en Aeroespacial en el Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Estados Unidos, entre noviembre de 2006 y agosto de 2007. La aerodinámica es una rama de la dinámica de fluidos referida al estudio de los movimientos de los líquidos o gases, cuya meta principal es predecir las fuerzas aerodinámicas en un avión o cualquier tipo de vehículo, incluyendo los automóviles. Las ecuaciones de Navier-Stokes representan un estado dinámico del equilibrio de las fuerzas que actúan en cualquier región dada del fluido. Son uno de los sistemas de ecuaciones más útiles porque describen la física de una gran cantidad de fenómenos como corrientes del océano, flujos alrededor de una superficie de sustentación, etc. En el contexto de una tesis doctoral, se está estudiando un flujo viscoso e incompresible, solucionando las ecuaciones de Navier- Stokes incompresibles de una manera eficiente. Durante la estancia en el MIT, se ha utilizado un método de Galerkin discontinuo para solucionar las ecuaciones de Navier-Stokes incompresibles usando, o bien un parámetro de penalti para asegurar la continuidad de los flujos entre elementos, o bien un método de Galerkin discontinuo compacto. Ambos métodos han dado buenos resultados y varios ejemplos numéricos se han simulado para validar el buen comportamiento de los métodos desarrollados. También se han estudiado elementos particulares, los elementos de Raviart y Thomas, que se podrían utilizar en una formulación mixta para obtener un algoritmo eficiente para solucionar problemas numéricos complejos.
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In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue, and penalties based on profits. Our analysis is the first to compare these regimes in terms of their impact on both (i) the prices charged by those cartels that do form; and (ii) the number of stable cartels that form (deterrence). We show that the class of penalties based on profits is identical to the class of fixed penalties in all welfare-relevant respects. For the other three types of penalty we show that, for those cartels that do form, penalties based on the overcharge produce lower prices than those based on profit) while penalties based on revenue produce the highest prices. Further, in conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the overcharge out-perform those based on profits, which in turn out-perform those based on revenue in terms of their impact on each of the following welfare criteria: (a) average overcharge; (b) average consumer surplus; (c) average total welfare.
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We introduce an algebraic operator framework to study discounted penalty functions in renewal risk models. For inter-arrival and claim size distributions with rational Laplace transform, the usual integral equation is transformed into a boundary value problem, which is solved by symbolic techniques. The factorization of the differential operator can be lifted to the level of boundary value problems, amounting to iteratively solving first-order problems. This leads to an explicit expression for the Gerber-Shiu function in terms of the penalty function.