A decentralized model of information pricing in networks

We propose a recursive method of pricing an information good in a network of holders and demanders of this good. The prices are determined via a unique equilibrium outcome in a sequence of bilateral bargaining games that are played by connected agents. If the information is an homogenous, non-depreciating good without network effects we derive explicit formulae which elucidate the role of the link pattern among the players. Particularly, we find out that the equilibrium price is intimately related to the existence of cycles in the network: It is zero if a cycle covers the trading pair and it is proportional to the direct and indirect utility that the good generates otherwise.

Bilateral Bargaining in Networks

Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150). All pairs, that reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network).

Theoretical and spatial limits to the value of rural environmental benefits: Evidence from the forestry sector

The valuation of environmental benefits has been well researched in the forestry sector. This is not generally the case in the agriculture sector although schemes to compensate farmers for provision of officially defined environmental benefits are already in place throughout the European Union. This paper draws on empirical findings from forestry and deductions from economic theory to challenge the notion of the universality of such benefits. Empirical findings from forestry suggest recreational use value is location specific rather than widely spread. Household utility theory predicts zero willingness to pay to maintain the status quo level of a previously unpaid for environmental benefit (when provision is not perceived as under risk) but a positive willingness to pay for an increase. Thus, non use values cannot be attributed to the major part of existing commercial forestry area but to spatially restricted schemes such as additional afforestation or preservation of ancient natural woodlands.

Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first property, Pareto Nash implementation (PNI), requires that the efficient outcome always be implemented in a Nash equilibrium and that the efficient outcome Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium. The average cost mechanism and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under strong Nash implementation. The second property, weakly Pareto Nash implementation (WPNI), requires that the least inefficient equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium. The egalitarian mechanism (EG) and other asymmetric variations are the only mechanisms that meet WPNI and individual
rationality. EG minimizes the price of stability across all individually rational mechanisms. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Poverty Trap and Educational Shock: Evidence from Missionary Fields

Low growth equilibria with low investment in human capital generally tend to
persist till an external shock affects the economy. In this paper we use data on
Christian missions to proxy a long-lasting educational shock in Africa. We estimate
the effect of this shock on the quality of children which we proxy using the rate of
underweight children. Consistent with the economic theory we find that the quality
of children significantly rises with the exposure to this shock and this indirect effect
accounts to almost 4 percent in terms of GDP for districts with the maximal exposure

Sequence Effects in the Valuation of Multiple Environmental Programs Using the Contingent Valuation Method

In contingent valuation, the willingness to pay for hypothetical programs may be affected by the order in which programs are presented to respondents. With inclusive lists, economic theory suggests that sequence effects should be expected. However, when policy makers allocate public budgets to several environmental programs, they may be interested in assessing the value of the programs without the valuations being affected by the order in which the programs are presented. Using single-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valuation questions, we show that if respondents have the possibility to revise their willingness-to-pay answers, sequence effects are mitigated. (JEL Q51, Q54)

The incentives of a resource owner: Evidence from a private oyster fishery

European flat oyster Ostrea edulis fisheries were once abundant around the UK coastline. The sole remaining productive O. edulis fishery in Scotland is in Loch Ryan. This fishery has been privately owned and managed by a single family since 1701. Economic theory predicts that ownership, whether public or private, is a necessary condition for rational fishery management. In this paper, a series of four leases and a licence are examined, covering an 85-year period over the 20th and 21st century, to examine whether the management of the Loch Ryan fishery conforms to the expected norms of rational management. The leases show that, over this period, the owners appear more willing to expend resources on regulating tenant behaviour, supporting the conclusion that successive generations of owners developed an evolving sense of what "rational management" might require. The results of this study could inform the management of other fisheries - both public and private - by emphasising the importance of learning from experience.

Business Intelligence and Multi-market Competition

We consider a multi-market framework where a set of firms compete on two oligopolistic markets. The cost of production of each firm allows for spillovers across markets, ensuring that output decisions for both markets have to be made jointly. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can establish links gathering business intelligence about other firms. A link formed by a firm generates two types of externalities for competitors and consumers. We characterize the business intelligence equilibrium networks and networks that maximize social welfare. By contrast with single market competition, we show that in multi-market competition there exist situations where intelligence gathering activities are underdeveloped with regard to social welfare and should be tolerated, if not encouraged, by public authorities.

Agentes comerciais: modelos de avaliação de risco e rentabilidade

Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Electrotécnica na Área de Especialização de Energia