Bilateral Bargaining in Networks
Data(s) |
01/05/2007
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Resumo |
Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150). All pairs, that reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network). |
Identificador |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006 http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34247102660&partnerID=8YFLogxK |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Direitos |
info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
Fonte |
Polanski , A 2007 , ' Bilateral Bargaining in Networks ' Journal of Economic Theory , vol 134(1) , no. 1 , pp. 557-565 . DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.006 |
Palavras-Chave | #/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2002 #Economics and Econometrics |
Tipo |
article |