Abstract Subdifferential Calculus and Semi-Convex Functions

∗ The work is partially supported by NSFR Grant No MM 409/94.

On Typical Compact Convex Sets in Hilbert Spaces

Let E be an infinite dimensional separable space and for e ∈ E and X a nonempty compact convex subset of E, let qX(e) be the metric antiprojection of e on X. Let n ≥ 2 be an arbitrary integer. It is shown that for a typical (in the sence of the Baire category) compact convex set X ⊂ E the metric antiprojection qX(e) has cardinality at least n for every e in a dense subset of E.

Stability of Supporting and Exposing Elements of Convex Sets in Banach Spaces

* This work was supported by the CNR while the author was visiting the University of Milan.

On Uniformly Convex and Uniformly Kadec-Klee Renomings

We give a new construction of uniformly convex norms with a power type modulus on super-reflexive spaces based on the notion of dentability index. Furthermore, we prove that if the Szlenk index of a Banach space is less than or equal to ω (first infinite ordinal) then there is an equivalent weak* lower semicontinuous positively homogeneous functional on X* satisfying the uniform Kadec-Klee Property for the weak*-topology (UKK*). Then we solve the UKK or UKK* renorming problems for Lp(X) spaces and C(K) spaces for K scattered compact space.

Applications of the Owa-Srivastava Operator to the Class of K-Uniformly Convex Functions

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 30C45, 26A33; Secondary 33C15

Some Growth and Distortion Theorems for Close-to-Convex Harmonic Functions in the Unit Disc

MSC 2010: 30C45, 30C55

Characterizations of the Solution Sets of Generalized Convex Minimization Problems

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 90C26, 90C20, 49J52, 47H05, 47J20.

A PVT-Type Algorithm for Minimizing a Nonsmooth Convex Function

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 90C25, 68W10, 49M37.

On the Algebraic Properties of Convex Bodies

AMS subject classification: 52A01, 13C99.

Piecewise Convex Curves and their Integral Representation

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 52A10.

Does Atkinson-Wilcox Expansion Converges for any Convex Domain?

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 35C10, 35C20, 35P25, 47A40, 58D30, 81U40.

Courbure et Polygone de Newton

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: 26E35, 14H05, 14H20.

Why (and When) are Preferences Convex? Threshold Effects and Uncertain Quality

It is often assumed (for analytical convenience, but also in accordance with common intuition) that consumer preferences are convex. In this paper, we consider circumstances under which such preferences are (or are not) optimal. In particular, we investigate a setting in which goods possess some hidden quality with known distribution, and the consumer chooses a bundle of goods that maximizes the probability that he receives some threshold level of this quality. We show that if the threshold is small relative to consumption levels, preferences will tend to be convex; whereas the opposite holds if the threshold is large. Our theory helps explain a broad spectrum of economic behavior (including, in particular, certain common commercial advertising strategies), suggesting that sensitivity to information about thresholds is deeply rooted in human psychology.

Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider ve generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be uni¯ed under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of Π-balanced, totally Π-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another.

A cardinally convex game with empty core

In this note we present a cardinally convex game (Sharkey, 1981) with empty core. Sharkey assumes that V (N) is convex, we do not do so, hence we do not contradict Sharkey's result.