Proof of causation in informed consent cases : establishing what the plaintiff would have done

A degree of judicial caution in accepting the assertion of a plaintiff as to what he or she would have done, if fully informed of risks, is clearly evident upon a review of decisions applying the common law. Civil liability legislation in some jurisdictions now precludes assertion evidence by a plaintiff. Although this legislative change was seen as creating a significant challenge for plaintiffs seeking to discharge the onus of proof of establishing causation in such cases, recent decisions suggest a more limited practical effect. While a plaintiff’s ex post facto assertions as to what he or she would have done if fully informed of risks may now be inadmissible, objective and subjective evidence as to the surrounding facts and circumstances, in particular the plaintiff’s prior attitudes and conduct, and the assertion evidence of others remains admissible. Given the court’s reliance on both objective and subjective evidence, statistical evidence may be of increasing importance.

Mental harm, rescuers and the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)

At common law, a duty of care may be owed to a claimant who suffers nervous shock or pure mental harm due to witnessing, or hearing about, physical injury caused to another due to a defendant’s negligence. “Pure mental harm” is the ‘impairment of a person’s mental condition’ that is not suffered as a consequence of any other kind of personal injury to them. However, as many accidents have the potential to create a wide circle of mental suffering to bystanders, family members or others not physically injured themselves, it has traditionally been ‘thought impolitic that everybody so affected should be able to recover damages from the tortfeasor.’ ‘To allow such extended recovery would stretch liability too far.’ Nevertheless, whilst adopting a restrictive approach to liability, the common law courts have recognised that a defendant might owe a duty in relation to the pure mental harm suffered by one who foreseeably attends an accident scene to rescue another from a situation created by the defendant’s negligence.

The legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment : Part 1 (New South Wales)

This is the first article in a series of three that examines the legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity. This article considers the position in New South Wales. A review of the law in this State reveals that medical professionals play significant legal roles in these decisions. However, the law is problematic in a number of respects and this is likely to impede medical professionals’ legal knowledge in this area. The article examines the level of training medical professionals receive on issues such as advance directives and substitute decision-making, and the available empirical evidence as to the state of medical professionals’ knowledge of the law at the end of life. It concludes that there are gaps in legal knowledge and that law reform is needed in New South Wales.

The legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment : Part 2 (Queensland)

This is the second article in a series of three that examines the legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity. This article considers the position in Queensland, including the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. A review of the law in this State reveals that medical professionals play significant legal roles in these decisions. However, the law is problematic in a number of respects and this is likely to impede medical professionals’ legal knowledge in this area. The article examines the level of training medical professionals receive on issues such as advance health directives and substitute decision-making, and the available empirical evidence as to the state of medical professionals’ knowledge of the law at the end of life. It concludes that there are gaps in legal knowledge and that law reform is needed in Queensland.

The legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment : part 3 (Victoria)

This is the final article in a series of three that examines the legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity. This article considers the position in Victoria. A review of the law in this State reveals that medical professionals play significant legal roles in these decisions. However, the law is problematic in a number of respects and this is likely to impede medical professionals’ legal knowledge in this area. The article examines the level of training that medical professionals receive on issues such as refusal of treatment certificates and substitute decision-making, and the available empirical evidence as to the state of medical professionals’ knowledge of the law at the end of life. It concludes that there are gaps in legal knowledge and that law reform is needed in Victoria. The article also draws together themes from the series as a whole, including conclusions about the need for more and better medical education and about law reform generally.

Queensland College of Teachers annual lecture 2010 : child protection

Teachers have a crucial role as “sentinels” for children who have been abused or neglected. This professional development session will provide a framework for understanding the types, incidence and causes of child abuse and neglect, and teachers’ role in reporting suspected cases. The session will provide participants with knowledge and skills to enable them to identify warning signs and indicators of child abuse and neglect, know the basis of their duties to report suspected cases of abuse and neglect, and respond to the needs of abused and neglected children at school. The presentation will focus on: • the reasons why child abuse and neglect can occur; • the different types of child abuse and neglect and their effects on children; • the warning signs and indicators of physical abuse, emotional abuse, sexual abuse and neglect; • applying knowledge of indicators to make judgements about risk of harm; • responding to indications of risk of harm, including complying with legislative and policy-based duties to report suspected child abuse and neglect.

Ending the life of the act/omission dispute: Causation in withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining measures

My aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end of life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. My argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. I then provide a clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This enables me, in conclusion, to clarify important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.

Defending the sanctity of life principle : a reply to John Keown

This article is a response to Professor Keown’s criticism of my paper “Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia” (2005) 13 (3) Medical Law Review 357. The article takes up and responds to a number of criticisms raised by Keown in an attempt to further the debate concerning the moral and legal status of withdrawing life-sustaining measures, its distinction from euthanasia, and the implications of the lawfulness of withdrawal for the principle of the sanctity of life.

Is Dawkins a modern-day Nicodemus?

This article applies a Wittgensteinian approach to the examination of the intelligibility of religious belief, in the wake of the recent attack on the Judeo-Christian religion by Richard Dawkins's book The God Delusion. The article attempts to show that Dawkins has confused religion with superstition, and that while Dawkins's arguments are decisive in the case of superstition, they do not successfully show religion to be a delusion. Religious belief in God is not like belief in the existence of a planet, and genuine religious faith is not like the belief in something for which there is not yet enough evidence, like belief in dark matter. The Christian doctrines of the resurrection and eternal life are misconstrued if they are understood as factual claims because they are then merely shallow superstitions, and not the great religious riddles they are meant to be.

Firearm suicide in Queensland

The purpose of this article is to examine firearm suicide in Queensland. In 2006, statistical data were gathered from all closed paper coronial files for the 12-month period of December 2003—December 2004. Of the 567 people who committed suicide in Queensland during this period, 48 (8.5%) used firearms. The following results emerge from this data: first, gun suicides are continuing to decrease in Queensland, most likely as a function of ongoing gun controls, a decrease accompanied by a lesser increase in other methods of suicide, thereby providing little support for substitution theory; second, men continue to be more likely to shoot themselves, particularly elderly men; third, firearms are more likely to be used in rural settings, and by those with no known history of mental illness or previous suicide attempts. Finally, in spite of otherwise very high suicide rates, Aborigines rarely employ firearms, using instead the culturally significant method of hanging.

The role of coronial autopsies in a context of decreasing hospital autopsies: An investigation of the issues

This article scrutinises the argument that decreasing hospital autopsy rates are outside the control of medical personnel, based as they are on families’ unwillingness to consent to autopsy procedures, and that, as a consequence, the coronial autopsy is the appropriate alternative to the important medical and educational role of the autopsy. It makes three points which are well supported by the research. First, that while hospital autopsy rates are decreasing, they have been doing so for more than 60 years, and issues beyond the simple notion of consent, like funding formulae in hospitals, increased technology and fear of litigation by doctors are all playing their part in this decline. Secondly, the issue of consent has as much to do with families not being approached as with families declining to give consent. This is well supported by recent changes in hospital policy and procedures which include senior medical personnel and detailed consent forms, both of which have been linked to rising consent rates in recent years. Finally, the perception that coronial autopsies are beyond familial consent has been challenged recently by legislative changes in both Australia and the United States of America which allow objections based on religion and culture to be heard by coroners. For these reasons, it is argued that medical personnel need to focus on increasing hospital autopsy rates, while also addressing the complex ethical issues associated with conducting medical research within the context of the coronial autopsy.