Examining corporate governance disclosures of listed companies in Fiji

In 2009, the Capital Markets Development Authority (CMDA) - Fiji’s capital market regulator - introduced the Code of Corporate Governance (the Code). The Code is ‘principle-based’ and requires companies listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) and the financial intermediaries to disclose their compliance with the Code’s principles. While compliance with the Code is mandatory, the nature and extent of disclosure is at the discretion of the complying entities. Agency theory and signalling theory suggest that firms with higher expected levels of agency costs will provide greater levels of voluntary disclosures as signals of strong corporate governance. Thus, the study seeks to test these theories by examining the heterogeneity of corporate governance disclosures by firms listed on SPSE, and determining the characteristics of firms that provide similar levels of disclosures. We conducted a content analysis of corporate governance disclosures on the annual reports of firms from 2008-2012. The study finds that large, non-family owned firms with high levels of shareholder dispersion provide greater quantity and higher quality corporate governance disclosures. For firms that are relatively smaller, family owned and have low levels of shareholder dispersion, the quantity and quality of corporate governance disclosures are much lower. Some of these firms provide boilerplate disclosures with minimal changes in the following years. These findings support the propositions of agency and signalling theory, which suggest that firms with higher separation between agents and principals will provide more voluntary disclosures to reduce expected agency costs transfers. Semi-structured interviews conducted with key stakeholders further reinforce the findings. The interviews also reveal that complying entities positively perceive the introduction of the Code. Furthermore, while compliance with Code brought about additional costs, they believed that most of these costs were minimal and one-off, and the benefits of greater corporate disclosure to improve user decision making outweighed the costs. The study contributes to the literature as it provides insight into the experience of a small capital market with introducing a ‘principle-based’ Code that attempts to encourage corporate governance practices through enhanced disclosure. The study also assists policy makers better understand complying entities’ motivations for compliance and the extent of compliance.

Corporate Environmental and Economic Performance of Japanese Manufacturing Firms: Empirical Study for Sustainable Development

This study examines the relationship between environmental performance and economic performance in Japanese manufacturing firms. The environmental performance indicators include CO2 emissions and the aggregate toxic risk associated with chemical emissions relative to sales. Return on assets (ROA) is used as an indicator of economic performance. We demonstrate that there is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between ROA and environmental performance calculated by aggregated toxic risk. We also find that the environmental performance increases ROA through both returns on sales and improved capital turnover. However, we observe a significant positive relationship between financial performance and environmental performance based on CO2 emissions. These findings may provide evidence for the consequences of firms' environmental behavior and sustainable development. © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Managing growth and entry strategies across borders

Should the firm move successfully into a growth or expansion phase the owner manager will be required to increase the scale and scope of its operations. Part of this expansion will involve hiring additional employees, and increasing the overall complexity of the firm's activities. It is likely that the need for greater levels of professional management will be required to operate the firm, along with the need for enhanced planning and the introduction of systems to support the new levels of complexity. The transition from a small, owner-managed firm to a large systems-managed business will require the development of a team-based management approach with greater specialisation within the management team. Corporate governance is also likely to change as the growth cycle takes place. As it grows, the business will become more formalised in its accounting, management and other systems. The need for greater quantities of capital is likely to lead the business towards equity finance. As new equity partner are taken into the company the original owner managers may find their level of control diminished. The larger the firm becomes the more likely its management structure will become decentralised with greater separation between the owner and the firm in terms of operational and financial matters.

Institutional investors, risk/return and corporate governance : practical lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

The global grown in institutional investors means that firms can no longer ignore their influence in capital markets. However, not all institutional investors have the same motives to influence the firms they invest in. Institution investors' ability to influence management depends on the size of their investment and whether they have any business relations with the firm. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical results show that the proportion of a company's shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with firm governance ratings, risk and profitability. This study shows that a positive association between risk and return is associated with large active institutional ownership, which we interpret as shareholders with sufficient power to pressure management to increase short-term profits.

Deriatives disclosure in corporate annual reports: bank analysts; perceptions of usefulness

Responding to mixed evidence on the decision-usefulness of annual report disclosures for derivative financial instruments to capital market participants, and concerns identified by practice, this paper examines usefulness in a direct study of user perceptions. Interviews with analysts from Australia’s four major banks reveal essential usefulness, limited by the disclosures’ failure to reflect companies’ actual use of derivatives throughout the period, and inability of users to understand companies’ off-balance sheet risk and risk management practices from information considered generic and boilerplate. The research complements and extends existing archival and survey research and provides new evidence suggesting low-cost ways for increasing usefulness. It supports the International Accounting Standards Board’s disclosure recommendations in its recent Discussion Paper: A Review of the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, but, at the same time, highlights that for these proposed measures to be successful in relation to IFRS 7, they may need to address other issues. The research increases knowledge of the informational requirements of lenders, an important class of financial information user, and supports calls from practice for companies to improve their disclosure of material economic risks.

Corporate disclosure in relation to combating corporate bribery: A case study of two Chinese telecommunications companies

This paper investigates the association between global community concerns about bribery activities and anti-bribery disclosure practices by two Chinese telecommunication companies operating internationally, namely China Mobile and ZTE. Based on content analysis of annual reports and global news media articles over a period of 16 years from 1995-2010, the findings suggest that the changes in the level of disclosures by the two major Chinese telecommunications companies were closely associated with the level of international concerns over bribery practices within the Chinese telecommunications industry. This finding indicates that the companies adopt anti-bribery disclosure practices in order to minimise the gap of trust (Social capital) between companies themselves and global stakeholders. In this paper we argue that, for domestic companies in China, culturally constructed social capital, such as guanxi, creates a level of trust between managers and their stakeholders, which obviates the need for managers to disclose anti-bribery performance information. However, for companies operating internationally, as social capital is inadequate to bridge the gap of trust between managers and global stakeholders, managers use disclosures of anti-bribery performance information as a way to minimise such a gap.

Essays on corporate governance, stakeholders, and restructuring

This dissertation consists of an introductory section and three theoretical essays analyzing the interaction of corporate governance and restructuring. The essays adopt an incomplete contracts approach and analyze the role of different institutional designs to facilitate the alignment of the objectives of shareholders and management (or employees) over the magnitude of corporate restructuring. The first essay analyzes how a firm's choice of production technology affects the employees' human capital investment. In the essay, the owners of the firm can choose between a specific and a general technology that both require a costly human capital investment by the employees. The specific technology is initially superior in using the human capital of employees but, in contrast to the general technology, it is not compatible with future innovations. As a result, anticipated changes in the specific technology diminish the ex ante incentives of the employees to invest in human capital unless the shareholders grant the employees specific governance mechanisms (a right of veto, severance pay) so as to protect their investments. The results of the first essay indicate that the level of protection that the shareholders are willing to offer falls short of the socially desirable one. Furthermore, when restructuring opportunities become more abundant, it becomes more attractive both socially and from the viewpoint of the shareholders to initially adopt the general technology. The second essay analyzes how the allocation of authority within the firm interacts with the owners' choice of business strategy when the ability of the owners to monitor the project proposals of the management is biased in favor of the status quo strategy. The essay shows that a bias in the monitoring ability will affect not only the allocation of authority within the firm but also the choice of business strategy. Especially, when delegation has positive managerial incentive effects, delegation turns out to be more attractive under the new business strategy because the improved managerial incentives are a way for the owners to compensate their own reduced information gathering ability. This effect, however, simultaneously makes the owners hesitant to switch the strategy since it would involve a more frequent loss of control over the project choice. Consequently, the owners' lack of knowledge of the new business strategy may lead to a suboptimal choice of strategy. The third essay analyzes the implications of CEO succession process for the ideal board structure. In this essay, the presence of the departing CEO on the board facilitates the ability of the board to find a matching successor and to counsel him. However, the ex-CEO's presence may simultaneously also weaken the ability of the board to restructure since the predecessor may use the opportunity to distort the successor's project choice. The results of the essay suggest that the extent of restructuring gains, the firm's ability to hire good outside directors and the importance of board's advisory role affect at which point and for how long the shareholders may want to nominate the predecessor to the board.

Corporate Governance in China (summary section only)

The negative relationship between economic growth and stock market return is not an anomaly according to evidence documented in many economies. It is argued that future economic growth is largely irrelevant for predicting future equity returns, since long-run equity returns depend mainly on dividend yields and the growth of per share dividends. The economic growth does result in a higher standard of living for consumers, but does not necessarily translate into higher returns for owners of the capital. The divergence in performance between the real sector and stock markets appears to support the above argument. However, this thesis strives to offer an alternative explanation to the apparent divergence within the framework of corporate governance. It argues that weak corporate governance standards in Chinese listed firms exacerbated by poor inventor protection results into a marginalized capital market. Each of the three essays in the thesis addresses one particular aspect of corporate governance on the Chinese stock market in a sequential way through gathering empirical evidence on three distinctive stock market activities. The first essay questions whether significant agency conflicts do exist by building a game on rights issues. It documents significant divergence in interests among shareholders holding different classes of shares. The second essay investigates the level of agency costs by examining value of control through constructing a sample of block transactions. It finds that block transactions that transfer ultimate control entail higher premiums. The third essay looks into possible avenues through which corporate governance standards could be improved by investigating the economic consequences of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. It finds that, by adopting a higher disclosure standard through cross-listings, firms voluntarily commit themselves to reducing information asymmetry, and consequently command higher valuation than their counterparts.

Essays on Corporate Governance and the Quality of Disclosed Earnings: Across Transitional Europe

A growing body of empirical research examines the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance systems around the world. An important insight from this literature is that corporate governance mechanisms address the excessive use of managerial discretionary powers to get private benefits by expropriating the value of shareholders. One possible way of expropriation is to reduce the quality of disclosed earnings by manipulating the financial statements. This lower quality of earnings should then be reflected by the stock price of firm according to value relevance theorem. Hence, instead of testing the direct effect of corporate governance on the firm’s market value, it is important to understand the causes of the lower quality of accounting earnings. This thesis contributes to the literature by increasing knowledge about the extent of the earnings management – measured as the extent of discretionary accruals in total disclosed earnings - and its determinants across the Transitional European countries. The thesis comprises of three essays of empirical analysis of which first two utilize the data of Russian listed firms whereas the third essay uses data from 10 European economies. More specifically, the first essay adds to existing research connecting earnings management to corporate governance. It testifies the impact of the Russian corporate governance reforms of 2002 on the quality of disclosed earnings in all publicly listed firms. This essay provides empirical evidence of the fact that the desired impact of reforms is not fully substantiated in Russia without proper enforcement. Instead, firm-level factors such as long-term capital investments and compliance with International financial reporting standards (IFRS) determine the quality of the earnings. The result presented in the essay support the notion proposed by Leuz et al. (2003) that the reforms aimed to bring transparency do not correspond to desired results in economies where investor protection is lower and legal enforcement is weak. The second essay focuses on the relationship between the internal-control mechanism such as the types and levels of ownership and the quality of disclosed earnings in Russia. The empirical analysis shows that the controlling shareholders in Russia use their powers to manipulate the reported performance in order to get private benefits of control. Comparatively, firms owned by the State have significantly better quality of disclosed earnings than other controllers such as oligarchs and foreign corporations. Interestingly, market performance of firms controlled by either State or oligarchs is better than widely held firms. The third essay provides useful evidence on the fact that both ownership structures and economic characteristics are important factors in determining the quality of disclosed earnings in three groups of countries in Europe. Evidence suggests that ownership structure is a more important determinant in developed and transparent countries, while economic determinants are important determinants in developing and transitional countries.

Knowledge Transfer within Western Multinationals' Subsidiary Units in China and Finland - The Impact of Headquarter Control Mechanisms, Subsidiary Location and Social Capital (summary section only)

It is suggested that the ability and practices of how the multinational corporation (MNC) manages knowledge transfer among its geographically dispersed subsidiary units are crucial for the building and development of firm competitive advantage. However, cross-border transfer of valuable organizational knowledge is likely to be problematic and laborious, especially within diversified and differentiated MNCs. Using data collected from 164 western multinational companies’ subsidiary units located in China and Finland, this study aims to investigate cross-border knowledge transfer within the MNC. It explores a number of factors that influence the transfer of knowledge among units in the differentiated MNC. The study consists of five individual papers. Paper 1 investigates a range of organizational mechanisms that may positively influence a subsidiary’s propensity to undertake knowledge transfers to other parts of the corporation. Paper 2 explores the impact of subsidiary location on the motivational dispositions of knowledge receiving units to value and accept knowledge from subsidiaries located in economically less advanced countries. Paper 3 examines the influence of social capital variables on knowledge transfer in dyadic relationships between foreign-owned subsidiaries and their sister and patent units. Paper 4 provides some initial insights into potentially different effects of trust and shared vision in intra-organizational vs. inter-organizational relationships. Using a case study setting, Paper 5 explores means and mechanisms used in transferring human resource management practices to Western MNCs’ business units in China from a cultural perspective. The results of the study show that MNC management through choices regarding organizational controls can encourage and enhance corporate-internal knowledge transfer. It also finds evidence that more knowledge is transferred from subsidiaries located in an industrialized country (e.g., Finland) than subsidiaries located in a developing country (e.g., China). While the study has highlighted the importance of social capital in promoting knowledge transfer, it has also uncovered some new findings that the effect of trust and shared vision may be contingent upon different contexts. Finally, in Paper 5, a number of mechanisms used in transferring selected HRM practices and competences to the Chinese business units have been identified. The findings suggest that cultural differences should be taken into consideration in the choice and use of different transfer mechanisms.

Um estudo sobre a relação entre ações preferenciais e valor de mercado das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto

O mercado de capitais brasileiro se caracteriza pela alta concentração de poder nas mãos de poucos acionistas controladores. No Brasil, a existência de ações preferenciais sem direito a voto enseja o surgimento de conflito de agência entre acionistas controladores e acionistas minoritários, agravado pelo fato de que o controle pode ser exercido com uma participação relativamente pequena sobre o total de ações emitidas pelas companhias. A concentração de propriedade permitiria a possibilidade de expropriação dos direitos dos minoritários. Diversos estudos empíricos vêm sendo realizados ao longo dos últimos anos com o objetivo de avaliar a influência da estrutura de propriedade das ações sobre o valor de mercado das companhias. Nesse contexto, o presente trabalho pretende trazer novas contribuições, com ênfase na participação de ações preferenciais na estrutura de propriedade. Neste trabalho, usando uma amostra de empresas de capital aberto negociadas na BM&FBOVESPA, a partir de teste de diferença de médias, rejeita-se a hipótese de igualdade de valor entre empresas que só possuem ações ON em sua estrutura de propriedade, em relação às que possuem ambos os tipos, ON e PN. Em continuidade, usando modelos de regressão linear, encontra-se relação negativa estatisticamente significativa entre valor de mercado das empresas e variável utilizada para caracterizar a estrutura de propriedade, especificamente, a diferença entre o percentual de participação dos acionistas não controladores no total de ações PN e o percentual de participação dos acionistas controladores no total de ações PN.

Evolving corporate entrepreneurship strategy: Technology incubation at Philips

Established firms tend to pursue incremental innovation by modifying and refining their existing products and processes rather than developing radical innovations. In the face of resistance to change and incumbent inertia, which prevent the generation of novelty, established firms have turned towards corporate entrepreneurship as a means of exploiting knowledge accumulated within its own boundaries and exploring external markets. This paper focuses on one mode of corporate entrepreneurship, corporate incubation, informed by a study of a Technology Incubator at Philips. An account of the history of the incubator traces its progress from its inception in 2002-2006 when further incubators were formed, building on this experience and focusing on lifestyle and healthcare technologies. We identify ways in which the Philips incubator represents an alternative selection environment that effectively simulated the venture capitalist model of entrepreneurial innovation. © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

The Vietnamese Corporate Bond Market An Early Exploration into the 1992-1999 Period

This paper summarizes the situation of corporate bonds in Vietnam for the period 1992-1999. Corporate bonds are new in the transitional economy, but the capital shortage and operational inefficiency of the banking sector and financial system would likely drive the bond market up in the future. The paper also discusses some conditions for the Vietnamese bond market to further develop, based on the facts and observation.

Corporate Bond Market in the Transition Economy of Vietnam, 1990-2010

Corporate bond appeared early in 1992-1994 in Vietnamese capital markets. However, it is still not popular to both business sector and academic circle. This paper explores different dimensions of Vietnamese corporate bond market using a unique, and perhaps, most complete dataset. State not only intervenes in the bond markets with its powerful budget and policies but also competes directly with enterprises. The dominance of SOEs and large corporations also prevents SMEs from this debt financing vehicle. Whenever a convertible term is available, bondholders are more willing to accept lower fixed income payoff. But they would not likely stick to it. On one hand, prospective bondholders could value the holdings of equity when realized favorably ex ante. On the other hand, the applicable coupon rate for such bond could turn out negative inflationadjusted payoff when tight monetary policy is exercised and the corresponding equity holding turns out valueless, ex post. Given the weak primary market and virtually nonexistent secondary market, the corporate bond market in Vietnam reflects our perception of the relationship-based and rent-seeking behavior in the financial markets. For the corporate bonds to really work, they critically need a higher level of liquidity to become truly tradable financial assets.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.