Violences en famille : quelles réponses institutionnelles ?

Si la famille est en général synonyme d'intimité et de relations de confiance, elle peut également être un lieu d'abus, de contrôle ou de violences. Les diverses formes de violences qui se déroulent dans la sphère privée ont été dénoncées dès les années 1970 par les mouvements féministes. Elles ont alors fait l'objet d'une variété de politiques et d'actions publiques ayant pour vocation de défendre et d'accompagner les victimes, de punir et soigner les agresseurs ou de rétablir des liens familiaux distendus. En s'attachant à la façon dont ces violences ont été définies dans des contextes différents, en Europe, en Amérique du Nord et en Amérique latine, cet article a pour ambition de donner à voir les perspectives variées que recouvrent des catégories d'action publique aussi diverses que violences conjugales, violences domestiques, violences intrafamiliales ou encore féminicides ou fémicides, et les conséquences que ces différentes visions du problème ont sur sa prise en charge. Largement influencé par les études genre et la sociologie des problèmes publics, cet article, notamment à travers la présentation des contributions qui composent ce numéro de la revue Enfances Familles Générations, entend questionner les notions de violences de genre dans le cadre familial, dont les frontières sont fluctuantes et investies de façon variée, ainsi que les formes d'institutionnalisation du problème et les solutions qui sont envisagées.

RECUEIL DES ŒUVRES POÉTIQUES de Jehan Molinet. Ms. in-fol. sur papier de 201 f., demi-rel. v. f, tr. r. (Rel. du XVIIIe siècle.)

Complainte (La) de Grece

Supplément grec 1295

PORSON (Richard). papiers

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

Exact Tests for Contemporaneous Correlation of Disturbances in Seemingly Unrelated Regressions.

This paper proposes finite-sample procedures for testing the SURE specification in multi-equation regression models, i.e. whether the disturbances in different equations are contemporaneously uncorrelated or not. We apply the technique of Monte Carlo (MC) tests [Dwass (1957), Barnard (1963)] to obtain exact tests based on standard LR and LM zero correlation tests. We also suggest a MC quasi-LR (QLR) test based on feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). We show that the latter statistics are pivotal under the null, which provides the justification for applying MC tests. Furthermore, we extend the exact independence test proposed by Harvey and Phillips (1982) to the multi-equation framework. Specifically, we introduce several induced tests based on a set of simultaneous Harvey/Phillips-type tests and suggest a simulation-based solution to the associated combination problem. The properties of the proposed tests are studied in a Monte Carlo experiment which shows that standard asymptotic tests exhibit important size distortions, while MC tests achieve complete size control and display good power. Moreover, MC-QLR tests performed best in terms of power, a result of interest from the point of view of simulation-based tests. The power of the MC induced tests improves appreciably in comparison to standard Bonferroni tests and, in certain cases, outperforms the likelihood-based MC tests. The tests are applied to data used by Fischer (1993) to analyze the macroeconomic determinants of growth.

Simulation-Based Finite-Sample Tests for Heteroskedasticity and ARCH Effects.

A wide range of tests for heteroskedasticity have been proposed in the econometric and statistics literature. Although a few exact homoskedasticity tests are available, the commonly employed procedures are quite generally based on asymptotic approximations which may not provide good size control in finite samples. There has been a number of recent studies that seek to improve the reliability of common heteroskedasticity tests using Edgeworth, Bartlett, jackknife and bootstrap methods. Yet the latter remain approximate. In this paper, we describe a solution to the problem of controlling the size of homoskedasticity tests in linear regression contexts. We study procedures based on the standard test statistics [e.g., the Goldfeld-Quandt, Glejser, Bartlett, Cochran, Hartley, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey, White and Szroeter criteria] as well as tests for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH-type models). We also suggest several extensions of the existing procedures (sup-type of combined test statistics) to allow for unknown breakpoints in the error variance. We exploit the technique of Monte Carlo tests to obtain provably exact p-values, for both the standard and the new tests suggested. We show that the MC test procedure conveniently solves the intractable null distribution problem, in particular those raised by the sup-type and combined test statistics as well as (when relevant) unidentified nuisance parameter problems under the null hypothesis. The method proposed works in exactly the same way with both Gaussian and non-Gaussian disturbance distributions [such as heavy-tailed or stable distributions]. The performance of the procedures is examined by simulation. The Monte Carlo experiments conducted focus on : (1) ARCH, GARCH, and ARCH-in-mean alternatives; (2) the case where the variance increases monotonically with : (i) one exogenous variable, and (ii) the mean of the dependent variable; (3) grouped heteroskedasticity; (4) breaks in variance at unknown points. We find that the proposed tests achieve perfect size control and have good power.

Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.

Logique et tests d'hypotheses: reflexions sur les problemes mal poses en econometrie

Dans ce texte, nous analysons les développements récents de l’économétrie à la lumière de la théorie des tests statistiques. Nous revoyons d’abord quelques principes fondamentaux de philosophie des sciences et de théorie statistique, en mettant l’accent sur la parcimonie et la falsifiabilité comme critères d’évaluation des modèles, sur le rôle de la théorie des tests comme formalisation du principe de falsification de modèles probabilistes, ainsi que sur la justification logique des notions de base de la théorie des tests (tel le niveau d’un test). Nous montrons ensuite que certaines des méthodes statistiques et économétriques les plus utilisées sont fondamentalement inappropriées pour les problèmes et modèles considérés, tandis que de nombreuses hypothèses, pour lesquelles des procédures de test sont communément proposées, ne sont en fait pas du tout testables. De telles situations conduisent à des problèmes statistiques mal posés. Nous analysons quelques cas particuliers de tels problèmes : (1) la construction d’intervalles de confiance dans le cadre de modèles structurels qui posent des problèmes d’identification; (2) la construction de tests pour des hypothèses non paramétriques, incluant la construction de procédures robustes à l’hétéroscédasticité, à la non-normalité ou à la spécification dynamique. Nous indiquons que ces difficultés proviennent souvent de l’ambition d’affaiblir les conditions de régularité nécessaires à toute analyse statistique ainsi que d’une utilisation inappropriée de résultats de théorie distributionnelle asymptotique. Enfin, nous soulignons l’importance de formuler des hypothèses et modèles testables, et de proposer des techniques économétriques dont les propriétés sont démontrables dans les échantillons finis.

Exact Nonparametric Two-Sample Homogeneity Tests for Possibly Discrete Distributions.

In this paper, we study several tests for the equality of two unknown distributions. Two are based on empirical distribution functions, three others on nonparametric probability density estimates, and the last ones on differences between sample moments. We suggest controlling the size of such tests (under nonparametric assumptions) by using permutational versions of the tests jointly with the method of Monte Carlo tests properly adjusted to deal with discrete distributions. We also propose a combined test procedure, whose level is again perfectly controlled through the Monte Carlo test technique and has better power properties than the individual tests that are combined. Finally, in a simulation experiment, we show that the technique suggested provides perfect control of test size and that the new tests proposed can yield sizeable power improvements.

Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle.

We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes only his most preferred public good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize the class of single-peaked preference rules by Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. This result is considerably different from the corresponding characterization by Miyagawa (2001a).

Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules.

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.

Nonparametric Instrumental Regression

The focus of the paper is the nonparametric estimation of an instrumental regression function P defined by conditional moment restrictions stemming from a structural econometric model : E[Y-P(Z)|W]=0 and involving endogenous variables Y and Z and instruments W. The function P is the solution of an ill-posed inverse problem and we propose an estimation procedure based on Tikhonov regularization. The paper analyses identification and overidentification of this model and presents asymptotic properties of the estimated nonparametric instrumental regression function.

Efficient and Non-Deteriorating Choice

We analyze collective choice procedures with respect to their rationalizability by means of profiles of individual preference orderings. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. Given the number of agents n, a selection function satisfies efficient and non-deteriorating n-rationalizability if there exists a profile of n orderings on the universal set of alternatives such that the selected alternatives are (i) efficient for that profile, and (ii) at least as good as the reference option according to each individual preference. We analyze efficient and non-deteriorating collective choice in a general abstract framework and provide a characterization result given a universal set domain.

Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited.

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that the risk averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk neutral and the risk averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff witha kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991, 1995).

Explaining the Persistence of Commodity Prices

This paper extends the Competitive Storage Model by incorporating prominent features of the production process and financial markets. A major limitation of this basic model is that it cannot successfully explain the degree of serial correlation observed in actual data. The proposed extensions build on the observation that in order to generate a high degree of price persistence, a model must incorporate features such that agents are willing to hold stocks more often than predicted by the basic model. We therefore allow unique characteristics of the production and trading mechanisms to provide the required incentives. Specifically, the proposed models introduce (i) gestation lags in production with heteroskedastic supply shocks, (ii) multiperiod forward contracts, and (iii) a convenience return to inventory holding. The rational expectations solutions for twelve commodities are numerically solved. Simulations are then employed to assess the effects of the above extensions on the time series properties of commodity prices. Results indicate that each of the features above partially account for the persistence and occasional spikes observed in actual data. Evidence is presented that the precautionary demand for stocks might play a substantial role in the dynamics of commodity prices.