On lattices from combinatorial game theory modularity and a representation theorem: finite case

We show that a self-generated set of combinatorial games, S. may not be hereditarily closed but, strong self-generation and hereditary closure are equivalent in the universe of short games. In [13], the question "Is there a set which will give a non-distributive but modular lattice?" appears. A useful necessary condition for the existence of a finite non-distributive modular L(S) is proved. We show the existence of S such that L(S) is modular and not distributive, exhibiting the first known example. More, we prove a Representation Theorem with Games that allows the generation of all finite lattices in game context. Finally, a computational tool for drawing lattices of games is presented. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Formation Control Driven by Cooperative Object Tracking

In this paper we introduce a formation control loop that maximizes the performance of the cooperative perception of a tracked target by a team of mobile robots, while maintaining the team in formation, with a dynamically adjustable geometry which is a function of the quality of the target perception by the team. In the formation control loop, the controller module is a distributed non-linear model predictive controller and the estimator module fuses local estimates of the target state, obtained by a particle filter at each robot. The two modules and their integration are described in detail, including a real-time database associated to a wireless communication protocol that facilitates the exchange of state data while reducing collisions among team members. Simulation and real robot results for indoor and outdoor teams of different robots are presented. The results highlight how our method successfully enables a team of homogeneous robots to minimize the total uncertainty of the tracked target cooperative estimate while complying with performance criteria such as keeping a pre-set distance between the teammates and the target, avoiding collisions with teammates and/or surrounding obstacles.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Revised definitions of invasive fungal disease from the European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer/Invasive Fungal Infections Cooperative Group and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Mycoses Study Group (EORTC/MSG) Consensus Group.

BACKGROUND: Invasive fungal diseases are important causes of morbidity and mortality. Clarity and uniformity in defining these infections are important factors in improving the quality of clinical studies. A standard set of definitions strengthens the consistency and reproducibility of such studies. METHODS: After the introduction of the original European Organization for Research and Treatment of Cancer/Invasive Fungal Infections Cooperative Group and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Mycoses Study Group (EORTC/MSG) Consensus Group definitions, advances in diagnostic technology and the recognition of areas in need of improvement led to a revision of this document. The revision process started with a meeting of participants in 2003, to decide on the process and to draft the proposal. This was followed by several rounds of consultation until a final draft was approved in 2005. This was made available for 6 months to allow public comment, and then the manuscript was prepared and approved. RESULTS: The revised definitions retain the original classifications of "proven," "probable," and "possible" invasive fungal disease, but the definition of "probable" has been expanded, whereas the scope of the category "possible" has been diminished. The category of proven invasive fungal disease can apply to any patient, regardless of whether the patient is immunocompromised, whereas the probable and possible categories are proposed for immunocompromised patients only. CONCLUSIONS: These revised definitions of invasive fungal disease are intended to advance clinical and epidemiological research and may serve as a useful model for defining other infections in high-risk patients.

Salivary testosterone and cortisol : role of athletic setting, game outcome, and game location /

Many studies investigating the relationship between hormones and competition have focused on athletic competition. The athletic setting enables r researchers to investigate the hormone-behaviour relationship in a relatively controlled environment. However, research to date has been based on observations made from single status contests and/or weekend tournaments and as such, does not provide a clear picture of an individual's average hormonal responses to both victory and defeat. In appreciation of this limitation, the current study tracked elite hockey players throughout a hockey season, measuring pre- and post-game salivary testosterone and Cortisol as well as psychological measures. I was interested in determining whether status outcome (win vs. loss) would influence an individual's testosterone and Cortisol responses to competition. Furthermore, I was also interested in assessing whether testosterone and Cortisol responses were specific to the competitive environment or whether similar hormonal responses would occur during non-competitive practice sessions. Last, I was interested in whether there were any differences in pre-game hormonal and psychological states depending on where the status contest was held: home versus away. The results indicated that game outcome moderated the testosterone responses to competition. That is, testosterone increased significantly more after a victory compared to a defeat. Furthermore, a loss of status produced significantly hreports, the players did not show an anticipatory rise in either Cortisol or testosterone prior to competition. In addition to the effects of status outcome on hormonal levels, it was also found that these hormonal responses were specific to competition. The athletes in the current study did not demonstrate any hormonal responses to the practice sessions. Last, there were significant differences in pre-game testosterone as well as in selfconfidence, cognitive, and somatic anxiety levels depending on the location at which the status contest took place. Pre-game testosterone and self-confidence levels were significantly higher prior to games played in the home venue. In contrast, pre-game somatic and cognitive anxiety levels were significantly higher prior to games played in the away venue. The current findings add to the developing literature on the relationship between hormones and competition. This was the first study to detect a moderating effect of status outcome on testosterone responses in a team sport. Furthermore, this was also the first study in humans to demonstrate that post-contest Cortisol levels were significantly higher after a loss of status. Last, the current study also adds to the sport psychology literature by demonstrating that pre-game psychological variables differ depending on where the status contest is being held: higher self-confidence at home and higher somatic and cognitive anxiety away. Taken together, the results from the current thesis may have important practical relevance to coaches, trainers and sport psychologists who are always trying to find ways to maximize performance. post-game Cortisol levels than did an increase in status. In contrast to previous

The relation between video game violence and aggression

Experimental research has shown that playing violent video games produces higher levels of aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and aggressive behavior (in the short-term) than non-violent video games (see Anderson, Gentile & Buckley, 2007). However, there are two major limitations with these studies. First, the majority of experimental studies that have compared the effects of violent versus non-violent video games on aggression have failed to equate these games in terms of competitiveness, difficulty, and pace of action. Thus, although the common finding is that violent video games produce higher levels of aggression than nonviolent video games, other unmatched factors beyond the actual violent content may be responsible for the elevated levels of aggression. Second, previous experimental studies have tended to use a measure of aggression that may also measure competitiveness, leading to questions about whether violent video games are related to aggression or competitiveness. The present thesis addressed these two issues by fIrst equating a violent and non-violent video game on competitiveness, difficulty and pace of action in Experiment I , and then comparing the effect of each game on aggressive behavior using an unambiguous measure of aggressive behavior (i.e., the Hot Sauce Paradigm). We found that video game violence was not sufficient to elevate aggressive behavior compared to a non-violent video game. Practical implications and directions for future research are discussed.

Dr. Stuart D. Scott Papers, 1837-2010 (non-inclusive)

Dr. Stuart D. Scott has written extensively in the fields of prehistory and history. As an archaeologist, he has traveled to some of the most significant sites in the world, including Pompeii, Stonehenge, the Valley of the Kings, Egypt’s pyramids and the Taj Mahal. He spent nine months excavating with the Tikal Project in Guatemala before returning to the University of Arizona where he received a Ph.D. in 1963. He excavated in New Zealand as a Fulbright scholar in 1963-1964. In the fall of 1964, Dr. Scott started a long career in the Anthropology Department of the State University of New York. He taught graduate and undergraduate archaeology courses and continued his archaeological and historical research. In 1979, Scott established the Old Fort Niagara Archaeology in Progress Project at Old Fort Niagara in Youngstown, New York. For many years, he became involved with historical archaeology in western New York. It was during this work that he became interested in the Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837-1838 and its aftermath. Dr. Scott and his wife, Patricia Kay Scott, would use Christmas breaks, summer vacations, and sabbatical years to travel. They were repeatedly lured back to the South Pacific, conducting research in New Zealand, Australia and many of the Micronesian and Polynesian islands. To tell the whole story of the Rebellion and the prison exiles, they traveled extensively in Canada, the United States, England and Tasmania to collect archival research and to experience the scenes of this remarkable narrative. In 2004, Dr. Scott published To the Outskirts of Habitable Creation: Americans and Canadians Transported to Tasmania in the 1840s, which told the story of the men captured, tried, convicted, and exiled as a result of the Rebellion, also called the Patriot War. Other contributions include: • A collaboration with Dr. Charles Cazeau on the book Exploring the Unknown, Great Mysteries Reexamined published by Plenum Press in 1979 • The Patriot Game: New Yorkers and the Canadian Rebellion of 1837-1838, which appeared in New York History, Vol. 68, No.3. 1987 • A Frontier Spirit: The Life of James Gemmell published in Australiasian Canadian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 2007 • To the Outskirts of Habitable Creation which appeared in the Friends of the National Archives, Vol. 20, No. 1 2009 • Numerous academic journal publications • Service on conference panels • Various research papers and proposals Before retiring in 1997 and while still a resident of Buffalo, N.Y., Dr. Scott spent considerable time with Brock University President Emeritus James A. Gibson and History Professor Colin Duquemin. The three shared a love of Rebellion history. It was largely because of this connection that Brock University was chosen as the recipient of Dr. Scott’s research materials.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Cooperative of Noncooperative Behavior?

In an abstract two-agent model, we show that every deterministic joint choice function compatible with the hypothesis that agents act noncooperatively is also compatible with the hypothesis that they act cooperatively. the converse is false.

Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity

Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability under general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice are often considered to be too demanding. An alternative definition of rationality of choice is that of non-deteriorating choice, which requires that the chosen alternatives must be judged at least as good as a reference alternative. In game theory, this definition is well-known under the name of individual rationality when the reference alternative is construed to be the status quo. This alternative form of rationality of individual and social choice is characterized in this paper on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations.

Design pédagogique et jeux vidéo : recherche exploratoire pour le développement d’un modèle soutenant le design pédagogique dans les jeux vidéo non éducatifs

Le design pédagogique dans les jeux vidéo non éducatifs est une discipline en mal de définitions et de méthodes. Contrairement à celui que l’on trouve dans les écoles ou autres institutions de formation, le design pédagogique pour les jeux vidéo non éducatifs est fait par des designers de jeux qui n’ont souvent aucune formation en enseignement. Un modèle de design pédagogique pour les jeux vidéo non éducatifs est donc développé dans ce mémoire, à partir d’une recherche exploratoire utilisant l’analyse de contenu de jeux vidéo et les théories de la science de l’éducation. Étant donné les ressources limitées disponibles pour le développement du modèle, la présente recherche pourra servir de base à la construction d’un modèle plus élaboré sur un sujet semblable, offrira des pistes intéressantes de recherche sur l’enseignement par le jeu et pourra soutenir les designers de jeu lors de la planification du design pédagogique dans leurs jeux.

Essays on numerically efficient inference in nonlinear and non-Gaussian state space models, and commodity market analysis.

The first two articles build procedures to simulate vector of univariate states and estimate parameters in nonlinear and non Gaussian state space models. We propose state space speci fications that offer more flexibility in modeling dynamic relationship with latent variables. Our procedures are extension of the HESSIAN method of McCausland[2012]. Thus, they use approximation of the posterior density of the vector of states that allow to : simulate directly from the state vector posterior distribution, to simulate the states vector in one bloc and jointly with the vector of parameters, and to not allow data augmentation. These properties allow to build posterior simulators with very high relative numerical efficiency. Generic, they open a new path in nonlinear and non Gaussian state space analysis with limited contribution of the modeler. The third article is an essay in commodity market analysis. Private firms coexist with farmers' cooperatives in commodity markets in subsaharan african countries. The private firms have the biggest market share while some theoretical models predict they disappearance once confronted to farmers cooperatives. Elsewhere, some empirical studies and observations link cooperative incidence in a region with interpersonal trust, and thus to farmers trust toward cooperatives. We propose a model that sustain these empirical facts. A model where the cooperative reputation is a leading factor determining the market equilibrium of a price competition between a cooperative and a private firm

Institutions, Behavior and Evolution

The three articles constituting this thesis are for reasons of content or method related to the following three fields in economics: Behavioral Economics, Evolutionary Game Theory and Formal Institutional Economics. A core element of these fields is the concept of individual preferences. Preferences are of central importance for the conceptional framework to analyze human behavior. They form the foundation for the theory of rational choice which is defined by the determination of the choice set and the selection of the most preferred alternative according to some consistency requirements. The theory of rational choice is based on a very simplified description of the problem of choice (object function and constraints). However, that choices depend on many more factors is for instance propagated by psychological theories and is supported by many empirical and experimental studies. This thesis adds to a better understanding of individual behavior to the extent that the evolution of certain characteristics of preferences and their consequences on human behavior forms the overarching theme of the dissertation. The long-term effect of evolutionary forces on a particular characteristic of importance in the theoretical, empirical and experimental economic literature, the concept of inequality aversion, is subject of the article “The evolution of inequality aversion in a simplified game of life” (Chapter 4). The contribution of the article is the overcoming of a restriction of former approaches to analyze the evolution of preferences in very simple environments. By classifying human interaction into three central economic games, the article provides a first step towards a simplified and sufficiently complete description of the interaction environment. Within such an environment the article characterizes the evolutionary stable preference distribution. One result shows, that the interaction of the aforementioned three classes can stabilize a preference of inequality aversion in the subpopulation which is favored in the problem of redistribution. The two remaining articles are concerned with social norms, which dissemination is determined by medium-run forces of cultural evolution. The article “The impact of market innovations on the evolution of social norms: the sustainability case.“ (Chapter 2) studies the interrelation between product innovations which are relevant from a sustainability perspective and an according social norm in consumption. This relation is based on a conformity bias in consumption and the attempt to avoid cognitive dissonances resulting from non-compliant consumption. Among others, it is shown that a conformity bias on the consumption side can lead to multiple equilibria on the side of norm adoption. The article “Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas: signaling internalized norms.” (Chapter 3) studies the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas based on the signaling of social norms. The article provides a potential explanation of cooperative behavior, which does not rely on the assumption of structured populations or on the unmotivated ability of social norms to restrict individual actions or strategy spaces. A comprehensive result of the single articles is the explanation of the phenomenon of partial norm adaption or dissemination of preferences. The plurality of the applied approaches with respect to the proximity to the rational choice approach and regarding the underlying evolutionary mechanics is a particular strength of the thesis. It shows the equality of these approaches in their potential to explain the phenomenon of cooperation in environments that provide material incentives for defective behavior. This also points to the need of a unified framework considering the biological and cultural coevolution of preference patterns.

Systematic Storytelling: Interactivity, Agency and Non-linear Narratives

In this lecture we go over the fundamentals of interactive game narratives. Defining what we mean by narrative, and placing games in context with other ergodic literature. We look at non-linear structures, agency, and the narrative paradox. Concluding with a set of mechanisms that games designers use to manage agency in their narrative games.

La cooperación internacional para el desarrollo

La Cooperación Internacional para el desarrollo se ha caracterizado por una evolución constante a lo largo de las últimas tres décadas. Las bases sobre las cuales se han practicado dicha cooperación han sido reformuladas, impactando la forma en que los diversos agentes involucrados interactúan. En la primera parte de éste trabajo se busca caracterizar la naturaleza de la interacción entre agentes dentro del proceso de cooperación; para ello recurrimos a la Teoría de Juegos, en particular a los Juegos Cooperativos en su modalidad de Acuerdo; introduciendo el concepto de óptimo de Pareto y el postulado de eficiencia de Coase. La segunda parte de éste trabajo es dedicada al concepto de Desarrollo. Describimos su evolución -caracterizada por la ruptura de paradigmas-; exponemos dos enfoques: uno basado en el cómo y para quién y otro temporario que hace referencia al corto y largo plazo; resaltando que el enfoque actual es aquel centrado en los elementos humanos. Por otra parte, analizamos el rol que tiene la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD), desde un punto de vista político, permitiéndonos entrever los intereses implícitos de la misma en los Estados receptores. Finalmente, describimos los elementos críticos de la evolución de las relaciones y la cooperación para el desarrollo entre América latina y la Unión Europea, así como la relación de Colombia con ésta última. Adicionalmente, detallamos el importante rol que las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales (ONG) han tenido para el desarrollo de los proyectos generados dentro del marco de las relaciones de cooperación entre América Latina y la Unión Europea.