Pensar las ciencias sociales desde América Latina ante el cambio de época

Herederas de propuestas disciplinarias originales, como la teoría de la dependencia -y sus posteriores críticas desde el marxismo-, o del pensamiento socioeconómico de la CEPAL, las ciencias sociales latinoamericanas toman distancia de enfoques anglo-euro-céntricos, para avanzar en una línea crítica del pensamiento y de las prácticas neocolonialistas. El desafío para el pensamiento es ser cosmopolita y simultáneamente latinoamericano. En este proceso, el pensamiento social latinoamericano está logrando recuperar su originalidad y vigor, gracias a un rico diálogo Sur-Sur que no pierde de vista el carácter global de sus reflexiones y de sus referentes universales. Aunque ni el marxismo clásico ni el occidental son hegemónicos dentro de la teoría crítica, el (neo)marxismo enriquecido con la crítica a la colonialidad del poder, la teoría del Sistema-mundo, la geopolítica crítica y la ecología política recuperan el campo de la teoría crítica en clave fundadora de un pensamiento de época. Sus debates epistemológicos con el post-estructuralismo y diversos enfoques posmodernos configuran los desarrollos recientes de la teoría crítica.

A Restorative Theory of Criminal Justice

In this project, I defend a restorative theory of criminal justice. I argue that the response to criminal wrongdoing in a just society should take the form of an attempt to heal the damage done to the community resulting from crime. I argue that the moral responsibilities of wrongdoers as wrongdoers ought to provide the framework for how a just society should respond to crime. Following the work of R.A. Duff, I argue that wrongdoers incur second-order duties of moral recognition. Wrongdoers owe it to others to recognize their wrongdoing for what it is, i.e. wrongdoing, and to shoulder certain burdens in order to express their repentant recognition to others via a meaningful apology. In short, wrongdoers owe it to their victims and others in the community to make amends. What I will deny, however, is the now familiar claim in the restorative justice literature that restoring the normative relationships in the community damaged by criminal forms of wrongdoing requires retributive punishment. In my view, how we choose to express the judgement that wrongdoers are blameworthy should flow from an all things considered judgment that is neither reducible to the judgement that the wrongdoer is culpably responsible for wronging others, nor the judgement that the wrongdoer in some basic sense “deserves to suffer” (or “deserves punishment,” etc.).

Sobre Κρῆτες de Sófocles

En este artículo se estudia una obra atribuida a Sófocles titulada Κρῆτες (Los cretenses), una tragedia sólo conocida por dos dudosos testimonios de Hesiquio y Ateneo de Náucratis. A finales del siglo xviii una nueva lectura de ambos los adscribía a otra tragedia, con lo que se negaba la existencia de Κρῆτες. A pesar de esto, este título se sigue manteniendo en las ediciones de la obra sofoclea, ahora relacionado con nuevos hallazgos de fragmentos papiráceos del autor. Nuestro objetivo es el de analizar los testimonios en profundidad para concluir si la obra pudo o no haberse escrito.

Territoriality and Migration in a Divided Society: Lay Theories of Citizenship and Place in Northern Ireland

The study of citizenship has increasingly focused on the ways in which spatialized understandings of the concept can be used to marginalise and exclude social groups: exclusive constructions of national boundaries, local neighbourhoods and public spaces can deny marginalised groups their social and political rights. Less attention has been paid to how constructions of place can accommodate different groups’ rights and promote peaceful coexistence. This is particularly important in locations where migration disrupts existing understandings (‘lay theories’) of the relationship between residency, identity and collective rights. The present research examines how spatialized understandings of citizenship shape perceptions of intergroup mixing in previously segregated areas of a post-conflict society. Critical Discursive Social Psychological (CDSP) analysis of 30 interviews with long-term residents and recent migrants to increasingly mixed areas of Belfast shows that, while all pa
rticipants acknowledged Northern Ireland’s territorialisation, different lay theories of citizenship underpin the possibility and desirability of intergroup coexistence. Long-term residents drew upon understandings of the negative citizenry of the outgroup to argue against the possibility of peaceful coexistence within their locale, while recent incomers gave evidence of their own experiences of good citizenship within the shared spaces of neighbourhood to demonstrate that this could and should be achieved. The implications of lay theories of citizenship for the study of residential migration and mixing are discussed

Justice envers les enfants et légitimité politique en éducation

L’idée selon laquelle les enfants sont des sujets à part entière de considérations de justice n’est pas très contestée. Les enfants ont des intérêts qui leur sont propres et ont un statut moral indépendant de leurs parents : ils ne sont ni la propriété de ces derniers ni une simple extension de leur personne. Pourtant, les travaux des plus grands théoriciens de la justice en philosophie politique contemporaine ne contiennent pas de discussion systématique du statut moral et politique des enfants et du contenu de nos obligations à leur égard. Cette thèse contribue à remédier à cette omission à travers l’examen de quatre grandes questions principales. (1) Quelles sont les obligations de justice de l’état libéral envers les enfants ? (2) Quels types de politiques publiques en matière d’éducation des enfants sont moralement légitimes ? (3) Jusqu’à quel point est-il moralement acceptable pour les parents de délibérément forger la vision du monde de leurs enfants ? (4) Quels critères moraux devraient guider l’élaboration de politiques en matière d’éducation morale dans les écoles ? Cette thèse est constituée de quatre articles. Le premier, « Political Liberalism and Children’s Education », aborde les questions du fondement normatif et des implications du principe de ‘neutralité éducative’ ou ‘anti-perfectionnisme éducatif’. Selon ce principe, il n’est pas légitime pour l’État libéral de délibérément promouvoir, à travers ses politiques publiques en éducation, une conception particulière de la vie bonne. L’article défend les idées suivantes. D’abord, ledit principe est exclusivement fondé sur des raisons de justice envers les parents. Ensuite, l’anti-perfectionnisme libéral n’est pas, pour autant, ‘mauvais pour les enfants’, puisqu’une vaste gamme d’interventions politiques dans la vie familiale et l’éducation des enfants sont, de manière surprenante, justifiables dans ce cadre théorique. Le deuxième article, « On the Permissibility of Shaping Children’s Values », examine la question de savoir si les parents ont un droit moral de forger délibérément l’identité, la conception du monde et les valeurs de leurs enfants. L’article développe une critique de la conception anti-perfectionniste des devoirs parentaux et propose un nouvel argument libéral à l’appui d’un droit parental conditionnel de forger l’identité de leurs enfants. L’article introduit également une distinction importante entre les notions d’éducation compréhensive et d’« enrôlement » compréhensif. Le troisième article, « Common Education and the Practice of Liberal Neutrality: The Loyola High School Case », défend trois thèses principales à travers une analyse normative de l’affaire juridique de l’école Loyola. Premièrement, il est légitime pour l’État libéral d’adopter un modèle d’éducation commune fort. Deuxièmement, la thèse selon laquelle la neutralité comme approche éducative serait impossible est injustifiée. Troisièmement, il existe néanmoins de bonnes raisons pour l’État libéral d’accommoder plusieurs écoles religieuses qui rejettent le modèle de la neutralité. Le quatrième article, « Which Moral Issues Should be Taught as Controversial? », critique à la fois le critère ‘épistémique’ dominant pour déterminer quels enjeux moraux devraient être enseignés aux jeunes comme ‘controversés’, et à la fois la manière dont le débat sur l’enseignement des enjeux controversés fut construit au cours des dernières années, d’un point de vue substantiel et méthodologique. L’article propose une manière alternative d’aborder le débat, laquelle prend adéquatement en compte la pluralité des objectifs de l’éducation et un ensemble d’autres considérations morales pertinentes.

Persons : their identity and individuation

This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? Concerning the first question, I argue that persons persist three-dimensionally (the endurance view), and not four-dimensionally (the perdurarne view), on the ground that objects must always fall under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. Concerning the second question, I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. I argue against Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. I further criticise three Psychological Non-Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. Instead I formulate the Revised Animal Attribute View where person is understood as a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring animals. In this, I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons.

Space-related confabulations after right hemisphere damage

Confabulations are usually referred to memory distortions, characterized by the production of verbal statements or actions that are inconsistent with the patient’s history and present situation. However, behavioral patterns reminiscent of memory confabulations can also occur in patients with right hemisphere damage, in relation to their personal, peripersonal or extrapersonal space. Thus, such patients may be unaware of their left hemiplegia and confabulate about it (anosognosia), deny the ownership of their left limbs (somatoparaphrenia), insult and hit them (misoplegia), or experience a “third”, supernumerary left limb. Right brain-damaged patients can also sometimes confabulate about the left, neglected part of images presented in their peripersonal space, or believe to be in another place (reduplicative paramnesia). We review here these instances of confabulation occurring after right hemisphere damage, and propose that they might reflect, at least partially, the attempts of the left hemisphere to make sense of inappropriate input received from the damaged right hemisphere.

Survenue des arythmies et troubles de conduction après un remplacement de la valve aortique par cathéter : incidence et impact

La sténose aortique est la cardiopathie valvulaire la plus fréquente retrouvée chez les patients agés. Suite à l’apparition des symptômes, la survie des patients diminue de façon drastique en l’absence d’un remplacement valvulaire aortique. Cependant, une proportion considérable de ces patients n’est pas opérée en raison d’un risque chirurgical élevé, l’âge étant l’une des principales raisons de refus d’un remplacement valvulaire aortique chirurgical. Ce défaut dans la prise en charge des ces patients a favorisé le développement du remplacement valvulaire aortique par cathéter où implantation valvulaire aortique par cathèter (TAVR ou TAVI), qui a représenté une révolution dans le traitement de la sténose aortique. Cette intervention est actuellement un traitement de routine chez les patients à haut risque chirurgical atteints d’une sténose aortique, même si la chirurgie cardiaque n’est pas contre-indiquée. Ces dernières années ont vu un changement de profil des candidats potentiels vers une population à plus faible risque. Cependant, plusieurs préoccupations demeurent. L’une des plus importantes est la survenue des arythmies et de troubles de conduction, notamment le bloc de branche gauche et le bloc auriculo-ventriculaire, qui sont des complications fréquemment associées au TAVR. Malgré l’évolution de la technologie et le développement de nouveaux dispositifs réduisant le taux global de complications, aucune amélioration n’a pas été intégrée pour prévenir l’apparition de telles complications. De plus, l’utilisation de certains dispositifs de nouvelle génération semble être associée à un risque accru de troubles de conduction, et par conséquent, l’incidence de ces complications pourrait augmenter dans le futur. Cependant, L’impact et l’évolution de ces complications sont inconnus. Ce travail de recherche évalue l’incidence et l’évolution des troubles de conduction suite au TAVR et l’impact des blocs de branche gauche de novo et de l’implantation d’un pacemaker sur les résultats cliniques et échocardiographiques.

What Does Value Matter? The Interest-Relational Theory of the Semantics and Metaphysics of Value

Value and reasons for action are often cited by rationalists and moral realists as providing a desire-independent foundation for normativity. Those maintaining instead that normativity is dependent upon motivation often deny that anything called '"value" or "reasons" exists. According to the interest-relational theory, something has value relative to some perspective of desire just in case it satisfies those desires, and a consideration is a reason for some action just in case it indicates that something of value will be accomplished by that action. Value judgements therefore describe real properties of objects and actions, but have no normative significance independent of desires. It is argued that only the interest-relational theory can account for the practical significance of value and reasons for action. Against the Kantian hypothesis of prescriptive rational norms, I attack the alleged instrumental norm or hypothetical imperative, showing that the normative force for taking the means to our ends is explicable in terms of our desire for the end, and not as a command of reason. This analysis also provides a solution to the puzzle concerning the connection between value judgement and motivation. While it is possible to hold value judgements without motivation, the connection is more than accidental. This is because value judgements are usually but not always made from the perspective of desires that actually motivate the speaker. In the normal case judgement entails motivation. But often we conversationally borrow external perspectives of desire, and subsequent judgements do not entail motivation. This analysis drives a critique of a common practice as a misuse of normative language. The "absolutist" attempts to use and, as philosopher, analyze normative language in such a way as to justify the imposition of certain interests over others. But these uses and analyses are incoherent - in denying relativity to particular desires they conflict with the actual meaning of these utterances, which is always indexed to some particular set of desires.

No right to sext? A critical examination of media and legal debates about teenage girls' sexual agency in the digital age

Advances in digital photography and distribution technologies enable many people to produce and distribute images of their sex acts. When teenagers do this, the photos and videos they create can be legally classified as child pornography since the law makes no exception for youth who create sexually explicit images of themselves. The dominant discussions about teenage girls producing sexually explicit media (including sexting) are profoundly unproductive: (1) they blame teenage girls for creating private images that another person later maliciously distributed and (2) they fail to respect—or even discuss—teenagers’ rights to freedom of expression. Cell phones and the internet make producing and distributing images extremely easy, which provide widely accessible venues for both consensual sexual expression between partners and for sexual harassment. Dominant understandings view sexting as a troubling teenage trend created through the combination of camera phones and adolescent hormones and impulsivity, but this view often conflates consensual sexting between partners with the malicious distribution of a person’s private image as essentially equivalent behaviors. In this project, I ask: What is the role of assumptions about teen girls’ sexual agency in these problematic understandings of sexting that blame victims and deny teenagers’ rights? In contrast to the popular media panic about online predators and the familiar accusation that youth are wasting their leisure time by using digital media, some people champion the internet as a democratic space that offers young people the opportunity to explore identities and develop social and communication skills. Yet, when teen girls’ sexuality enters this conversation, all this debate and discussion narrows to a problematic consensus. The optimists about adolescents and technology fall silent, and the argument that media production is inherently empowering for girls does not seem to apply to a girl who produces a sexually explicit image of herself. Instead, feminist, popular, and legal commentaries assert that she is necessarily a victim: of a “sexualized” mass media, pressure from her male peers, digital technology, her brain structures or hormones, or her own low self-esteem and misplaced desire for attention. Why and how are teenage girls’ sexual choices produced as evidence of their failure or success in achieving Western liberal ideals of self-esteem, resistance, and agency? Since mass media and policy reactions to sexting have so far been overwhelmingly sexist and counter-productive, it is crucial to interrogate the concepts and assumptions that characterize mainstream understandings of sexting. I argue that the common sense that is co-produced by law and mass media underlies the problematic legal and policy responses to sexting. Analyzing a range of nonfiction texts including newspaper articles, talk shows, press releases, public service announcements, websites, legislative debates, and legal documents, I investigate gendered, racialized, age-based, and technologically determinist common sense assumptions about teenage girls’ sexual agency. I examine the consensus and continuities that exist between news, nonfiction mass media, policy, institutions, and law, and describe the limits of their debates. I find that this early 21st century post-feminist girl-power moment not only demands that girls live up to gendered sexual ideals but also insists that actively choosing to follow these norms is the only way to exercise sexual agency. This is the first study to date examining the relationship of conventional wisdom about digital media and teenage girls’ sexuality to both policy and mass media.

A critical study of John Hick's religious pluralism

This study examines the pluralistic hypothesis advanced by the late Professor John Hick viz. that all religious faiths provide equally salvific pathways to God, irrespective of their theological and doctrinal differences. The central focus of the study is a critical examination of (a) the epistemology of religious experience as advanced by Professor Hick, (b) the ontological status of the being he understands to be God, and further asks (c) to what extent can the pluralistic view of religious experience be harmonised with the experience with which the Christian life is understood to begin viz. regeneration. Tracing the theological journey of Professor Hick from fundamentalist Christian to religious pluralist, the study notes the reasons given for Hick’s gradual disengagement from the Christian faith. In addition to his belief that the pre-scientific worldview of the Bible was obsolete and passé, Hick took the view that modern biblical scholarship could not accommodate traditionally held Christian beliefs. He conceded that the Incarnation, if true, would be decisive evidence for the uniqueness of Christianity, but rejected the same on the grounds of logical incoherence. This study affirms the view that the doctrine of the Incarnation occupies a place of crucial importance within world religion, but rejects the claim of incoherence. Professor Hick believed that God’s Spirit was at work in all religions, producing a common religious experience, or spiritual awakening to God. The soteriological dimension of this spiritual awakening, he suggests, finds expression as the worshipper turns away from self-centredness to the giving of themselves to God and others. At the level of epistemology he further argued that religious experience itself provided the rational basis for belief in God. The study supports the assertion by Professor Hick that religious experience itself ought to be trusted as a source of knowledge and this on the principle of credulity, which states that a person’s claim to perceive or experience something is prima facie justified, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Hick’s argument has been extensively developed and defended by philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga and William Alston. This confirms the importance of Hick’s contribution to the philosophy of religion, and further establishes his reputation within the field as an original thinker. It is recognised in this thesis, however, that in affirming only the rationality of belief, but not the obligation to believe, Professor Hick’s epistemology is not fully consistent with a Christian theology of revelation. Christian theology views the created order as pre-interpreted and unambiguous in its testimony to God’s existence. To disbelieve in God’s existence is to violate one’s epistemic duty by suppressing the truth. Professor Hick’s critical realist principle, which he regards as the key to understanding what is happening in the different forms of religious experience, is examined within this thesis. According to the critical realist principle, there are realities external to us, yet we are never aware of them as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us within our particular cognitive machinery and conceptual resources. All awareness of God is interpreted through the lens of pre-existing, culturally relative religious forms, which in turn explains the differing theologies within the world of religion. The critical realist principle views God as unknowable, in the sense that his inner nature is beyond the reach of human conceptual categories and linguistic systems. Professor Hick thus endorses and develops the view of God as ineffable, but employs the term transcategorial when speaking of God’s ineffability. The study takes the view that the notion of transcategoriality as developed by Professor Hick appears to deny any ontological status to God, effectively arguing him out of existence. Furthermore, in attributing the notion of transcategoriality to God, Professor Hick would appear to render incoherent his own fundamental assertion that we can know nothing of God that is either true or false. The claim that the experience of regeneration with which the Christian life begins can be classed as a mere species of the genus common throughout all faiths, is rejected within this thesis. Instead it is argued that Christian regeneration is a distinctive experience that cannot be reduced to a salvific experience, defined merely as an awareness of, or awakening to, God, followed by a turning away from self to others. Professor Hick argued against any notion that the Christian community was the social grouping through which God’s Spirit was working in an exclusively redemptive manner. He supported his view by drawing attention to (a) the presence, at times, of comparable or higher levels of morality in world religion, when contrasted with that evidenced by the followers of Christ, and (b) the presence, at times, of demonstrably lower levels of morality in the followers of Christ, when contrasted with the lives of other religious devotees. These observations are fully supported, but the conclusion reached is rejected, on the grounds that according to Christian theology the saving work of God’s Spirit is evidenced in a life that is changing from what it was before. Christian theology does not suggest or demand that such lives at every stage be demonstrably superior, when contrasted with other virtuous or morally upright members of society. The study concludes by paying tribute to the contribution Professor Hick has made to the field of the epistemology of religious experience.

Justice envers les enfants et légitimité politique en éducation

L’idée selon laquelle les enfants sont des sujets à part entière de considérations de justice n’est pas très contestée. Les enfants ont des intérêts qui leur sont propres et ont un statut moral indépendant de leurs parents : ils ne sont ni la propriété de ces derniers ni une simple extension de leur personne. Pourtant, les travaux des plus grands théoriciens de la justice en philosophie politique contemporaine ne contiennent pas de discussion systématique du statut moral et politique des enfants et du contenu de nos obligations à leur égard. Cette thèse contribue à remédier à cette omission à travers l’examen de quatre grandes questions principales. (1) Quelles sont les obligations de justice de l’état libéral envers les enfants ? (2) Quels types de politiques publiques en matière d’éducation des enfants sont moralement légitimes ? (3) Jusqu’à quel point est-il moralement acceptable pour les parents de délibérément forger la vision du monde de leurs enfants ? (4) Quels critères moraux devraient guider l’élaboration de politiques en matière d’éducation morale dans les écoles ? Cette thèse est constituée de quatre articles. Le premier, « Political Liberalism and Children’s Education », aborde les questions du fondement normatif et des implications du principe de ‘neutralité éducative’ ou ‘anti-perfectionnisme éducatif’. Selon ce principe, il n’est pas légitime pour l’État libéral de délibérément promouvoir, à travers ses politiques publiques en éducation, une conception particulière de la vie bonne. L’article défend les idées suivantes. D’abord, ledit principe est exclusivement fondé sur des raisons de justice envers les parents. Ensuite, l’anti-perfectionnisme libéral n’est pas, pour autant, ‘mauvais pour les enfants’, puisqu’une vaste gamme d’interventions politiques dans la vie familiale et l’éducation des enfants sont, de manière surprenante, justifiables dans ce cadre théorique. Le deuxième article, « On the Permissibility of Shaping Children’s Values », examine la question de savoir si les parents ont un droit moral de forger délibérément l’identité, la conception du monde et les valeurs de leurs enfants. L’article développe une critique de la conception anti-perfectionniste des devoirs parentaux et propose un nouvel argument libéral à l’appui d’un droit parental conditionnel de forger l’identité de leurs enfants. L’article introduit également une distinction importante entre les notions d’éducation compréhensive et d’« enrôlement » compréhensif. Le troisième article, « Common Education and the Practice of Liberal Neutrality: The Loyola High School Case », défend trois thèses principales à travers une analyse normative de l’affaire juridique de l’école Loyola. Premièrement, il est légitime pour l’État libéral d’adopter un modèle d’éducation commune fort. Deuxièmement, la thèse selon laquelle la neutralité comme approche éducative serait impossible est injustifiée. Troisièmement, il existe néanmoins de bonnes raisons pour l’État libéral d’accommoder plusieurs écoles religieuses qui rejettent le modèle de la neutralité. Le quatrième article, « Which Moral Issues Should be Taught as Controversial? », critique à la fois le critère ‘épistémique’ dominant pour déterminer quels enjeux moraux devraient être enseignés aux jeunes comme ‘controversés’, et à la fois la manière dont le débat sur l’enseignement des enjeux controversés fut construit au cours des dernières années, d’un point de vue substantiel et méthodologique. L’article propose une manière alternative d’aborder le débat, laquelle prend adéquatement en compte la pluralité des objectifs de l’éducation et un ensemble d’autres considérations morales pertinentes.

Blame Attributions Among Child Sexual Abuse Survivors and Disclosure of the Abuse

Child sexual abuse (CSA) disclosure is critical for survivor´s psychosocial adjustment later in life. The aim of the present study was to analyze the relationship between attributions of blame for child sexual abuse by the victim and the disclosure of the abuse to parents or caregivers while controlling for characteristics of the abuse. Female college students between 17 and 24 years of age (M = 19.44, SD = 1.64) from a southern Spanish University were surveyed. Of 1547 respondents, 153 (9.90%) reported having suffered some form of CSA before the age of 15. Information about the characteristics of abuse (age of onset, type of abuse suffered, continuity of abuse, and relationship with and age of the perpetrator) and the existence of abuse disclosure by the survivor was obtained from a self-reported questionnaire developed for the present study. The Attributions of Responsibility and Blame Scale (McMillen & Zuravin, 1997) was used to assess attributions made about CSA (self-blame, perpetrator blame and family blame). The results of a logistic regression model was statistically significant, χ² (9) = 43.856, p < .001. The model explained 41% (Nagelkerke R²) of the variance of abuse disclosure and correctly classified 85.6% of cases. Survivor disclosure was 5.50 times more likely to occur when the perpetrator was not a family member (Wald = 8.14, p < .01) and 3.95 times more likely to occur when there was not physical contact with the perpetrator (Wald = 4.30, p < .05). The occurrence of disclosure was also related to increased perpetrator age (Wald = 4.83, p < .05). With regard to the attributions of blame, the occurrence of disclosure was related to lower scores on self-blame (Wald = 6.78, p < .01) and higher scores on family blame (Wald = 9.67, p < .001). However, no relationship was found between perpetrator blame and disclosure of abuse. The results confirm the idea that not only self-blame attributions, but also family blame attributions are critical to the decision of a CSA victim to disclose abuse. The possibility that children who do not disclose abuse have a greater need to deny the occurrence of abuse, or have more confusion about being abused is discussed. Attributions of blame should be taken into serious consideration when evaluating children for possible sexual abuse.

A valorização social da leitura literária

Dissertação de mest. em Didáctica das Línguas e Literaturas Modernas - especialização em Português, Faculdade de Ciências Humanas e Sociais, Univ. do Algarve, 2003

Ontologia do espaço : critica da critica da entificação social do ser enquanto pressuposto a uma teoria espacial interpenetrada a “ontologia do ser social”, de Gyorgy Lukacs

Tese (doutorado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Geografia, Programa de Pós Graduação em Geografia, 2015.