Essays on Russia's Economic Transition

This study comprises an introductory section and three essays analysing Russia's economic transition from the early 1990s up to the present. The papers present a combination of both theoretical and empirical analysis on some of the key issues Russia has faced during its somewhat troublesome transformation from state-controlled command economy to market-based economy. The first essay analyses fiscal competition for mobile capital between identical regions in a transition country. A standard tax competition framework is extended to account for two features of a transition economy: the presence of two sectors, old and new, which differ in productivity; and a non-benevolent regional decision-maker. It is shown that in very early phase of transition, when the old sector clearly dominates, consumers in a transition economy may be better off in a competitive equilibrium. Decision-makers, on the other hand, will prefer to coordinate their fiscal policies. The second essay uses annual data for 1992-2003 to examine income dispersion and convergence across 76 Russian regions. Wide disparities in income levels have indeed emerged during the transition period. Dispersion has increased most among the initially better-off regions, whereas for the initially poorer regions no clear trend of divergence or convergence could be established. Further, some - albeit not highly robust - evidence was found of both unconditional and conditional convergence, especially among the initially richer regions. Finally, it is observed that there is much less evidence of convergence after the economic crisis of 1998. The third essay analyses industrial firms' engagement in provision of infrastructure services, such as heating, electricity and road maintenance. Using a unique dataset of 404 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises in 40 regions of Russia, the essay examines public infrastructure provision by Russian industrial enterprises. It is found that to a large degree engagement in infrastructure provision, as proxied by district heating production, is a Soviet legacy. Secondly, firms providing district heating to users outside their plant area are more likely to have close and multidimensional relations with the local public sector.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Essays on the Economics of Intellectual Property Rights

Väitöskirjassani tarkastelen informaatiohyödykkeiden ja tekijänoikeuksien taloustiedettä kahdesta eri perspektiivistä. Niistä ensimmäinen kuuluu endogeenisen kasvuteorian alaan. Väitöskirjassani yleistän ”pool of knowledge” -tyyppisen endogeenisen kasvumallin tilanteeseen, jossa patentoitavissa olevalla innovaatiolla on minimikoko, ja jossa uudenlaisen tuotteen patentoinut yritys voi menettää monopolinsa tuotteeseen jäljittelyn johdosta. Mallin kontekstissa voidaan analysoida jäljittelyn ja innovaatioilta vaaditun ”minimikoon” vaikutuksia hyvinvointiin ja talouskasvuun. Kasvun maksimoiva imitaation määrä on mallissa aina nolla, mutta hyvinvoinnin maksimoiva imitaation määrä voi olla positiivinen. Talouskasvun ja hyvinvoinnin maksimoivalla patentoitavissa olevan innovaation ”minimikoolla” voi olla mikä tahansa teoreettista maksimia pienempi arvo. Väitöskirjani kahdessa jälkimmäisessä pääluvussa tarkastelen informaatiohyödykkeiden kaupallista piratismia mikrotaloustieteellisen mallin avulla. Informaatiohyödykkeistä laittomasti tehtyjen kopioiden tuotantokustannukset ovat pienet, ja miltei olemattomat silloin kun niitä levitetään esimerkiksi Internetissä. Koska piraattikopioilla on monta eri tuottajaa, niiden hinnan voitaisiin mikrotaloustieteen teorian perusteella olettaa laskevan melkein nollaan, ja jos näin kävisi, kaupallinen piratismi olisi mahdotonta. Mallissani selitän kaupallisen piratismin olemassaolon olettamalla, että piratismista saatavan rangaistuksen uhka riippuu siitä, kuinka monille kuluttajille piraatti tarjoaa laittomia hyödykkeitä, ja että se siksi vaikuttaa piraattikopioiden markkinoihin mainonnan kustannuksen tavoin. Kaupallisten piraattien kiinteiden kustannusten lisääminen on mallissani aina tekijänoikeuksien haltijan etujen mukaista, mutta ”mainonnan kustannuksen” lisääminen ei välttämättä ole, vaan se saattaa myös alentaa laillisten kopioiden myynnistä saatavia voittoja. Tämä tulos poikkeaa vastaavista aiemmista tuloksista sikäli, että se pätee vaikka tarkasteltuihin informaatiohyödykkeisiin ei liittyisi verkkovaikutuksia. Aiemmin ei-kaupallisen piratismin malleista on usein johdettu tulos, jonka mukaan informaatiohyödykkeen laittomat kopiot voivat kasvattaa laillisten kopioiden myynnistä saatavia voittoja jos laillisten kopioiden arvo niiden käyttäjille riippuu siitä, kuinka monet muut kuluttajat käyttävät samanlaista hyödykettä ja jos piraattikopioiden saatavuus lisää riittävästi laillisten kopioiden arvoa. Väitöskirjan viimeisessä pääluvussa yleistän mallini verkkotoimialoille, ja tutkin yleistämäni mallin avulla sitä, missä tapauksissa vastaava tulos pätee myös kaupalliseen piratismiin.

Essays on Labor Market Frictions, Technological Change and Macroeconomic Fluctuations

The dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and three essays that apply search-matching theory to study the interaction of labor market frictions, technological change and macroeconomic fluctuations. The first essay studies the impact of capital-embodied growth on equilibrium unemployment by extending a vintage capital/search model to incorporate vintage human capital. In addition to the capital obsolescence (or creative destruction) effect that tends to raise unemployment, vintage human capital introduces a skill obsolescence effect of faster growth that has the opposite sign. Faster skill obsolescence reduces the value of unemployment, hence wages and leads to more job creation and less job destruction, unambiguously reducing unemployment. The second essay studies the effect of skill biased technological change on skill mismatch and the allocation of workers and firms in the labor market. By allowing workers to invest in education, we extend a matching model with two-sided heterogeneity to incorporate an endogenous distribution of high and low skill workers. We consider various possibilities for the cost of acquiring skills and show that while unemployment increases in most scenarios, the effect on the distribution of vacancy and worker types varies according to the structure of skill costs. When the model is extended to incorporate endogenous labor market participation, we show that the unemployment rate becomes less informative of the state of the labor market as the participation margin absorbs employment effects. The third essay studies the effects of labor taxes on equilibrium labor market outcomes and macroeconomic dynamics in a New Keynesian model with matching frictions. Three policy instruments are considered: a marginal tax and a tax subsidy to produce tax progression schemes, and a replacement ratio to account for variability in outside options. In equilibrium, the marginal tax rate and replacement ratio dampen economic activity whereas tax subsidies boost the economy. The marginal tax rate and replacement ratio amplify shock responses whereas employment subsidies weaken them. The tax instruments affect the degree to which the wage absorbs shocks. We show that increasing tax progression when taxation is initially progressive is harmful for steady state employment and output, and amplifies the sensitivity of macroeconomic variables to shocks. When taxation is initially proportional, increasing progression is beneficial for output and employment and dampens shock responses.

Economics of tourism & growth for small island countries

We theoretically analyze the impact of changes in foreign income from tourism source countries on the growth of tourism dependent small island economies. Using a general theoretical construct, we attempt to answer the question of how price elasticity of demand, income elasticity of tourist and the degree of competition in the service sector influence the economic development of small economies. One of the main results is that politicians may consider applying policies which lead to a competitive environment in the service sector to maximize growth and the consequent labor income share.

Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Donor strategy under the fungibility of foreign aid

We develop a political–economic model of aid fungibility: a part of aid is diverted away from its intended target by lobby groups. The size of this diversion – the degree of aid fungibility – is determined endogenously by the recipient government. The donor can affect the equilibrium degree of fungibility by choosing both the size of aid and the timing of its decision. We derive a condition under which the donor's reaction to fungibility is to reduce the amount of aid. Under this condition, if the donor acts as a follower, both the donor and the target group are better off.

Lobbying by ethnic groups and aid allocation

We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government to allocate more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts political contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption, aid fatigue, and ethnic composition, in the donor country on the allocation of aid.

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tariffs, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tariff, the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.

Reducing tariffs according to WTO accession rules: The case of Vietnam

When Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007 it was granted an accession period up to 2014. During this period tariffs would have to fall according to the accession agreement. This paper evaluates this 2007–2014 trade liberalization by building an applied general equilibrium model and calibrating it to the Vietnamese data. The model pays careful attention to the fact that Vietnam has many state-owned enterprises. The model simulations show that the WTO tariff reductions will reduce overall welfare. Moreover, the biggest loss will take place among the poor rural households in Vietnam. This paper proposes other tariff reforms that will both raise overall welfare and reduce income inequality.

Transfer pricing rules and competing governments

The literature on the regulation of multinationals' transfer prices has not considered the possibility that governments may use transfer pricing rules strategically when they compete with other governments. The present paper analyses this case and shows that, even in the absence of agency considerations, a non‐cooperative equilibrium is characterised by above‐optimal levels of effective taxation. We then derive conditions under which harmonization of transfer pricing rules lead to a Pareto improvement, and show that harmonization according to the ‘arm's length’ principle—the form of harmonization advocated by the OECD—may not be Pareto improving.

Determination of skin friction in strong pressure-gradient equilibrium and near-equilibrium turbulent boundary layers

The conventional Clauser-chart method for determination of local skin friction in zero or weak pressure-gradient turbulent boundary layer flows fails entirely in strong pressure-gradient situations. This failure occurs due to the large departure of the mean velocity profile from the universal logarithmic law upon which the conventional Clauser-chart method is based. It is possible to extend this method,even for strong pressure-gradient situations involving equilibrium or near-equilibrium turbulent boundary layers by making use of the so-called non-universal logarithmic laws. These non-universal log laws depend on the local strength of the pressure gradient and may be regarded as perturbations of the universal log law.The present paper shows that the modified Clauser-chart method, so developed, yields quit satisfactory results in terms of estimation of local skin friction in strongly accelerated or retarded equilibrium and near-equilibrium turbulent boundary layers that are not very close to relaminarization or separation.

CFD analysis of high frequency miniature pulse tube refrigerators for space applications with thermal non-equilibrium model

High frequency, miniature, pulse tube cryocoolers are extensively used in space applications because of their simplicity. Parametric studies of inertance type pulse tube cooler are performed with different length-to-diameter ratios of the pulse tube with the help of the FLUENT (R) package. The local thermal non-equilibrium of the gas and the matrix is taken into account for the modeling of porous zones, in addition to the wall thickness of the components. Dynamic characteristics and the actual mechanism of energy transfer in pulse are examined with the help of the pulse tube wall time constant. The heat interaction between pulse tube wall and the oscillating gas, leading to surface heat pumping, is quantified. The axial heat conduction is found to reduce the performance of the pulse tube refrigerator. The thermal non-equilibrium predicts a higher cold heat exchanger temperature compared to thermal equilibrium. The pressure drop through the porous medium has a strong non-linear effect due to the dominating influence of Forchheimer term over that of the linear Darcy term at high operating frequencies. The phase angle relationships among the pressure, temperature and the mass flow rate in the porous zones are also important in determining the performance of pulse tuberefrigerator.

Design considerations and economics of different shaped surface aeration tanks

This paper deals with the design considerations of surface aeration tanks on two basic issues of oxygen transfer coefficient and power requirements for the surface aeration system. Earlier developed simulation equations for simulating the oxygen transfer coefficient with theoretical power per unit volume have been verified by conducting experiments in geometrically similar but differently shaped and sized square tanks, rectangular tanks of length to width ratio (L/W) of 1.5 and 2 as well as circular tanks. Based on the experimental investigations, new simulation criteria to simulate actual power per unit volume have been proposed. Based on such design considerations, it has been demonstrated that it is economical (in terms of energy saving) to use smaller tanks rather than using a bigger tank to aerate the same volume of water for any shape of tanks. Among the various shapes studied, it has been found that circular tanks are more energy efficient than any other shape.