Debt and default in a growth model

This paper presents a small open economy model with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. The optimal debt contract specifies debt relief following bad shocks and debt increase following good shocks and brings first order benefits if the country's borrowing constraint is binding. Countries with less capital (with higher marginal productivity of capital) have a higher debt-GDP ratio, are more likely to default on uncontingent bonds, require higher debt relief after bad shocks and pay a higher spread over treasury. Debt relief prescribed by the optimal contract following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 is more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

Debt maturity determinants in Brazil: evidence from private and public corporate borrowings

This study provides an empirical investigation of the determinants of long-term debt maturity in Brazil. We built a unique database that includes privately placed debt and public debt for 308 publicly traded, non-financial Brazilian companies, from 2009 to 2013. We perform GMM panel analyses using as dependent variables the amount of long-term debt payable in more than one, three, and five years for total debt, BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) debt and corporate bonds. The results show that the BNDES finances less risky firms, i.e., those that are larger, older, more tangible and more transparent. We also find support for information asymmetry theories, as companies with higher transparency levels have similar leverage levels relative to others but higher proportions of long-term debt in their capital structures. Regarding debt levels, we find that more levered companies are larger, less profitable, more tangible and have fewer growth opportunities. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to address the determinants of long-term debt maturity in Brazil that uses various specifications of long-term debt and that examines different types of debt.

Implied Hazard Rates Analysis Through Brazilian Corporate Debt

No Brasil, o mercado de crédito corporativo ainda é sub-aproveitado. A maioria dos participantes não exploram e não operam no mercado secundário, especialmente no caso de debêntures. Apesar disso, há inúmeras ferramentas que poderiam ajudar os participantes do mercado a analisar o risco de crédito e encorajá-los a operar esses riscos no mercado secundário. Essa dissertação introduz um modelo livre de arbitragem que extrai a Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita nos preços de mercado. É uma forma reduzida do modelo proposto por Duffie and Singleton (1999) e modela a estrutura a termo das taxas de juros através de uma Função Constante por Partes. Através do modelo, foi possível analisar a Curva de Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita através dos diferentes instrumentos de emissores corporativos brasileiros, utilizando Títulos de Dívida, Swaps de Crédito e Debêntures. Foi possível comparar as diferentes curvas e decidir, em cada caso analisado, qual a melhor alternativa para se tomar o risco de crédito da empresa, via Títulos de Dívida, Debêntures ou Swaps de Crédito.

Deregulation and The 2007-2008 Housing/Debt Crisis Analysis of the Housing/Debt Crisis of 2007-2008 and its impact on the Financial Strength and Vulnerability of the United States and Global Economy

One looming question has persisted in the minds of economists the world over in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 American Housing and Debt Crisis: How did it begin and who is responsible for making this happen? Another two-part question is: What measures were implemented to help end the crisis and what changes are being implemented to ensure that it will never happen again? Many speculate that the major contributing factor was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 that prompted a virtual feeding frenzy among the banking community when new calls from Capitol Hill encouraged home ownership in America as well as the secondary mortgage market which skyrocketed thereafter. The Glass-Steagall Act will be among many of the topics explored in this paper along with the events leading up to the 2007-2008 housing/debt crisis as well as the aftermath.

Essays on corporate restructuring

Esta tese tem por objetivo examinar as características do processo de decisão em que credores optam pela recuperação judicial ou liquidação da empresa em dificuldade financeira. O trabalho está dividido em quatro capítulos. No segundo capítulo, apresenta-se, de forma sistematizada, referencial teórico e evidências empíricas para apontar resultados importantes sobre estudos desenvolvidos nas áreas de recuperação de empresas e falência. O capítulo também apresenta três estudos de caso com o propósito de mostrar a complexidade de cada caso no que diz respeito à concentração de recursos, conflito de interesse entre as classes de credores e a decisão final sobre a aprovação ou rejeição do plano de recuperação judicial. No terceiro capítulo, analisam-se os determinantes do atraso pertinente à votação do plano de recuperação judicial. O trabalho propõe um estudo empírico dos atrasos entre 2005 e 2014. Os resultados sugerem que: (i) maior concentração da dívida entre as classes de credores possui relação com atrasos menores; (ii) maior quantidade de bancos para votar o plano de recuperação judicial possui relação com maiores atrasos; (iii) o atraso médio na votação diminui quando apenas uma classe de credores participa da votação do plano; (iv) credores trabalhistas e com garantia real atrasam a votação quando o valor dos ativos para garantir a dívida em caso de liquidação é maior; (v) o atraso médio na votação é maior em casos de pior desempenho do setor de atuação do devedor, sendo solicitado pelas classes quirografária e com garantia real; e (vi) a proposta de venda de ativos é o principal tópico discutido nas reuniões de votação do plano nos casos em que o atraso na votação é maior. Por fim, no quarto capítulo, apresenta-se evidência sobre a votação dos credores e a probabilidade de aprovação do plano de recuperação judicial. Os resultados sugerem que: (i) credores trabalhistas estão propensos a aprovar o plano de recuperação mesmo quando o plano é rejeitado pelas demais classes; (ii) planos com propostas de pagamento mais heterogêneas para as três classes de credores possuem menor chance de serem aceitos; (iii) a chance de aprovação do plano diminui nos casos em que mais credores quirografários participam da recuperação; e (iv) planos com proposta de venda de ativos possuem maior chance de serem aprovados. Finalmente, maior concentração da dívida na classe com garantia real diminui a chance de aprovação do plano, e o contrário ocorre na classe quirografária.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

Credit ratings and government bonds evidence before, during and after the european debt crisis

Neste projeto, investigamos se as agências de rating e as taxas de juro de longo prazo da dívida soberana tiveram uma influência recíproca antes, durante e após a crise da dívida soberana Europeia. Esta análise é realizada, estimando a relação existente entre os ratings da dívida soberana ou taxas de juro e factores macroeconomicos e estruturais, através de uma diferente aplicação de metodologias utilizadas para este efeito. Os resultados obtidos demonstram que, no período da crise soberana, os ratings e as taxas de juros tiveram um mútuo impacto, sugerindo que as descidas dos ratings podem ter conduzido a profecias auto-realizáveis, levando países relativamente estáveis a um eventual incumprimento

Delays in stabilization or in reforms? The debt crisis

Empirical analyses attributing the 1980s' debt crisis to inconsistent stabilization policies rest on an inappropriate long-run approach. Revising this long-run approach yields opposite results: terms of trade shocks and foreign indebtedness explain this crisis, regardless of domestic stabilization policies. This prompts us to consider a new hypothesis, of delays in trade-policy reforms, with a model in which terms-of-trade variation (under shocks) is endogenous to export structure and efficiency of resource allocation. Evidence from the structural equations model shows that allocation distortions negatively affect changes in terms of trade, which then explain this crisis. A political economy extension demonstrates that income inequality and regional trade policy determine the distortions, which in turn leads to this crisis.

The debt crisis: a re-appraisal

The 1980s' debt crisis is a landmark in developing economies' growth and stabilization. According to the most quoted empirical articles, external shocks and vicissitudes gave rise to crisis just because of delays in stabilization policies, engendered by internal conflicts and institutional immaturity. I review some of these papers, and find out some problems - in the measurement of shocks and foreign indebtedness, namely - whose corrections lead to opposite results: external shocks and foreign indebtedness explain that crisis regardless of domestic policies. At the same time, the strong correlation of income distribution to terms of trade changes and foreign indebtedness suggest that inequality may have contributed differently to that crisis: either through an economic channel, or through a political channel based on delays in reforms.

World inflation and foreign debt: the case of the improper deflator

Includes bibliography

The real cost of the external debt for the creditor and for the debtor

Includes bibliography

Debt financing rollercoaster: Latin American and Caribbean access to international bond markets since the debt crisis, 1982-2012

Includes bibliography

Ajuste del balance de pagos, política crediticia y control del endeudamiento externo = Balance-of-payments adjustment, credit policy and control of the external debt

Incluye Bibliografía

Debt for nature: a swap whose time has gone?

Includes bibliography

Finding solutions to the debt problems of developing countries: report of the Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations (New York, 20 May 1999)

Includes bibliography