Drivers of populism - A four-country comparison of party communication in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections

The aim of this paper is to analyze what different types of populist communication styles emerged during the 2014 EP election campaign and under which conditions political parties selected specific populist communication styles. To do this, a comparative quantitative content analysis of press releases in the run-up of the latest EP elections has been conducted for parties in France, Germany, Austria and Greece. The paper presents a definition of populism based on the contemporary academic discourse, which focuses on the transnational nature of the European political field. It is shown that populist party communication is more pronounced on the fringes of the political spectrum and in countries struggling with severe macroeconomic difficulties. Contrary to intuitive expectations, the perceived populist rhetoric of exclusivity in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, which is identified as a central feature of right-wing populism, barely takes place within populist party communication.

Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation:evidence from household and firm portfolios

We use a unique dataset with bank clients’ security holdings for all German banks to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect asset allocation preferences of households and non-financial firms. Our analysis focuses on two alternative mechanisms which can influence portfolio choice: wealth shocks, which are represented by the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area, and credit-supply shocks which arise from reductions in borrowing abilities during bank distress. While households with large holdings of securities from stressed Euro area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) de-crease the degree of concentration in their security portfolio as a result of the Euro area crisis, non-financial firms with similar levels of holdings from stressed Euro area countries do not. Credit-supply shocks at the bank level result in lower concentration, for both households and non-financial corporations. Only shocks to corporate credit bear ramifications on bank clients’ portfolio concentration. Our results are robust to falsification tests, and instrumental variables estimation.

Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation:evidence from household and firm portfolios

We use a unique dataset with bank clients’ security holdings for all German banks to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect asset allocation preferences of households and non-financial firms. Our analysis focuses on two alternative mechanisms which can influence portfolio choice: wealth shocks, which are represented by the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, and credit-supply shocks which arise from reductions in borrowing abilities during bank distress. We document het- erogeneous responses to these two types of shocks. While households with large holdings of secu- rities from stressed Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) decrease the degree of concentration in their security portfolio as a result of the Eurozone crisis, non-financial firms with similar levels of holdings from stressed Eurozone countries do not. Credit-supply shocks at the bank level (caused by bank distress) result in lower concentration, for both households and non-financial corporations. We also show that only shocks to corporate credit bear ramifications on bank clients’ portfolio concentration, while shocks in retail credit are inconsequential. Our results are robust to falsification tests, propensity score matching techniques, and instrumental variables estimation.

Megmenthető-e az euróövezet? (Can the eurozone be saved?)

Az euró válságának szélesebb globális összefüggései vannak, mind a kiváltó okait, mind a nemzetközi pénzügyi rendszer működésének hiányosságait illetően. Az európai monetáris integráció szilárd reálgazdasági alapokon nyugszik. Az euró teljesítménye mind az árstabilitás, mind az árfolyamok ingadozása tekintetében megfelelőnek tekinthető. Az euróválság szuverénadósság-válság, és leginkább a zóna egyes (déli) országait érinti. Az euróválság okai többrétűek: ezek között az eurózóna hibás konstrukcióját, téves koncepcionális feltételezéseit, a politikai kompromisszumokkal folyamatosan megnyomorított működését említhetjük leginkább. A közös pénz önmagában nem oka a válságnak és nem is bűvös ellenszer. A hibás gazdaságpolitikáért belül ugyanúgy bűnhődni kell, mint kívül. Görögország, vagy Írország elsősorban nem azért került válságba, mert tagjai az eurózónának, hanem mert hibás gazdaságpolitikát folytattak. Nem zárható ki az eurózóna szétesése, de kicsi az esélye. / === / The euro crisis has broad global connections, both in terms of deficiencies of the international monetary system, and of the crisis of the global financial markets. The European monetary integration is based on strong real-economic foundations. The performance of the euro has been satisfactory both in terms of price and exchange rate stability. The present crisis is a sovereign debt crisis, and it is concentrated mainly on some Southern members. The causes of the crisis are manifold: wrong institutional and policy structures, mistaken conceptual assumptions, and the distortion of its operation by continuous political compromises. The contradictions between common monetary policy and the national fiscal policies, the failure of disciplining role of the markets, the weakness of control of national fiscal policies, the dangers of "one size fits all" monetary policy, the failure of finding the proper national policy mixes, particularly in terms of income and structural policies, and the underestimation of social and cultural differences, can be particularly stressed. The common monetary policy failed to secure the necessary equilibrium among liquidity, stability and growth. Greece and Ireland got in crisis not because they are members of the euro zone, but because of their mistaken economic policies. The collapse of the euro zone cannot be excluded, but the chances of it are limited.

Rules-based economic governance in the European Union: A reappraisal of national fiscal rules.

The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong political commitment.

The Reverse Balassa–Samuelson Effect in the Euro Zone

The debt crisis of the eurozone revealed a structural problem of the single market. The single currency created a pegged foreign exchange system among the euro member states. Thus, the less competitive countries can not improve their wage competitiveness through devaluation, but are motivated to extend the current consumption as the single central bank rate and the zone stability created cheap debt financing. The paper overviews the process of Reverse Balassa-Samuelson effect to explain the importance of external imbalance in the debt crisis.

Az államcsőd költségei régen és ma (Costs of sovereign defaults now and long ago)

Az államoknak nyújtott hitelekre gyakran gondolunk biztonságos befektetésként, lehetetlen vagy legalábbis valószerűtlen kimenetelként kezelve az államcsőd lehetőségét. Pedig államcsődök azóta vannak, amióta szuverén államok hitelt vesznek fel, és még csak nem is ritka eseményekről van szó. Amikor egy-egy válság vagy csődesemény felhívja erre a figyelmünket, a leggyakrabban elhangzó kérdés az, hogy miért következett be a csőd. Ebben a tanulmányban a szerző ennél furcsább kérdésre hívja fel a figyelmet: mi késztet egy hitelt felvevő államot arra, hogy visszafizesse hiteleit, vagyis miért nem megy csődbe? Ez rögtön felvet egy további, talán még meglepőbb problémát: miért kap egyáltalán egy szuverén állam hitelt? Ezekre a kérdésekre már régóta tudni véljük a választ: azért, mert az államcsődnek költségei vannak. A lehetséges költségek és a hozzájuk kapcsolódó empirikus kutatások értelmezésével és rendszerezésével, az ellentmondások feltárásával azonban a szerző felhívja a figyelmet arra, hogy bár elképzeléseink vannak és lehetnek, valójában nem ismerjük a törlesztést kikényszerítő és így az államadósságok létezését biztosító mechanizmusokat. Talán éppen azért nem, mert az államcsőd lehetséges politikai, gazdasági következményei - azaz költségei - idővel legalább annyira változnak, mint öltözködési, étkezési és közlekedési szokásaink. ____ Loans to sovereign states are often referred to as safe investments, treating default as an impossible or at least improbable event. Yet sovereign defaults have been arising ever since countries borrowed money. They are not rare at all. When a debt crisis or default event draws attention to the problem, the commonest question put is why defaults occur. This paper stresses the need to ask a less common question as well: why sovereign states repay loans, why they do not default. Consequent on that is why rational lenders give money to countries. The answer to these questions seems to be because defaults are costly. The paper reviews and systematizes possible cost types and explores inconsistencies in the related literature, to show that the mechanisms supporting the existence of sovereign debts are not precisely known. One reason why costs of defaults are challenging to study may be that the possible political and economic consequences of defaults change over time.

The Argentine Dilemma: “Vulture Funds” and the Risks Posed to Developing Economies

Post-crisis Argentina is a case study of crisis management through debt restructuring. This article examines how Argentina negotiated the external debt in the wake of the sovereign default in December 2001 and now confronts challenges posed by holdout creditors—the so called “vulture funds”. It argues that debt restructuring has put a straitjacket on the national economy, making it virtually impossible for healthy growth short of a break with the international economic order. While Argentina has successfully restructured a $95 billion debt with an unprecedented “hair cut” (around 70% reduction in “net value of debt”), a sustainable growth appears out of reach as long as reliance on the government debt market prevails. In this cycle, the transmission belt of financial crisis to developing countries is characterized by the entry of highly speculative players such as hedge funds, conflicts of interests embedded in “sovereign debt restructuring” (SDR) and vulnerabilities associated with “emerging market debt”.

Eurobonos: evolución y soluciones de la deuda en Europa

En este trabajo se analizan los principales problemas derivados de la gestión de la deuda pública, discutiendo si es un problema latente o puntual. A continuación, se propone un mecanismo solución a la crisis de deuda soberana que sufren los países de la Eurozona en el marco de la crisis financiera internacional. Dicho mecanismo consiste en la combinación de un proceso de reestructuración unido a la creación de un sistema común de emisión de deuda soberana en la Eurozona, denominado habitualmente como Eurobonos. Por tanto, el objetivo de esta investigación es ofrecer los elementos analíticos necesarios para comprender las posibles soluciones a los problemas de la deuda pública.

Bond Fund Performance During Recessions and Expansions: Empirical Evidence from a Small Market

This paper provides the first investigation about bond mutual fund performance during recession and expansion periods separately. Based on multi-factor performance evaluation models, results show that bond funds significantly underperform the market during both phases of the business cycle. Nevertheless, unlike equity funds, bond funds exhibit considerably higher alphas during good economic states than during market downturns. These results, however, seem entirely driven by the global financial crisis subperiod. In contrast, during the recession associated to the Euro sovereign debt crisis, bond funds are able to accomplish neutral performance. This improved performance throughout the debt crisis seems to be related to more conservative investment strategies, which reflect an increase in managers’ risk aversion.

Análise do contágio nos principais índices bolsistas europeu e norte-americano

Mestrado em Controlo de Gestão e dos Negócios

Sobre o contágio nos mercados bolsistas internacionais: evidência de nove países

Mestrado em Contabilidade e Análise Financeira

Low-Volatility Anomaly in Helsinki Stock Exchange

International research shows that low-volatility stocks have beaten high-volatility stocks in terms of returns for decades on multiple markets. This abbreviation from traditional risk-return framework is known as low-volatility anomaly. This study focuses on explaining the anomaly and finding how strongly it appears in NASDAQ OMX Helsinki stock exchange. Data consists of all listed companies starting from 2001 and ending close to 2015. Methodology follows closely Baker and Haugen (2012) by sorting companies into deciles according to 3-month volatility and then calculating monthly returns for these different volatility groups. Annualized return for the lowest volatility decile is 8.85 %, while highest volatility decile destroys wealth at rate of -19.96 % per annum. Results are parallel also in quintiles that represent larger amount of companies and thus dilute outliers. Observation period captures financial crisis of 2007-2008 and European debt crisis, which embodies as low main index annual return of 1 %, but at the same time proves the success of low-volatility strategy. Low-volatility anomaly is driven by multiple reasons such as leverage constrained trading and managerial incentives which both prompt to invest in risky assets, but behavioral matters also have major weight in maintaining the anomaly.

Volatility Spillover and Multivariate Volatility Impulse Response Analysis of GFC News Events

This paper applies two measures to assess spillovers across markets: the Diebold Yilmaz (2012) Spillover Index and the Hafner and Herwartz (2006) analysis of multivariate GARCH models using volatility impulse response analysis. We use two sets of data, daily realized volatility estimates taken from the Oxford Man RV library, running from the beginning of 2000 to October 2016, for the S&P500 and the FTSE, plus ten years of daily returns series for the New York Stock Exchange Index and the FTSE 100 index, from 3 January 2005 to 31 January 2015. Both data sets capture both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the subsequent European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC). The spillover index captures the transmission of volatility to and from markets, plus net spillovers. The key difference between the measures is that the spillover index captures an average of spillovers over a period, whilst volatility impulse responses (VIRF) have to be calibrated to conditional volatility estimated at a particular point in time. The VIRF provide information about the impact of independent shocks on volatility. In the latter analysis, we explore the impact of three different shocks, the onset of the GFC, which we date as 9 August 2007 (GFC1). It took a year for the financial crisis to come to a head, but it did so on 15 September 2008, (GFC2). The third shock is 9 May 2010. Our modelling includes leverage and asymmetric effects undertaken in the context of a multivariate GARCH model, which are then analysed using both BEKK and diagonal BEKK (DBEKK) models. A key result is that the impact of negative shocks is larger, in terms of the effects on variances and covariances, but shorter in duration, in this case a difference between three and six months.

Banca Digital

Em plena quarta revolução industrial, todas as industrias se estão a transformar para se ajustar aos novos paradigmas de relação com os clientes, altamente influenciados pelos pioneiros digitais como a Uber, Netflix ou Amazon, porém no setor financeiro há desafios acrescidos, pois os clientes esperam juntar essas expectativas digitais com a manutenção da iteração humana, enquanto, do lados bancos, em simultâneo, necessitam de recuperar da crise da dívida soberana que impôs necessidades de ajustamento dos balanços. O momento de desenvolvimento tecnológico potenciado pelo forte crescimento do acesso à internet em mobilidade traz novos hábitos e expectativas na relação com as entidades, com dispositivos cada vez mais potentes a cada vez menor custo, o que criou a oportunidade perfeita para o surgimento de startups tecnológicas dispostas a transformar os modelos de negócio de intermediação clássica, dando origem, no setor financeiro, às fintechs – empresas de base tecnológica dedicadas à prestação de serviços financeiros - impondo uma disrupção na industria financeira, com destaque para mercados como os EUA e Reino Unido. Olhando aos últimos cinco anos do setor financeiro, será muito difícil antecipar como estará o setor financeiro dentro de cinco anos, mas sabemos que estará seguramente muito diferente do que conhecemos hoje, por esse fato este trabalho é assente essencialmente em referências bibliográficas dos últimos 5 anos, tendo sido feito utilizados estudos de investigação de empresas e documentos académicos para a caracterização do setor neste contexto de inovação permanente e em que medida este processo de “digitalização” do setor financeiro influencia a propensão dos clientes na contratação de mais produtos e serviços, sendo esse um fator central para os bancos em Portugal recuperarem economicamente. É também analisada a dimensão seguida pelas instituições de regulação e supervisão do setor financeiro com vista a potenciar a concorrência e inovação do setor financeiro, enquanto mantém a garantia de segurança, confiança e controlo de risco sistémico. É bastante escassa a literatura disponível para caracterizar a banca em Portugal numa ótica de inovação e transformação, porém este trabalho procura caracterizar o sistema financeiro português face à forma como está a responder aos desafios de transformação tecnológica e digital. Procurou-se estabelecer uma metodologia de investigação que permita caracterizar a perceção de valor acrescentado para os clientes da utilização de serviços digitais e em que medida estes se podem substituir aos balcões e à intervenção humana dos profissionais dos bancos, tendo-se concluído que estes dois elementos são ainda fatores centrais para os clientes.