Incidencia de los actores internacionales no estatales en los conflictos internos. Estudio de caso: la participación de las empresas militares privadas “Executive Outcomes” y “Sandline International” en la guerra civil de Sierra Leona (1991-2002)

La Participación de las Empresas Militares Executive Outcomes y Sandline International en el conflicto de Sierra Leona fue una de las primeras veces en las que se vieron en escena a estos actores confluyendo en un nuevo orden internacional; y este estudio de caso busca determinar la manera de actuar de estas empresas y su incidencia en el conflicto. El caso de Sierra Leona es uno de los principales acercamientos a este nuevo fenómeno, que empezó a ejercer funciones que tradicionalmente le correspondían a los Estados y que han llevado a una privatización de la seguridad. Por medio de este estudio de caso se busca también determinar cuáles son las falencias y los retos que acarrean a las Empresas Militares Privadas en cuanto a su intervención en los conflictos internos. El caso de Sierra Leona es fundamental en tanto fue uno de los conflictos más intensos desarrollados en África en la década de los 90; y fue el momento en el cual las Empresas Militares Privadas empezaron a estar en la mira internacional a causa de estas intervenciones que generaron tanto críticas negativas como positivas.

Conflict and child labor: evidence from poor households in Colombia

Colombia suffers from one of the longest civil conflicts in the world, which is believed to have had several consequences on the country’s economic and development performance. This study uses measures of central government deterrence effort as instruments of conflict to estimate the impact of conflict on children’s time allocation to two different types of work: housework and work performed outside the household for poor families living in small municipalities in Colombia. I find that conflict significantly increases the amount of time children allocate to work. Both housework, for girls, and work outside the household, for boys, increase with Guerrilla attacks. However, the later effect is the opposite for Paramilitary attacks.

Influencia de la estrategia de guerra jurídica de las FARC-EP en la autonomía del sistema judicial colombiano

La presente investigación tiene como objeto analizar la influencia de la estrategia de guerra jurídica de las Farc en la autonomía del sistema judicial colombiano. Así mismo, se busca desarrollar un análisis de la VIII Conferencia Nacional Guerrillera de las Farc, con el fin de dar cuenta de la evolución de sus planes estratégicos, que han llevado a la inserción en nuevos teatros de operaciones. Lo anterior irá enfocado en la importancia que tiene para la guerrilla de las Farc el paso de la guerra de guerrillas a la guerra asimétrica; y en ésta última será posible encontrar el sustento teórico necesario para realizar el presente estudio. Por último, se pretende resaltar que la evolución del plan ha conllevado a una inseguridad jurídica perjudicial para los principales fines del Estado, causando con esto un debilitamiento de las instituciones.

La piratería de Nigeria como una amenaza a la seguridad marítima del Golfo de Guinea (2007-2012). Una aproximación desde el crimen organizado

Desde finales de los 70 la piratería se convirtió en un problema para Nigeria. Con el tiempo adquirió características del crimen organizado y en 2010 se transformó en un problema transnacional, afectando a Estados del golfo de Guinea. Así, a través de una base conceptual, el estudio de caso concluyó que los factores internos –como la pobreza, debilidad estatal y marginalización- y externos –siendo ellos la falta de políticas internas destinadas a las aguas y la ausencia de estrategias marítimas en la región- de la piratería, crearon una dinámica para que dicha actividad se convirtiera en una amenaza a la seguridad marítima del golfo de Guinea, tomando como referencia a Benín y Togo. Siguiendo la línea argumentativa, se demuestra que la búsqueda de una solución a la delincuencia marítima ha generado interacciones de seguridad que sugieren las primeras fases de un posible complejo de seguridad regional.

Learning how (not) to fire a gun: combatant training and civilian victimization

What is the relationship between the type of training combatants receive upon recruitment into an armed group and their propensity to abuse civilians in civil war? Does military training or political training prevent or exacerbate the victimization of civilians by armed non-state actors? While the literature on civilian victimization has expanded rapidly, few studies have examined the correlation between abuse of civilians and the modes of training that illegal armed actors receive. Using a simple formal model, we develop hypotheses regarding this connection and argue that while military training should not decrease the probability that a combatant engages in civilian abuse, political training should. We test these hypotheses using a new survey consisting of a representative sample of approximately 1,500 demobilized combatants from the Colombian conflict, which we match with department-level data on civilian casualties. The empirical analysis confirms our hypotheses about the connection between training and civilian abuse and the results are robust to adding a full set of controls both at the department and at the individual level

Military empowerment and civilian targeting in civil war

Civilians constitute a large share of casualties in civil wars across the world. They are targeted to create fear and punish allegiance with the enemy. This maximizes collaboration with the perpetrator and strengthens the support network necessary to consolidate control over contested regions. I develop a model of the magnitude and structure of civilian killings in civil wars involving two armed groups who Öght over territorial control. Armies secure compliance through a combination of carrots and sticks. In turn, civilians di§er from each other in their intrinsic preference towards one group. I explore the e§ect of the empowerment of one of the groups in the civilian death toll. There are two e§ects that go in opposite directions. While a direct e§ect makes the powerful group more lethal, there is an indirect e§ect by which the number of civilians who align with that group increases, leaving less enemy supporters to kill. I study the conditions under which there is one dominant e§ect and illustrate the predictions using sub-national longitudinal data for Colombiaís civil war.

Publicness of goods and violent conflict : evidence from Colombia

How the degree of publicness of goods affect violent conflict? Based on the theoretical model in Esteban and Ray (2001) we find that the effect of the degree of publicness depends on the group size. When the group is small (large), the degree of publicness increases (decreases) the likelihood of conflict. This opens an empirical question that we tackle using microdata from the Colombian conflict at the municipality level. We use three goods with different publicness degree to identify the sign of the effect of publicness on conflict. These goods are coca crops (private good), road density (public good subject to congestion) and average education quality (a purer public good). After dealing with endogeneity issues using an IV approach, we find that the degree of publicness reduces the likelihood of both paramilitary and guerrilla attacks. Moreover, coca production exacerbates conflict and the provision of both public goods mitigates conflict. These results are robust to size, geographical, and welfare controls. Policies that improve public goods provision will help to fight the onset of conflict.

The environmental impact of civil conflict : the deforestation effect of paramilitary expansion in Colombia

Despite a growing body of literature on how environmental degradation can fuel civil war, the reverse effect, namely that of conflict on environmental outcomes, is relatively understudied. From a theoretical point of view this effect is ambiguous, with some forces pointing to pressures for environmental degradation and some pointing in the opposite direction. Hence, the overall effect of conflict on the environment is an empirical question. We study this relationship in the case of Colombia. We combine a detailed satellite-based longitudinal dataset on forest cover across municipalities over the period 1990-2010 with a comprehensive panel of conflict-related violent actions by paramilitary militias. We first provide evidence that paramilitary activity significantly reduces the share of forest cover in a panel specification that includes municipal and time fixed effects. Then we confirm these findings by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment that provides us with an exogenous source of variation for the expansion of the paramilitary. Using the distance to the region of Urab´a, the epicenter of such expansion, we instrument paramilitary activity in each cross-section for which data on forest cover is available. As a falsification exercise, we show that the instrument ceases to be relevant after the paramilitaries largely demobilized following peace negotiations with the government. Further, after the demobilization the deforestation effect of the paramilitaries disappears. We explore a number of potential mechanisms that may explain the conflict-driven deforestation, and show evidence suggesting that paramilitary violence generates large outflows of people in order to secure areas for growing illegal crops, exploit mineral resources, and engage in extensive agriculture. In turn, these activities are associated with deforestation.

Violence and growth in colombia : a review of the quantitative literature

This is a critical review of the empirical literature on the relationship between violence and economic growth in Colombia: an interesting case study for social scientists studying violence, conflict, crime and development. We argue that, despite the rapid development of this literature and the increasing use of new techniques, there is still much room for research. After assessing the contribution of the most influential papers on the subject, we suggest directions for future research.

Beyond divide and rule : weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict

We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation’s natural resources to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents. Inter-group fighting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to increase fiscal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conflict for his own profit, especially if the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specific heterogeneity.

Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war

Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.

Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria

Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.

Don't make war, make elections : Franchise extension and violence in XIXth-century Colombia

This paper studies the effect of strengthening democracy, as captured by an increase in voting rights, on the incidence of violent civil conflict in nineteenth-century Colombia. Empirically studying the relationship between democracy and conflict is challenging, not only because of conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy, but also because political institutions and violence are jointly determined. We take advantage of an experiment of history to examine the impact of one simple, measurable dimension of democracy (the size of the franchise) on con- flict, while at the same time attempting to overcome the identification problem. In 1853, Colombia established universal male suffrage. Using a simple difference-indifferences specification at the municipal level, we find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised relative to their population experienced fewer violent political battles while the reform was in effect. The results are robust to including a number of additional controls. Moreover, we investigate the potential mechanisms driving the results. In particular, we look at which components of the proportion of new voters in 1853 explain the results, and we examine if results are stronger in places with more political competition and state capacity. We interpret our findings as suggesting that violence in nineteenth-century Colombia was a technology for political elites to compete for the rents from power, and that democracy constituted an alternative way to compete which substituted violence.

Why peace processes fail or move forward? Negotiations in Colombia with FARC and AUC (1998-2003)

Este trabajo examina la teoría sobre guerras civiles y resolución de conflictos con el fin de contestar la pregunta: ¿por qué fracasan o progresan los procesos de paz? Se miraron los procesos de paz en Colombia en los últimos cinco años cuando comenzó y fracasó el proceso de paz con las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC y comenzaron con las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC. La teoría revela la relevancia de factores económicos, políticos, participación externa y militares para explicar por que fallan o prosperan los procesos de paz. Por su parte, el fracaso de las negociaciones con las FARC puede explicarse por razones de estrategia militar, el rol de la violencia durante la negociación y la falta de participación internacional. De otro lado, evitando todos los puntos sensibles de la negociación inicial, las AUC ganaron apoyo de la opinión publica y la confianza del gobierno para iniciar los diálogos. De esta forma, tenemos dos procesos recientes en Colombia para analizar: uno que fallo y el otro que esta progresando. El análisis de estos procesos puede ayudarnos a contestar la pregunta inicial de este trabajo.

Georgia y Rusia: la identidad como factor delimitador de los intereses y políticas de ambos estados con sus efectos en la Guerra de Osetia del Sur en 2008

Esta monografía se centra en evaluar mediante un enfoque constructivista, y a partir de una serie de hechos históricos, cómo la identidad construida por Rusia y Georgia fue el detonante de la Guerra de Osetia del Sur en 2008. Para tal objetivo, se partirá del supuesto que este conflicto fue el resultado de las diferencias entre ambos actores que desarrollaron una serie de políticas antagónicas, enmarcadas en una cultura de anarquía hobbesiana la cual se configuró tras la Revolución de las Rosas y la posterior llegada de Mijaíl Saakashvili al poder, puesto que Georgia se convertiría en el principal aliado de occidente en el Cáucaso, basado en un rol anti ruso y disidente de la influencia del Kremlin en la zona, divergiendo con el liderazgo de Rusia el cual se fundamenta en una identidad construida a raíz de su pasado imperial y hegemónico.