Developing real option game models

By mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory, an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a ‘‘game’’ between firms, as firms implicitly take into account other firms’ reactions to their own investment actions. We review two decades of real option game models, suggesting which critical problems have been ‘‘solved’’ by considering game theory, and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed. We provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications, or shortfalls in applications to date, and suggest some promising avenues for future research.

Industry-academia linkages in a high tech research field

Currently academic researches' focus started changing towards protecting IP rights and to transferring them into industrial actors. Accordingly, it is argued that academic's basic research focus started shifting towards applied research as it is essential for the radical inventions to be introduced in a competitive market. This research seeks to understand industry-academia linkages in a high tech field such as nano-crystals. In regards to supporting the technology transfer process within or cross country, this study illustrates the technology development trends and actors' engagement; nano-crystals technology and their interconnections; and maps the organisational (industry-academia) linkages that enhance the commercialisation of radical inventions. The results show that the industry-academia linkages that appeared as decentralized structure are more stable compared to other linkage types. Korean and Japanese organisations present such stable linkages. The linkages are even stronger when they appear as a mono-linkage type. Chinese organisations show a great illustration of such an effective mono-linkage of co-inventorships in high tech research field. The organisations in the US maintain international linkages.

AV11006 Competitive threat to fresh avocado market from processed products

Response to industry call. Compare range of current and possible processed products versus whole fresh avocado for both retail and food service markets. Explore and evaluate opportunities for value added products.

Exploring the characteristics of the market-driven firms and antecedents to sustained competitive advantage

During the last few decades, identifying and examining the characteristics of market-driven firms have been a dominant theme in strategic marketing research. It has been argued that market-driven firms are superior in their market sensing and customer linking capabilities, enabling market-driven firms to outperform their competitors. This paper reports the findings of a study that examines the role market-focused learning capability and marketing capability in innovation-based competitive strategy on sustainable competitive advantage. The findings indicate that entrepreneurship is an important factor in sustained competitive advantage (SCA) and while market-focused learning capability leads to higher degrees of innovation, marketing capability enables SCA. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Genetic algorithm-based spinning reserve dispatching in a competitive electricity market

Power systems rely greatly on ancillary services in maintaining operation security. As one of the most important ancillary services, spinning reserve must be provided effectively in the deregulated market environment. This paper focuses on the design of an integrated market for both electricity and spinning reserve service with particular emphasis on coordinated dispatch of bulk power and spinning reserve services. A new market dispatching mechanism has been developed to minimize the ISO's total payment while ensuring system security. Genetic algorithms are used in the finding of the global optimal solutions for this dispatching problem. Case studies and corresponding analyses haw been carried out to demonstrate and discuss the efficiency and usefulness of the proposed market.

Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market

The existence of undesirable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market requires an efficient auction mechanism. However, many of the existing auction mechanism have difficulties in suppressing such unreasonable price spikes effectively. A new auction mechanism is proposed to suppress effectively unreasonable price spikes in a competitive electricity market. It optimally combines system marginal price auction and pay as bid auction mechanisms. A threshold value is determined to activate the switching between the marginal price auction and the proposed composite auction. Basically when the system marginal price is higher than the threshold value, the composite auction for high price electricity market is activated. The winning electricity sellers will sell their electricity at the system marginal price or their own bid prices, depending on their rights of being paid at the system marginal price and their offers' impact on suppressing undesirable price spikes. Such economic stimuli discourage sellers from practising economic and physical withholdings. Multiple price caps are proposed to regulate strong market power. We also compare other auction mechanisms to highlight the characteristics of the proposed one. Numerical simulation using the proposed auction mechanism is given to illustrate the procedure of this new auction mechanism.