Cooperative and market-based solutions to pollution abatement problems

This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.

Investigation of competitive antagonist binding to the nicotinic acetylcholine receptor using voltage-jump and light-flash techniques

1. The effect of 2,2’-bis-[α-(trimethylammonium)methyl]azobenzene (2BQ), a photoisomerizable competitive antagonist, was studied at the nicotinic acetycholine receptor of Electrophorus electroplaques using voltage-jump and light-flash techniques.

2. 2BQ, at concentrations below 3 μΜ, reduced the amplitude of voltage-jump relaxations but had little effect on the voltage-jump relaxation time constants under all experimental conditions. At higher concentrations and voltages more negative than -150 mV, 2BQ caused significant open channel blockade.

3. Dose-ratio studies showed that the cis and trans isomers of 2BQ have equilibrium binding constants (K _ᵢ) of .33 and 1.0 μΜ, respectively. The binding constants determined for both isomers are independent of temperature, voltage, agonist concentration, and the nature of the agonist.

4. In a solution of predominantly cis-2BQ, visible-light flashes led to a net cis→trans isomerization and caused an increase in the agonist-induced current. This increase had at least two exponential components; the larger amplitude component had the same time constant as a subsequent voltage-jump relaxation; the smaller amplitude component was investigated using ultraviolet light flashes.

5. In a solution of predominantly trans-2BQ, UV-light flashes led to a net trans→cis isomerization and caused a net decrease in the agonist-induced current. This effect had at least two exponential components. The smaller and faster component was an increase in agonist-induced current and had a similar time constant to the voltage-jump relaxation. The larger component was a slow decrease in the agonist-induced current with rate constant approximately an order of magnitude less than that of the voltage-jump relaxation. This slow component provided a measure of the rate constant for dissociation of cis-2BQ (k_ = 60/s at 20°C). Simple modelling of the slope of the dose-rate curves yields an association rate constant of 1.6 x 10⁸/M/s. This agrees with the association rate constant of 1.8 x 10⁸/M/s estimated from the binding constant (K_i). The Q₁₀ of the dissociation rate constant of cis-2BQ was 3.3 between 6° and 20°C. The rate constants for association and dissociation of cis-28Q at receptors are independent of voltage, agonist concentration, and the nature of the agonist.

6. We have measured the molecular rate constants of a competitive antagonist which has roughly the same K _ᵢ as d-tubocurarine but interacts more slowly with the receptor. This leads to the conclusion that curare itself has an association rate constant of 4 x 10⁹/M/s or roughly as fast as possible for an encounter-limited reaction.