Environmental regulation of land use and public compensation: principles, and Swiss and Australian examples

The authors discuss the regulation of rural land use and compensation for property-rights restrictions, both of which appear to have become more commonplace in recent years but also more contested. The implications of contemporary theories in relation to this matter are examined, including: the applicability of new welfare economics; the relevance of the neoclassical theory of politics; and the implications of contemporary theories of social conflict resolution and communication. Examination of examples of Swiss and Australian regulation of the use of rural properties, and the ensuing conflicts, reveals that many decisions reflect a mixture of these elements. Rarely, if ever, are social decisions in this area made solely on the basis of welfare economics, for instance social cost-benefit analysis. Only some aspects of such decisions can be explained by the neoclassical theory of politics. Theories of social conflict resolution suggest why, and in what way, approaches of discourse and participation may resolve conflicts regarding regulation and compensation. These theories and their practical application seem to gain in importance as opposition to government decisions increases. The high degree of complexity of most conflicts concerning regulation and compensation cannot be tackled with narrow economic theories. Moreover, the Swiss and Australian examples show that approaches involving conflict resolution may favour environmental standards.

Autonomy-enhancing paternalism

We present a form of soft paternalism called "autonomy-enhancing paternalism" that seeks to in-crease individual well-being by facilitating the individual ability to make critically reflected, autonomous decisions. The focus of autonomy-enhancing paternalism is on helping individuals to become better decision-makers, rather than on helping them by making better decisions for them. Autonomy-enhancing paternalism acknowledges that behavioral interventions can change the strength of decision-making anomalies over time, and favors those interventions that improve, rather than reduce, individuals ability to make good and unbiased decisions. By this it prevents manipulation of the individual by the soft paternalist, accounts for the heterogeneity of individuals, and counteracts slippery slope arguments by decreasing the probability of future paternalistic interventions. Moreover, autonomy-enhancing paternalism can be defended based on both liberal values and welfare considerations.

Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue, and penalties based on profits. Our analysis is the first to compare these regimes in terms of their impact on both (i) the prices charged by those cartels that do form; and (ii) the number of stable cartels that form (deterrence). We show that the class of penalties based on profits is identical to the class of fixed penalties in all welfare-relevant respects. For the other three types of penalty we show that, for those cartels that do form, penalties based on the overcharge produce lower prices than those based on profit) while penalties based on revenue produce the highest prices. Further, in conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the overcharge out-perform those based on profits, which in turn out-perform those based on revenue in terms of their impact on each of the following welfare criteria: (a) average overcharge; (b) average consumer surplus; (c) average total welfare.

Monetary policy misspecification in VAR models

We examine the effects of extracting monetary policy disturbances with semi-structural and structural VARs, using data generated bya limited participation model under partial accommodative and feedback rules. We find that, in general, misspecification is substantial: short run coefficients often have wrong signs; impulse responses and variance decompositions give misleadingrepresentations of the dynamics. Explanations for the results and suggestions for macroeconomic practice are provided.

Income maintenance programs and multidimensional screening

This paper examines properties of optimal poverty assistance programs under different informational environments using an income maintenanceframework. To that end, we make both the income generating ability andthe disutility of labor of individuals unobservable, and compare theresulting benefit schedules with those of programs found in the UnitedStates since Welfare Reform (1996). We find that optimal programs closelyresemble a Negative Income Tax with a Benefit Reduction rate that dependson the distribution of population characteristics. A policy of workfare(unpaid public sector work) is inefficient when disutility of labor isunobservable, but minimum work requirements (for paid work) may be usedin that same environment. The distortions to work incentives and thepresence of minimum work requirements depend on the observability andrelative importance of the population's characteristics.

Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media

Within a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competitionamong arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize qualityand content of media under different ownership structures. Assumingadvertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topicssensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by alloutlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentrationof ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number ofowners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relieson consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by thesame media companies. We argue that externalities resulting fromself-censorship could be empirically large.

Generational effects on adult height in individual heterogeneity

As adult height is a well-established retrospective measure of health and standard of living, it is important to understand the factors that determine it. Among them, the influence of socio-environmental factors has been subjected to empirical scrutiny. This paper explores the influence of generational (or environmental) effects and individual and gender-specific heterogeneity on adult height. Our data set is from contemporary Spain, a country governed by an authoritarian regime between 1939 and 1977. First, we use normal position and quantile regression analysis to identify the determinants of self-reported adult height and to measure the influence of individual heterogeneity. Second, we use a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach to explain the `gender height gap¿ and its distribution, so as to measure the influence on this gap of individual heterogeneity. Our findings suggest a significant increase in adult height in the generations that benefited from the country¿s economic liberalization in the 1950s, and especially those brought up after the transition to democracy in the 1970s. In contrast, distributional effects on height suggest that only in recent generations has ¿height increased more among the tallest¿. Although the mean gender height gap is 11 cm, generational effects and other controls such as individual capabilities explain on average roughly 5% of this difference, a figure that rises to 10% in the lowest 10% quantile.

Generational effects on adult height in individual heterogeneity

As adult height is a well-established retrospective measure of health and standard of living, it is important to understand the factors that determine it. Among them, the influence of socio-environmental factors has been subjected to empirical scrutiny. This paper explores the influence of generational (or environmental) effects and individual and gender-specific heterogeneity on adult height. Our data set is from contemporary Spain, a country governed by an authoritarian regime between 1939 and 1977. First, we use normal position and quantile regression analysis to identify the determinants of self-reported adult height and to measure the influence of individual heterogeneity. Second, we use a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach to explain the `gender height gap¿ and its distribution, so as to measure the influence on this gap of individual heterogeneity. Our findings suggest a significant increase in adult height in the generations that benefited from the country¿s economic liberalization in the 1950s, and especially those brought up after the transition to democracy in the 1970s. In contrast, distributional effects on height suggest that only in recent generations has ¿height increased more among the tallest¿. Although the mean gender height gap is 11 cm, generational effects and other controls such as individual capabilities explain on average roughly 5% of this difference, a figure that rises to 10% in the lowest 10% quantile.

Jevons et Walras : entre philosophie morale et économie sociale, un jalon dans la compréhension de la décision publique

This PhD dissertation deals with the question of evaluating social welfare and public policy making through the works of William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) and Léon Walras (1834-1910), two economists who lived in the 19th century. These authors, well-known for their analyses on pure economics, were also deeply interested in the social problems of their time and proposed solutions to remedy them. In accordance with utilitarianism, Jevons was convinced that the reforms implemented by public authorities should improve social welfare (viewed as dependant on individual utilities). As for Walras, he defined a justice criterion based on a particular definition of natural law, and the reforms he proposed had the objective of restoring the rights following from this definition. We have drawn two principal conclusions from our work. First, the analyses of Jevons and Walras, who are often considered marginalise, are different not only in pure economics (as suggested by Jaffé in the seventies), but also from the point of view of welfare economics (defined as a science dealing with the evaluation of different social states). Secondly, these authors propose two different ways of justifying social reforms which have similarities with modern theory even though neither Jevons nor Walras are considered pioneers of welfare economics or public economics. Based on these two conclusions, we claim that studying these authors' theories might be of interest for the evaluation of public projects by the economists of today. Not only were their problems similar to ours, but also the original ideas present in their analyses may lead to the refinement of modern methods.Résumé en françaisCette these de doctorat porte sur les manières dont deux économistes du XIXe siècle, William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) et Léon Walras (1834-1910), abordent la question du bien- etre collectif et la prise de décision publique. Connus principalement pour leurs travaux en économie pure, ces auteurs s'intéressent également à la question sociale et proposent des solutions pour y remédier. Jevons, conformément à son adhésion à la tradition utilitariste, estime que les interventions des autorités publiques doivent avoir pour objectif l'amélioration du bien- être collectif. Quant à Walras, il adopte un critère de justice qui relève du « droit naturel » et les propositions sociales qu'il préconise sont justifiées sur la base de leur conformité avec ce dernier. A l'issue du travail effectué dans le cadre de cette thèse, nous avons abouti à deux résultats principaux : (1) Les analyses de Jevons et Walras, deux économistes qui sont souvent considérés comme des « marginalistes » diffèrent fondamentalement non seulement dans leur analyse de l'économie pure, comme Jaffé le soulignait (1976), mais également en termes d'économie du bien-être (comprise comme une science ayant pour objectif l'évaluation des différents états sociaux). (2) Il existe deux voies originales pour justifier les réformes sociales dans les oeuvres de Jevons et Walras qui partagent des similarités importantes avec les théories modernes bien que ces auteurs ne fassent pas partie des jalons généralement retenus de l'histoire de l'économie du bien-être et de l'économie publique. Ces deux résultats nous conduisent à avancer que l'étude des approches de Jevons et de Walras peut contribuer à la formulation de nouvelles solutions à des problèmes rencontrés dans l'évaluation des différentes politiques publiques, car non seulement les préoccupations de ces auteurs était similaires aux nôtres, mais vu les éléments originaux que leurs propositions comportent, elles peuvent permettre de nuancer certaines aspects des méthodes modernes.

Markkina- ja sääntelyhäiriöt taloudellisen tehottomuuden aiheuttajina

Tutkielmassa käsitellään markkina- ja sääntelyhäiriötä ja keskitytään selittämään, millä tavoin nämä häiriöt aiheuttavat taloudellista tehottomuutta. Lisäksi työssä osoitetaan markkina- ja sääntelyhäiriöiden välinen yhteys ja selitetään, kuinka markkina- ja sääntelyhäiriöiden ilmenemistä voitaisiin vähentää.

Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?

This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal.