O regime da distribuição de resultados nas cooperativas de crédito em Portugal. Uma análise crítica

As Caixas de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo, tendo em conta a sua forma cooperativa, não têm um escopo lucrativo, mas um escopo mutualístico, traduzido na promoção dos interesses económicos dos seus membros. Assim, defende-se a inviabilidade do regime de aplicação dos resultados previsto no diploma que regula estas entidades, por este permitir um retorno dos excedentes sob a forma de remuneração de títulos de capital, convertendo-o numa distribuição de dividendos. Invoca-se que a remuneração dos títulos de capital nas cooperativas não constitui uma repartição de resultados, mas um gasto. Por sua vez, os excedentes cooperativos não são lucros e o seu retorno não configura um dividendo.

Investing to survive in a duopoly model

We present deterministic dynamics on the production costs of Cournot competitions, based on perfect Nash equilibria of nonlinear R&D investment strategies to reduce the production costs of the firms at every period of the game. We analyse the effects that the R&D investment strategies can have in the profits of the firms along the time. We show that small changes in the initial production costs or small changes in the parameters that determine the efficiency of the R&D programs or of the firms can produce strong economic effects in the long run of the profits of the firms.

Stochasticity favoring the effects of the R&D strategies of the firms

We present stochastic dynamics on the production costs of Cournot competitions, based on perfect Nash equilibria of nonlinear R&D investment strategies to reduce the production costs of the firms at every period of the game. We analyse the effects that the R&D investment strategies can have in the profits of the firms along the time. We observe that, in certain cases, the uncertainty can improve the effects of the R&D strategies in the profits of the firms due to the non-linearity of the profit functions and also of the R&D parameters.

Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

International duopoly with unknown costs

We consider two firms, located in different countries, selling the same homogeneous good in both countries. In each country there is a non negative tariff on imports of the good produced in the other country. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms and also on the welfare of the governments.

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Asymmetric dynamic price competition with uncertainty

We consider a dynamic setting-price duopoly model in which a dominant (leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (follower) firm moves second. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms, for different values of the intercept demand parameters.

Ontologies for the interoperability of multiagent electricity markets simulation platforms

Electricity markets worldwide are complex and dynamic environments with very particular characteristics. These are the result of electricity markets’ restructuring and evolution into regional and continental scales, along with the constant changes brought by the increasing necessity for an adequate integration of renewable energy sources. The rising complexity and unpredictability in electricity markets has increased the need for the intervenient entities in foreseeing market behaviour. Market players and regulators are very interested in predicting the market’s behaviour. Market players need to understand the market behaviour and operation in order to maximize their profits, while market regulators need to test new rules and detect market inefficiencies before they are implemented. The growth of usage of simulation tools was driven by the need for understanding those mechanisms and how the involved players' interactions affect the markets' outcomes. Multi-agent based software is particularly well fitted to analyse dynamic and adaptive systems with complex interactions among its constituents, such as electricity markets. Several modelling tools directed to the study of restructured wholesale electricity markets have emerged. Still, they have a common limitation: the lack of interoperability between the various systems to allow the exchange of information and knowledge, to test different market models and to allow market players from different systems to interact in common market environments. This dissertation proposes the development and implementation of ontologies for semantic interoperability between multi-agent simulation platforms in the scope of electricity markets. The added value provided to these platforms is given by enabling them sharing their knowledge and market models with other agent societies, which provides the means for an actual improvement in current electricity markets studies and development. The proposed ontologies are implemented in MASCEM (Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive Electricity Markets) and tested through the interaction between MASCEM agents and agents from other multi-agent based simulators. The implementation of the proposed ontologies has also required a complete restructuring of MASCEM’s architecture and multi-agent model, which is also presented in this dissertation. The results achieved in the case studies allow identifying the advantages of the novel architecture of MASCEM, and most importantly, the added value of using the proposed ontologies. They facilitate the integration of independent multi-agent simulators, by providing a way for communications to be understood by heterogeneous agents from the various systems.

Internationalization strategy of ABotoa/Skypro shoes to United States of America

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The impact of banks dimension on profitability, sustainability and efficiency: An analysis for the Iberian financial system

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Welfare analysis of regulating mobile termination rates in the UK with an application to the Orange/T-Mobile merger

We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; network-based price discrimination; and call externalities. Our results show that reducing mobile termination rates broadly in line with the recent European Commission Recommendation to either pure long-run incremental cost ; reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks; or Bill & Keep (i.e. zero termination rates), increases social welfare, consumer surplus and networks profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities, social welfare may increase by as much as £ 990 million to £ 4.5 billion per year, with Bill & Keep leading to the highest increase in welfare. We also apply the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between Orange and T-Mobile under different scenarios concerning MTRs, and predict that consumer surplus decreases strongly.

Positioning of Ontario University Business Programs - Guelph-Humber

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Barriers to micro-enterprise development

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Positive self-image in tournaments

This paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent’s self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly assesses workers’ productivities and self-beliefs when setting tournament prizes. The paper shows that, under a variety of circumstances, firms make higher profits when workers have positive self-image than if workers do not. By contrast, workers’ welfare declines due to their own misguided choices.

Rethinking the Portuguese banking sector in a post-crisis context

As the financial crisis hit the Portuguese banks, the profitability of the whole sector squeezed to historical minimums. Reinventing the banking business model in the post-crisis context is an overriding issue to achieve sustainable profits and a low cost-to-income ratio. We propose banks to adopt a true multichannel approach, proceeding to a branch network reformatting and a relocation of services to online channels; adopt a true customer-centric approach and reduce the product and services portfolio complexity; finally, industrialize operations and rationalize the structure. With these measures in place, Portuguese banks will become leaner and more efficient, aspiring to a cost-to-income ratio below 45%.