Welfare analysis of regulating mobile termination rates in the UK with an application to the Orange/T-Mobile merger
| Data(s) |
24/01/2014
24/01/2014
01/10/2012
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| Resumo |
We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; network-based price discrimination; and call externalities. Our results show that reducing mobile termination rates broadly in line with the recent European Commission Recommendation to either pure long-run incremental cost ; reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks; or Bill & Keep (i.e. zero termination rates), increases social welfare, consumer surplus and networks profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities, social welfare may increase by as much as £ 990 million to £ 4.5 billion per year, with Bill & Keep leading to the highest increase in welfare. We also apply the model to estimate the welfare effects of the 2010 merger between Orange and T-Mobile under different scenarios concerning MTRs, and predict that consumer surplus decreases strongly. |
| Identificador | |
| Idioma(s) |
eng |
| Publicador |
Nova SBE |
| Relação |
Nova School of Business and Economics Working Paper Series;571 |
| Direitos |
openAccess |
| Palavras-Chave | #Telecommunications #Regulation #Mobile termination rates #Network effects #Welfare #Calibration |
| Tipo |
article |