Zur kognitiven Konstruktion von (Un-)Gerechtigkeit militärischer Gewalt: Die moralische Beurteilung des Kosovo-Kriegs

With reference to the Kosovo war, we examined how the (un-)justness of military intervention is cognitively constructed. Four types of reinterpretation were hypothesized to relate to positive evaluation of the intervention: minimisation of negative consequences of NATO's intervention, denial of responsibility of the Western countries for the war, blame of Yugoslavia, and justification of the intervention through positive motives. As determinants of evaluation of the war, belief in a just world, militarism-pacifism, authoritarianism, and diffuse political support were taken into account. Hypotheses were tested with 165 university students using structural equation modelling. Consistent with our assumptions, the four types of reinterpretation related strongly to positive evaluation of the intervention, showing their relevance with regard to military intervention. Further, the assessed political attitudes influenced evaluation of the war while, contrary to predictions, belief in a just world did not. The causal status of the reinterpretations and the interplay of belief in a just world and political attitudes are discussed.

The WEU::A Europe of the Seven, 1954-1969

The history of the Western European Union after 1954–1955 is still a terra incognita. This article examines the function of the Western European Union in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture of the Cold War up to the 1960s. The paper studies the prime shifts of the tectonic plates forming the Western partial system of the bipolar Cold War system – and their systemic repercussions. The relationship between the Western umbrella organisation, NATO, and its European subsystem is analysed in four case studies: (1) the Arms Pool Negotiations of 1955; (2) Selwyn Lloyd's Grand Design of 1956–1957; (3) the wider Political European Union agenda of 1960–1962 and (4) the Western European Union nuclear force project of 1963.