Kansakunnan parhaaksi. : Suomalaiset naisten- ja lastensairaalat 1920 1940-luvulla arkkitehtonisena, lääketieteellisenä ja yhteiskunnallisena suunnittelukohteena

This dissertation addresses the modernization process of Finnish hospital architecture between the First and Second World War, with focus on facilities explicitly designed for women and children, which as special hospitals reflect specialization, a distinct feature of the modern era. The facilities considered in the study are the Salus hospital, Dr. Länsimäki s women s hospital, the Folkhälsan in Svenska Finland association s child-care institute, the Helsinki Women s Clinic, the Viipuri Women s Hospital, the Helsinki Children s Clinic and the Children's Castle (Lastenlinna) in Helsinki. The study considers hospital architecture as an architectural, medical and social object of design. The theoretical starting point and perspective are the views of the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault (1925 1983) concerning the relationship of bio-power and architecture. Underlying the construction of health-care facilities for women and children were not only the desire to help but also issues of population policy, social policies, training and professionalization. In this study, hospital architecture is interpreted as reflecting developments in medicine, while also producing and reinforcing discourses associated with the ideologies of the time of design and construction. The results of the present research provide new information on the field of hospital design. The design of hospitals was no longer the sole prerogative of architects. Instead, modern hospital design involved the collaboration and networking of experts in various fields. During the period studied, the pavilion system was incorporated in hospital architecture in the block system, which was regarded as a rational. Rationalization was implemented upon the conditions of medical work. This led to spatial design in accordance with medical practices, through which norms were reinforced and created. An important aspect of the material is that the requirements of light, air, openness and hygiene created architecture in glass of an x-ray character, strongly associated with the element of discipline. The alliance of hygiene and architecture became a strategy for controlling the behaviour and encounters of people, for producing pedagogical and moral hygiene, and for reinforcing class hygiene. The modern hospital building also had to meet the requirements of aesthetic hygiene. Health-care facilities designed for women and children became production-oriented machinery, instruments for producing a healthy population and for reinforcing medical discourses.

Ordering within moral orders to manage classroom trouble

This paper demonstrates how classroom trouble warranting teacher intervention can stem from transgressions in different layers of the complex moral order regulating classroom interactions. The paper builds from Durkheim’s treatment of schooling as the institution responsible for the inculcation of a shared moral order, Bernstein’s distinction between the instructional and regulative discourses in any pedagogic setting, and the concept of verticality in the instructional discourse to illuminate how curricular knowledge might apply across different contexts. This paper proposes a similar vertical dimension of moral gravity in the regulative discourse, such that some moral expectations apply across any context, while others are highly contextualized. This paper then applies this frame to data from classroom observations conducted in prevocational pathways for 16 years olds created under Australia’s “earning or learning till 17” policy. This paper describes the variety of moral premises teachers invoked in different teacher/class combinations, according to their level of moral gravity to display the dominant use of highly contextualized moral premises seeking institutional compliance, and minimal use of broader moral frames for these students on the brink of entry to the adult world.

Dealing with discomfort: How the unspeakable confounds wicked planning problems

The idea of ‘wicked’ problems has made a valuable contribution to recognising the complexity and challenges of contemporary planning. However, some wicked policy problems are further complicated by a significant moral, psychological, religious or cultural dimension. This is particularly the case for problems that possess strong elements of abjection and symbolic pollution and high degrees of psychosocial sensitivity. Because this affects the way these problems are framed and discussed they are also characterised by high levels of verbal proscription. As a result, they are not discussed in the rational and emotion-free way that conventional planning demands and can become obscured or inadequately acknowledged in planning processes. This further contributes to their wickedness and intractability. Through paradigmatic urban planning examples, we argue that placing their unspeakable nature at the forefront of enquiry will enable planners to advocate for a more contextually and culturally situated approach to planning, which accommodates both emotional and embodied talk alongside more technical policy contributions. Re-imagining wicked problems in this way has the potential to enhance policy and plan-making and to disrupt norms, expose their contingency, and open new ways of planning for both the unspeakable and the merely wicked.

Moral expansiveness: Examining variability in the extension of the moral world

The nature of our moral judgments—and the extent to which we treat others with care—depend in part on the distinctions we make between entities deemed worthy or unworthy of moral consideration— our moral boundaries. Philosophers, historians, and social scientists have noted that people’s moral boundaries have expanded over the last few centuries, but the notion of moral expansiveness has received limited empirical attention in psychology. This research explores variations in the size of individuals’ moral boundaries using the psychological construct of moral expansiveness and introduces the Moral Expansiveness Scale (MES), designed to capture this variation. Across 6 studies, we established the reliability, convergent validity, and predictive validity of the MES. Moral expansiveness was related (but not reducible) to existing moral constructs (moral foundations, moral identity, “moral” universalism values), predictors of moral standing (moral patiency and warmth), and other constructs associated with concern for others (empathy, identification with humanity, connectedness to nature, and social responsibility). Importantly, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to engage in prosocial intentions and behaviors at personal cost independently of these established constructs. Specifically, the MES uniquely predicted willingness to prioritize humanitarian and environmental concerns over personal and national self-interest, willingness to sacrifice one’s life to save others (ranging from human out-groups to animals and plants), and volunteering behavior. Results demonstrate that moral expansiveness is a distinct and important factor in understanding moral judgments and their consequences.

Theories of moral education and implementation in Indonesia: Re-energizing cultural identity and addressing future challenges

School is regarded as a site of moral training for the younger generation to encounter nation’s future challenges as well as to re-energize nation’s cultural identity. The more competitive global society led by free market trade in terms of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), requires the school to adapt and change its curriculum more frequently. Like many other countries, Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture has introduced and nurtured universal values and traditional values respectively through school curriculum reforms to develop students’ ability to participating in global society. This paper will describe classical and contemporary theories related to moral education that have been implemented in Indonesia’s school curriculum and school activities. The theories developed by Durkheim, Alastair MacIntyre, and Basil Bernstein will be discussed. This includes explaining how far the theories have been adopted in Indonesia and how the approaches are currently being used in Indonesian schooling. This paper suggests despite the implementation of those theories in Indonesian schools, the government needs to optimise the operation of those theories to gain significant outcomes.

Ethics in a Technological World : Framing the Questions and Three Approaches

This study addresses the following question: How to think about ethics in a technological world? The question is treated first thematically by framing central issues in the relationship between ethics and technology. This relationship has three distinct facets: i) technological advance poses new challenges for ethics, ii) traditional ethics may become poorly applicable in a technologically transformed world, and iii) the progress in science and technology has altered the concept of rationality in ways that undermine ethical thinking itself. The thematic treatment is followed by the description and analysis of three approaches to the questions framed. First, Hans Jonas s thinking on the ontology of life and the imperative of responsibility is studied. In Jonas s analysis modern culture is found to be nihilistic because it is unable to understand organic life, to find meaning in reality, and to justify morals. At the root of nihilism Jonas finds dualism, the traditional Western way of seeing consciousness as radically separate from the material world. Jonas attempts to create a metaphysical grounding for an ethic that would take the technologically increased human powers into account and make the responsibility for future generations meaningful and justified. The second approach is Albert Borgmann s philosophy of technology that mainly assesses the ways in which technological development has affected everyday life. Borgmann admits that modern technology has liberated humans from toil, disease, danger, and sickness. Furthermore, liberal democracy, possibilities for self-realization, and many of the freedoms we now enjoy would not be possible on a large scale without technology. Borgmann, however, argues that modern technology in itself does not provide a whole and meaningful life. In fact, technological conditions are often detrimental to the good life. Integrity in life, according to him, is to be sought among things and practices that evade technoscientific objectification and commodification. Larry Hickman s Deweyan philosophy of technology is the third approach under scrutiny. Central in Hickman s thinking is a broad definition of technology that is nearly equal to Deweyan inquiry. Inquiry refers to the reflective and experiential way humans adapt to their environment by modifying their habits and beliefs. In Hickman s work, technology consists of all kinds of activities that through experimentation and/or reflection aim at improving human techniques and habits. Thus, in addition to research and development, many arts and political reforms are technological for Hickman. He argues for recasting such distinctions as fact/value, poiesis/praxis/theoria, and individual/society. Finally, Hickman does not admit a categorical difference between ethics and technology: moral values and norms need to be submitted to experiential inquiry as well as all the other notions. This study mainly argues for an interdisciplinary approach to the ethics of technology. This approach should make use of the potentialities of the research traditions in applied ethics, the philosophy of technology, and the social studies on science and technology and attempt to overcome their limitations. This study also advocates an endorsement of mid-level ethics that concentrate on the practices, institutions, and policies of temporal human life. Mid-level describes the realm between the instantaneous and individualistic micro-level and the universal and global macro level.

Tutkimusetiikka ja tutkimusympäristön normit

According to some scientists it is not useful to integrate ethics into research practices. Their claim is that only unethical persons have ethical problems and because of this we must accept ethical misbehaviour as a phenomenon typical of human society. In the present study the argument that the moral personality of scientists explains ethical problems in science is questioned; in addition, the focus is shifted from individuals to the level of the research environment. The question asked is whether the research environment somehow contributes to research ethics violations. To answer this question the focus was turned towards the research environment norms. The aim of the study was to investigate whether or not these norms are consistent with the norms of research ethics, so that it would be possible to evaluate if the research environment supports scientists in their task of meeting the ethical standards of scientific research. In the study the research environment was examined in three parts. The first deals with society especially Finnish society as a research environment. The second deals with the autonomous science institution as a research environment, while the third deals with scientific society (working according to scientific criteria) as a research environment. The conceptual analysis method was used. This means that various normative arguments were analysed, the primary assumptions behind them were recognized, and the acceptability of normative claims was evaluated according to their consistency. The results of the study do not support the claim that ethical violations in science could be satisfactorily explained by referring only to the personal qualities of scientists. The research environment can limit the freedom to follow the ethical principles of science, it can prevent scientists from handling ethical problems openly and from integrating ethical norms effectively into research practices. The norms of research environment are often implicit but nevertheless influence scientific practices. Further, the results indicate that handling ethical questions should be a part of scientific training.

Tax compliance and psychic costs: Behavioral experimental evidence using a physiological marker

Although paying taxes is a key element of a well-functioning society, there is still limited understanding as to why people actually pay their taxes. Models emphasizing that taxpayers make strategic, financially motivated compliance decisions seemingly assume an overly restrictive view of human nature. Law abidance may be more accurately explained by social norms, a concept that has gained growing importance as research attempts to understand the tax compliance puzzle. This study analyzes the influence of psychic stress generated by the possibility of breaking social norms in the tax compliance context. We measure psychic stress using heart rate variability (HRV), which captures the psychobiological or neural equivalents of psychic stress that may arise from the contemplation of real or imagined actions, producing immediate physiologic discomfort. The results of our laboratory experiments provide empirical evidence of a positive correlation between psychic stress and tax compliance, thus underscoring the importance of moral sentiments for tax compliance. We also identify three distinct types of individuals who differ in their levels of psychic stress, tax morale, and tax compliance.

Can moral potency and psychological risk close the gap between ethical beliefs and unacceptable consumer behavior?

Depending on how they perceive risk, consumers may not always act according to their ethical beliefs, exposing a gap between beliefs and behavior. We investigate the effect of moral potency on perceived psychological risk of committing an unacceptable behavior. The results suggest that perceived risk is triggered by moral ownership.

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights : A comparative analysis of the conceptual relationship between democracy and rights in contemporary political theories

Democratic Legitimacy and the Politics of Rights is a research in normative political theory, based on comparative analysis of contemporary democratic theories, classified roughly as conventional liberal, deliberative democratic and radical democratic. Its focus is on the conceptual relationship between alternative sources of democratic legitimacy: democratic inclusion and liberal rights. The relationship between rights and democracy is studied through the following questions: are rights to be seen as external constraints to democracy or as objects of democratic decision making processes? Are individual rights threatened by public participation in politics; do constitutionally protected rights limit the inclusiveness of democratic processes? Are liberal values such as individuality, autonomy and liberty; and democratic values such as equality, inclusion and popular sovereignty mutually conflictual or supportive? Analyzing feminist critique of liberal discourse, the dissertation also raises the question about Enlightenment ideals in current political debates: are the universal norms of liberal democracy inherently dependent on the rationalist grand narratives of modernity and incompatible with the ideal of diversity? Part I of the thesis introduces the sources of democratic legitimacy as presented in the alternative democratic models. Part II analyses how the relationship between rights and democracy is theorized in them. Part III contains arguments by feminists and radical democrats against the tenets of universalist liberal democratic models and responds to that critique by partly endorsing, partly rejecting it. The central argument promoted in the thesis is that while the deconstruction of modern rationalism indicates that rights are political constructions as opposed to externally given moral constraints to politics, this insight does not delegitimize the politics of universal rights as an inherent part of democratic institutions. The research indicates that democracy and universal individual rights are mutually interdependent rather than oppositional; and that democracy is more dependent on an unconditional protection of universal individual rights when it is conceived as inclusive, participatory and plural; as opposed to robust majoritarian rule. The central concepts are: liberalism, democracy, legitimacy, deliberation, inclusion, equality, diversity, conflict, public sphere, rights, individualism, universalism and contextuality. The authors discussed are e.g. John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Young, Chantal Mouffe and Stephen Holmes. The research focuses on contemporary political theory, but the more classical work of John S. Mill, Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt is also included.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

The role of moral disengagement in underage drinking and heavy episodic drinking

Objectives The current study had two aims. First, to develop a moral disengagement scale contextualized to underage drinking. Second, to investigate Bandura’s (1986) self-regulatory model within the context of underage drinking. Method Two different samples of students participated in the study. The first sample included 619 (362 females) adolescents (Mage = 15.3 years, SD = 1.09 years) and the second sample 636 (386 females) adolescents (Mage = 15.3 years, SD = 1.03 years). Students in the first sample completed the Underage Drinking Disengagement Scale (UDDS), and measures of engagement in underage drinking and heavy episodic drinking. Students in the second sample completed these measures as well as scales of general moral disengagement, personal standards and anticipatory guilt associated with underage drinking. Results For the UDDS, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses verified a single factor structure. The UDDS was more strongly associated with engagement in underage drinking and heavy episodic drinking than a general measure of moral disengagement. A moderated mediation analysis revealed that adolescents who negatively evaluated underage drinking reported more anticipatory guilt, and more anticipatory guilt was associated with less engagement in underage drinking and less heavy episodic drinking. This relationship was weaker at high compared to low levels of underage drinking disengagement. Conclusions/Importance Understanding how adolescents self-regulate their drinking, and ways that such self-regulation may be deactivated or disengaged, may help identify those adolescents at increased risk of drinking underage and of engaging in heavy episodic drinking.

"It's not the Jedi way!": Moral ambivalence and delivering the 'good' in Star Wars

This article examines the nature of good and evil through the prism of Star Wars, arguing that the ostensible dichotomy between the ‘good’ Jedi and the ‘evil’ Sith is false, and instead both the Jedi and the Sith engage in violence, which is evil. Anakin Skywalker then arrives as the Christ-figure who becomes evil and ‘dies’ to destroy the old rigid law of the letter adhered to by the Jedi, before resurrecting and sacrificing himself to defeat the Sith transgressors. As Milbank argues, the act of selfless love by Anakin as the Christ-figure therefore produces the good, the end of violent conflict which is ontological peace, and institutes the law of love which leads to life and peace.

A psychosocial analysis of parent's decisions for limiting their young child's screen time: An examination of attitudes, social norms and roles, and control perceptions

- Objectives Preschool-aged children spend substantial amounts of time engaged in screen-based activities. As parents have considerable control over their child's health behaviours during the younger years, it is important to understand those influences that guide parents' decisions about their child's screen time behaviours. - Design A prospective design with two waves of data collection, 1 week apart, was adopted. - Methods Parents (n = 207) completed a Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)-based questionnaire, with the addition of parental role construction (i.e., parents' expectations and beliefs of responsibility for their child's behaviour) and past behaviour. A number of underlying beliefs identified in a prior pilot study were also assessed. - Results The model explained 77% (with past behaviour accounting for 5%) of the variance in intention and 50% (with past behaviour accounting for 3%) of the variance in parental decisions to limit child screen time. Attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, parental role construction, and past behaviour predicted intentions, and intentions and past behaviour predicted follow-up behaviour. Underlying screen time beliefs (e.g., increased parental distress, pressure from friends, inconvenience) were also identified as guiding parents' decisions. - Conclusion Results support the TPB and highlight the importance of beliefs for understanding parental decisions for children's screen time behaviours, as well as the addition of parental role construction. This formative research provides necessary depth of understanding of sedentary lifestyle behaviours in young children which can be adopted in future interventions to test the efficacy of the TPB mechanisms in changing parental behaviour for their child's health.