Structure informationnelle et constructions du kabyle : Etude de trois types de phrase dans le cadre de la grammaire constructionnelle

Information structure and Kabyle constructions Three sentence types in the Construction Grammar framework The study examines three Kabyle sentence types and their variants. These sentence types have been chosen because they code the same state of affairs but have different syntactic structures. The sentence types are Dislocated sentence, Cleft sentence, and Canonical sentence. I argue first that a proper description of these sentence types should include information structure and, second, that a description which takes into account information structure is possible in the Construction Grammar framework. The study thus constitutes a testing ground for Construction Grammar for its applicability to a less known language. It constitutes a testing ground notably because the differentiation between the three types of sentences cannot be done without information structure categories and, consequently, these categories must be integrated also in the grammatical description. The information structure analysis is based on the model outlined by Knud Lambrecht. In that model, information structure is considered as a component of sentence grammar that assures the pragmatically correct sentence forms. The work starts by an examination of the three sentence types and the analyses that have been done in André Martinet s functional grammar framework. This introduces the sentence types chosen as the object of study and discusses the difficulties related to their analysis. After a presentation of the state of the art, including earlier and more recent models, the principles and notions of Construction Grammar and of Lambrecht s model are introduced and explicated. The information structure analysis is presented in three chapters, each treating one of the three sentence types. The analyses are based on spoken language data and elicitation. Prosody is included in the study when a syntactic structure seems to code two different focus structures. In such cases, it is pertinent to investigate whether these are coded by prosody. The final chapter presents the constructions that have been established and the problems encountered in analysing them. It also discusses the impact of the study on the theories used and on the theory of syntax in general.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Uncertain Information Structures and Backward Induction

In everyday economic interactions, it is not clear whether sequential choices are visible or not to other participants: agents might be deluded about opponents'capacity to acquire,interpret or keep track of data, or might simply unexpectedly forget what they previously observed (but not chose). Following this idea, this paper drops the assumption that the information structure of extensive-form games is commonly known; that is, it introduces uncertainty into players' capacity to observe each others' past choices. Using this approach, our main result provides the following epistemic characterisation: if players (i) are rational,(ii) have strong belief in both opponents' rationality and opponents' capacity to observe others' choices, and (iii) have common belief in both opponents' future rationality and op-ponents' future capacity to observe others' choices, then the backward induction outcome obtains. Consequently, we do not require perfect information, and players observing each others' choices is often irrelevant from a strategic point of view. The analysis extends {from generic games with perfect information to games with not necessarily perfect information{the work by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Perea (2014), who provide different sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome.

Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

L'efficacité de la gestion des ressources humaines en contexte de gestion de projet de systèmes d'information

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Essays in economics of information

Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en économie de l'information. Le premier chapitre sert d'introduction et les Chapitres 2 à 4 constituent le coeur de l'ouvrage. Le Chapitre 2 porte sur l’acquisition d’information sur l’Internet par le biais d'avis de consommateurs. En particulier, je détermine si les avis laissés par les acheteurs peuvent tout de même transmettre de l’information à d’autres consommateurs, lorsqu’il est connu que les vendeurs peuvent publier de faux avis à propos de leurs produits. Afin de comprendre si cette manipulation des avis est problématique, je démontre que la plateforme sur laquelle les avis sont publiés (e.g. TripAdvisor, Yelp) est un tiers important à considérer, autant que les vendeurs tentant de falsifier les avis. En effet, le design adopté par la plateforme a un effet indirect sur le niveau de manipulation des vendeurs. En particulier, je démontre que la plateforme, en cachant une partie du contenu qu'elle détient sur les avis, peut parfois améliorer la qualité de l'information obtenue par les consommateurs. Finalement, le design qui est choisi par la plateforme peut être lié à la façon dont elle génère ses revenus. Je montre qu'une plateforme générant des revenus par le biais de commissions sur les ventes peut être plus tolérante à la manipulation qu'une plateforme qui génère des revenus par le biais de publicité. Le Chapitre 3 est écrit en collaboration avec Marc Santugini. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions les effets de la discrimination par les prix au troisième degré en présence de consommateurs non informés qui apprennent sur la qualité d'un produit par le biais de son prix. Dans un environnement stochastique avec deux segments de marché, nous démontrons que la discrimination par les prix peut nuire à la firme et être bénéfique pour les consommateurs. D'un côté, la discrimination par les prix diminue l'incertitude à laquelle font face les consommateurs, c.-à-d., la variance des croyances postérieures est plus faible avec discrimination qu'avec un prix uniforme. En effet, le fait d'observer deux prix (avec discrimination) procure plus d'information aux consommateurs, et ce, même si individuellement chacun de ces prix est moins informatif que le prix uniforme. De l'autre côté, il n'est pas toujours optimal pour la firme de faire de la discrimination par les prix puisque la présence de consommateurs non informés lui donne une incitation à s'engager dans du signaling. Si l'avantage procuré par la flexibilité de fixer deux prix différents est contrebalancé par le coût du signaling avec deux prix différents, alors il est optimal pour la firme de fixer un prix uniforme sur le marché. Finalement, le Chapitre 4 est écrit en collaboration avec Sidartha Gordon. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions une classe de jeux où les joueurs sont contraints dans le nombre de sources d'information qu'ils peuvent choisir pour apprendre sur un paramètre du jeu, mais où ils ont une certaine liberté quant au degré de dépendance de leurs signaux, avant de prendre une action. En introduisant un nouvel ordre de dépendance entre signaux, nous démontrons qu'un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la plus dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, compléments stratégiques et isotoniques, soit substituts stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. De même, un joueur préfère de l'information qui est la moins dépendante possible de l'information obtenue par les joueurs pour qui les actions sont soit, substituts stratégiques et isotoniques, soit compléments stratégiques et anti-toniques, avec la sienne. Nous établissons également des conditions suffisantes pour qu'une structure d'information donnée, information publique ou privée par exemple, soit possible à l'équilibre.

Information provision in procurement auctions

We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante.

Aging in China and its impact on vehicle design

This study contributes to the growth of design knowledge in China, where vehicle design for the local, older user is in its initial developmental stages. Therefore, this research has explored the travel needs of older Chinese vehicle users in order to assist designers to better understand users’ current and future needs. A triangulation method consisting of interviews, logbook and co-discovery was used to collect multiple forms of data and so explore the research question. Grounded theory has been employed to analyze the research data. This study found that users’ needs are reflected through various ‘meanings’ that they attach to vehicles – meanings that give a tangible expression to their experiences. This study identified six older-user need categories: (i) safety, (ii) utility, (iii) comfort, (iv) identity, (v) emotion and (vi) spirituality. The interrelationships among these six categories are seen as an interactive structure, rather than as a linear or hierarchical arrangement. Chinese cultural values, which are generated from particular local context and users’ social practice, will play a dynamic role in linking and shaping the travel needs of older vehicle users in the future. Moreover, this study structures the older-user needs model into three levels of meaning, to give guidance to vehicle design direction: (i) the practical meaning level, (ii) the social meaning level and (ii) the cultural meaning level. This study suggests that a more comprehensive explanation exists if designers can identify the vehicle’s meaning and property associated with the fulfilled older users’ needs. However, these needs will vary, and must be related to particular technological, social, and cultural contexts. The significance of this study lies in its contributions to the body of knowledge in three areas: research methodology, theory and design. These theoretical contributions provide a series of methodological tools, models and approaches from a vehicle design perspective. These include a conditional/consequential matrix, a travel needs identification model, an older users’ travel-related needs framework, a user information structure model, and an Older-User-Need-Based vehicle design approach. These models suggest a basic framework for the new design process which might assist in the design of new vehicles to fulfil the needs of future, aging Chinese generations. The models have the potential to be transferred to other design domains and different cultural contexts.

Energy-Efficient Decentralized Cooperative Routing in Wireless Networks

Wireless adhoc networks transmit information from a source to a destination via multiple hops in order to save energy and, thus, increase the lifetime of battery-operated nodes. The energy savings can be especially significant in cooperative transmission schemes, where several nodes cooperate during one hop to forward the information to the next node along a route to the destination. Finding the best multi-hop transmission policy in such a network which determines nodes that are involved in each hop, is a very important problem, but also a very difficult one especially when the physical wireless channel behavior is to be accounted for and exploited. We model the above optimization problem for randomly fading channels as a decentralized control problem - the channel observations available at each node define the information structure, while the control policy is defined by the power and phase of the signal transmitted by each node. In particular, we consider the problem of computing an energy-optimal cooperative transmission scheme in a wireless network for two different channel fading models: (i) slow fading channels, where the channel gains of the links remain the same for a large number of transmissions, and (ii) fast fading channels, where the channel gains of the links change quickly from one transmission to another. For slow fading, we consider a factored class of policies (corresponding to local cooperation between nodes), and show that the computation of an optimal policy in this class is equivalent to a shortest path computation on an induced graph, whose edge costs can be computed in a decentralized manner using only locally available channel state information (CSI). For fast fading, both CSI acquisition and data transmission consume energy. Hence, we need to jointly optimize over both these; we cast this optimization problem as a large stochastic optimization problem. We then jointly optimize over a set of CSI functions of the local channel states, and a c- - orresponding factored class of control poli.

Given and News : Media discourse and the construction of community on national days

National anniversaries such as independence days demand precise coordination in order to make citizens change their routines to forego work and spend the day at rest or at festivities that provide social focus and spectacle. The complex social construction of national days is taken for granted and operates as a given in the news media, which are the main agents responsible for coordinating these planned disruptions of normal routines. This study examines the language used in the news to construct the rather unnatural idea of national days and to align people in observing them. The data for the study consist of news stories about the Fourth of July in the New York Times, sampled over 150 years and are supplemented by material from other sources and other countries. The study is multidimensional, applying concepts from pragmatics (speech acts, politeness, information structure), systemic functional linguistics (the interpersonal metafunction and the Appraisal framework) and cognitive linguistics (frames, metaphor) as well as journalism and communications to arrive at an interdisciplinary understanding of how resources for meaning are used by writers and readers of the news stories. The analysis shows that on national anniversaries, nations tend to be metaphorized as persons having birthdays, to whom politeness should be shown. The face of the nation is to be respected in the sense of identifying the nation's interests as one's own (positive face) and speaking of citizen responsibilities rather than rights (negative face). Resources are available for both positive and negative evaluations of events and participants and the newspaper deftly changes footings (Goffman 1981) to demonstrate the required politeness while also heteroglossically allowing for a certain amount of disattention and even protest - within limits, for state holidays are almost never construed as Bakhtinian festivals, as they tend to reaffirm the hierarchy rather than invert it. Celebrations are evaluated mainly for impressiveness, and for the essentially contested quality of appropriateness, which covers norms of predictability, size, audience response, aesthetics, and explicit reference to the past. Events may also be negatively evaluated as dull ("banal") or inauthentic ("hoopla"). Audiences are evaluated chiefly in terms of their enthusiasm, or production of appropriate displays for emotional response, for national days are supposed to be occasions of flooding-out of nationalistic feeling. By making these evaluations, the newspaper reinforces its powerful position as an independent critic, while at the same time playing an active role in the construction and reproduction of emotional order embodied in "the nation's birthday." As an occasion for mobilization and demonstrations of power, national days may be seen to stand to war in the relation of play to fighting (Bateson 1955). Evidence from the newspaper's coverage of recent conflicts is adduced to support this analysis. In the course of the investigation, methods are developed for analyzing large collections of newspaper content, particularly topical soft news and feature materials that have hitherto been considered less influential and worthy of study than so-called hard news. In his work on evaluation in newspaper stories, White (1998) proposed that the classic hard news story is focused on an event that threatens the social order, but news of holidays and celebrations in general does not fit this pattern, in fact its central event is a reproduction of the social order. Thus in the system of news values (Galtung and Ruge 1965), national holiday news draws on "ground" news values such as continuity and predictability rather than "figure" news values such as negativity and surprise. It is argued that this ground helps form a necessary space for hard news to be seen as important, similar to the way in which the information structure of language is seen to rely on the regular alternation of given and new information (Chafe 1994).

Energy-Efficient Decentralized Routing with Localized Cooperation Suitable for Fast Fading

Wireless networks transmit information from a source to a destination via multiple hops in order to save energy and, thus, increase the lifetime of battery-operated nodes. The energy savings can be especially significant in cooperative transmission schemes, where several nodes cooperate during one hop to forward the information to the next node along a route to the destination. Finding the best multi-hop transmission policy in such a network which determines nodes that are involved in each hop, is a very important problem, but also a very difficult one especially when the physical wireless channel behavior is to be accounted for and exploited. We model the above optimization problem for randomly fading channels as a decentralized control problem – the channel observations available at each node define the information structure, while the control policy is defined by the power and phase of the signal transmitted by each node.In particular, we consider the problem of computing an energy-optimal cooperative transmission scheme in a wireless network for two different channel fading models: (i) slow fading channels, where the channel gains of the links remain the same for a large number of transmissions, and (ii) fast fading channels,where the channel gains of the links change quickly from one transmission to another. For slow fading, we consider a factored class of policies (corresponding to local cooperation between nodes), and show that the computation of an optimal policy in this class is equivalent to a shortest path computation on an induced graph, whose edge costs can be computed in a decentralized manner using only locally available channel state information(CSI). For fast fading, both CSI acquisition and data transmission consume energy. Hence, we need to jointly optimize over both these; we cast this optimization problem as a large stochastic optimization problem. We then jointly optimize over a set of CSI functions of the local channel states, and a corresponding factored class of control policies corresponding to local cooperation between nodes with a local outage constraint. The resulting optimal scheme in this class can again be computed efficiently in a decentralized manner. We demonstrate significant energy savings for both slow and fast fading channels through numerical simulations of randomly distributed networks.

Astarloaren sintaxia eta hitz ordena naturala

[EN] This paper examines the syntactic ideas of Pablo Pedro Astarloa (1752-1806) as he explained in his Discursos filosóficos sobre la lengua primitiva (1805), and tries to put them in the context of the debate between rationalists and sensualists, who argued whether there is a «natural order» of words. Astarloa developed a system for accounting the word order in the primitive language of mankind (and hence in the Basque language) founded in three types of «nobleness», and in the principle that the noblest element precedes the less noble one. The first type (nobleza de origen) orders words according to their meaning. The second type (nobleza de ministerio) orders words according to the part of speech they belong to, or the semantic function they have. Finally, the third type (nobleza de mérito or de movilidad) considers the will for communication and, as a result, word order reflects the information structure. Moreover Astarloa ’s three types of nobleness are arranged in a hierarchy of superiority: movilidad > ministerio > origen. So Astarloa ’s syntax appears near to sensualists ’ conceptions on word order because it did not appeal for a fixed natural order of words; instead he proposed a variable word order based mainly on the communicative process.

Games with perceptions

We assume that 2 x 2 matrix games are publicly known and that players perceive a dichotomous characteristic on their opponents which defines two types for each player. In turn, each type has beliefs concerning her opponent's types, and payoffs are assumed to be type-independent. We analyze whether the mere possibility of different types playing different strategies generates discriminatory equilibria. Given a specific information structure we find that in equilibrium a player discriminates between her types if and only if her opponent does so. We also find that for dominant solvable 2x2 games no discriminatory equilibrium exists, while under different conditions of concordance between players' beliefs discrimination appears for coordination and for competitive games. A complete characterization of the set of Bayesian equilibria is provided.