On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework

This paper studies the wasteful e ffect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link between rent-seeking behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill, which is taken to represent the rent component. In particular, public o fficials are modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. The rent-seeking extraction technology in the government administration is modeled as in Murphy et al. (1991) and incorporated in an otherwise standard Real-Business-Cycle (RBC) framework with public sector. The model is calibrated to German data for the period 1970-2007. The main fi ndings are: (i) Due to the existence of a signi ficant public sector wage premium and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount of working time is spent rent-seeking, which in turn leads to signifi cant losses in terms of output; (ii) The measures for the rent-seeking cost obtained from the model for the major EU countries are highly-correlated to indices of bureaucratic ineffi ciency; (iii) Under the optimal scal policy regime,steady-state rent-seeking is smaller relative to the exogenous policy case, as the government chooses a higher public wage premium, but sets a much lower public employment, thus achieving a decrease in rent-seeking.

Street-level bureaucrats and new modes of governance - How conflicting roles affect the implementation of the Swiss Ordinance on Verterinary Drugs

Lipsky’s seminal concept of street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) focuses on their role as public servants. However, in the course of new modes of governance, private actors have gained an additional role as implementation agents. We explore the logic of private SLBs during the implementation of the Swiss Ordinance on Veterinary Medicinal Products (OVMP) where veterinarians are simultaneously implementing agents, policy addressees, and professionals with economic interests. We argue that, because of contradictory reference systems, it is problematic for the output performance if an actor is simultaneously the target group of a policy and its implementing agent.

Is output performance all about the resources? A fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of street-level bureaucrats in Switzerland

This article refines Lipsky’s (1980) assertion that lacking resources negatively affect output performance. It uses fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to analyse the nuanced interplay of contextual and individual determinants of the output performance of veterinary inspectors as street-level bureaucrats in Switzerland. Moving ‘beyond Lipsky’, the study builds on recent theoretical contributions and a systematic comparison across organizational contexts. Against a widespread assumption, output performance is not all about the resources. The impact of perceived available resources hinges on caseloads, which prove to be more decisive. These contextual factors interact with individual attitudes emerging from diverse public accountabilities. The results contextualize the often-emphasized importance of worker-client interaction. In a setting where clients cannot escape the interaction, street-level bureaucrats are not primarily held accountable by them. Studies of output performance should thus sensibly consider gaps between what is being demanded of and offered to street-level bureaucrats, and the latter’s multiple embeddedness.

Bureaucrats are beyond the beltway.

Mode of access: Internet.

Computer technology - A political player in social policy processes

The absence of considerations of technology in policy studies reinforces the popular notion that technology is a neutral tool, Through an analysis of the role played by computers in the policy processes of Australia's Department of Social Security, this paper argues that computers are political players in policy processes, Findings indicate that computers make aspects of the social domain knowable and therefore governable, The use of computers makes previously infeasible policies possible, Computers also operate as bureaucrats and as agents of client surveillance. Increased policy change, reduced discretion and increasingly targeted and complex policies can be attributed to the use of computer technology, If policy processes are to be adequately understood and analysed, then the role of technology in those processes must be considered.

Desafios da administra????o p??blica brasileira: governan??a, autonomia, neutralidade

O objetivo deste texto ?? iniciar um levantamento da dificuldades impostas ?? reforma administrativa a partir da considera????o do problema da neutralidade da burocracia versus o requisito da autonomia de decis??o, elemento fundamental do Modelo de Administra????o P??blica Gerencial. Tal problema assume especial relev??ncia frente aos objetivos de aumentar a governan??a do Estado e constitui um dos desafios centrais do Plano Diretor da Reforma do Aparelho do Estado, particularmente no que diz respeito ?? forma de administra????o do chamado ???n??cleo estrat??gico??? ??? respons??vel pela defini????o das leis e pol??ticas p??blicas ??? e das ???atividades exclusivas de Estado??? ??? caracterizadas pelo exerc??cio do poder de legislar e tributar, fiscalizando, regulamentando e transferindo recursos. Para isso, a discuss??o est?? organizada em quatro se????es. Na primeira, s??o rapidamente apresentados os conceitos de governabilidade e governan??a, com ??nfase no fato de que a distin????o entre eles representa apenas um recurso anal??tico. Na segunda se????o, a partir das distin????es cl??ssicas de Max Weber entre pol??tica e administra????o, pol??ticos e burocratas, busca-se caracterizar a neutralidade burocr??tica e mostrar que representa, na realidade, apenas um dos elementos de uma constru????o t??pico ideal, cada vez mais distante de qualquer correspond??ncia com o mundo real. Em seguida, comenta-se rapidamente o processo de mudan??a do modelo de administra????o p??blica; e s??o apresentadas algumas das caracter??sticas do chamado Modelo de Administra????o P??blica Gerencial que, em lugar da neutralidade, implicam elevado grau de autonomia por parte dos agentes burocr??ticos. Por fim, s??o tecidas algumas considera????es, procurando mostrar que, da mesma maneira que a neutralidade, a autonomia burocr??tica apresenta dificuldades e que a proposta da ???autonomia imersa??? ou ???autonomia inserida??? exibe implica????es que merecem reflex??o mais demorada.

Organiza????o dos usu??rios, participa????o na gest??o e controle das organiza????es sociais

O artigo discute a participa????o dos usu??rios na gest??o das Organiza????es Sociais, prevista num projeto da reforma do aparelho de Estado atualmente em curso. A participa????o dos usu??rios na gest??o das institui????es p??blicas ?? um instrumento que pode resolver problemas da rela????o principal-agente, garantindo a implementa????o eficiente das pol??ticas. No projeto das Organiza????es Sociais, essa participa????o ?? viabilizada, entre outros meios, pela presen??a de entidades representativas da sociedade civil no Conselho de Administra????o da institui????o, pressupondo, portanto, a organiza????o dos usu??rios. Por essa raz??o, no artigo s??o analisadas as possibilidades de organiza????o dos usu??rios com base na abordagem da ???l??gica da a????o coletiva???.

O servidor p??blico brasileiro: uma tipologia da burocracia

As teorias sobre a burocracia governamental e seu comportamento fornecem diferentes abordagens te??ricas e diferentes interpreta????es. A partir da tipologia de agentes burocr??ticos criada por Anthony Downs (1967), esse trabalho analisa os servidores p??blicos federais brasileiros e sua postura face ao trabalho. Com a aplica????o de question??rios a um grupo de servidores, buscou-se verificar a exist??ncia e/ou pertin??ncia dos tipos descritos como alpinistas, conservadores, defensores, militantes e homens de Estado. Os dados obtidos foram tratados pela t??cnica de an??lise de aglomerados. Os resultados encontrados apontam que a tipologia possui limites fluidos entre um perfil de burocrata e outro, acenando para a necessidade de se repensar as concep????es sobre a burocracia governamental e aprofundar os estudos.

Determinantes económicos da corrupção na União Europeia dos 15

Projecto «Economics of Corruption in Contemporary Portugal» no Centro de Estudos da População, Economia e Sociedade (CEPESE)

The Portuguese Administrative Elite, 1851-1910

The aim of this article is to examine the composition and patterns of recruitment of the ministries’directors-general, as well as to assess the interconnections between bureaucracy and politics, from the beginnings of Regeneração (1851) until the breakdown of Monarchy (1910). The post of director-general was considered one of “political trust”, that might be filled by individuals from outside the civil service, and the selection and de-selection of officeholders depended exclusively on the ministers’ will. Nonetheless, most directors-general were experienced bureaucrats, boasting a steady career as civil servants, and remained in office for long terms, regardless of ministerial discontinuities. In other words, High Administration became relatively immune to party-driven politics. Due to their professional background and lengthy tenure, directors-general were usually highly skilled specialists, combining technical expertise and practical knowledge of the wheels of state bureaucracy. Hence, they were often influential actors in policy-making, playing an active (and sometimes decisive) part behind the scenes, in both designing and implementing government policies. As regards their social profile, directors-general formed a cohesive and homogeneous elite group: being predominantly drawn from urban middle class milieus, highly educated, and appointed to office in their forties.

Pouvoir discrétionnaire et redevabilité de la bureaucratie de guichet : les taxateurs d'une caisse de chômage comme acteurs de mise en oeuvre

Résumé en français La thèse de doctorat porte, de manière générale, sur le rôle des acteurs administratifs dans la mise en oeuvre de l'action publique. En particulier, dans le contexte de l'implémentation de la politique suisse d'assurance-chômage, la recherche se focalise sur l'étude de la bureaucratie de guichet, à savoir un type spécifique d'administrations et d'agents publics situés aux premières lignes de l'action étatique et qui sont en contact direct et quotidien avec les usagers. La thèse a pour objectif principal d'obtenir une compréhension détaillée des impacts concrets dont sont porteurs deux types de réformes majeures du secteur public : les réformes de Nouvelle Gestion Publique (NGP) et les nouvelles technologies informatiques. Le questionnement central de la recherche consiste en une étude approfondie des effets de ces réformes sur les bureaucraties de guichet, et en particulier sur deux aspects centraux les concernant : d'une part, le niveau de pouvoir discrétionnaire que les agents publics de base disposent dans l'application de la loi fédérale sur l'assurance-chômage, autrement dit leur marge de manoeuvre ; d'autre part, les manières au travers desquelles ces mêmes agents sont appelés à rendre des comptes quant à leurs actions et leurs décisions, à savoir l'enjeu plus large de la redevabilité publique des acteurs administratifs. Ces enjeux ont été analysés au niveau empirique dans le contexte organisationnel d'une caisse publique cantonale de chômage ayant expérimenté les réformes évoquées ci-dessus. L'organisation choisie a été investiguée au travers d'une étude de cas ethnographique approfondie (observation directe du travail quotidien des agents, entretiens semi-directifs, analyse de documents) pendant une période de six mois environ entre 2008 et 2009. L'analyse empirique fournit quatre résultats : a) de manière générale, les taxateurs de la caisse de chômage disposent d'un faible niveau de pouvoir discrétionnaire ; b) le degré de pouvoir discrétionnaire varie selon le type de tâche ; c) les agents sur le terrain rendent des comptes auprès d'une multiplicité d'acteurs, sur une variété d'aspects de leur travail et au travers de différents mécanismes de contrôle ; d) les outils de NGP et les nouvelles technologies informatiques ont peu d'impact sur l'étendue du pouvoir discrétionnaire des agents mais contribuent à influencer le type de redevabilité publique pratiquée à ce niveau. Summary in English This PhD dissertation deals with the role of public administration in policy implementation. In the Swiss context of unemployment insurance policy, it focuses on street-level bureaucracy, a specific type of public organisations and agents located at the frontline of public action, that is to say low-level civil servants who are in direct, daily and face-to-face contact with citizens. The dissertation aims at a deep understanding of what are the concrete impacts of two main important changes touching public sector organizations : New Public Management reforms (NPM) and Information and Communication technologies (ICT). The main research question consists in assessing the impacts of those reforms on two central issues regarding street-level bureaucrats : on the one hand, the effective degree of discretion frontline agents do have in implementing the federal law on unemployment insurance ; on the other hand, the ways through which these bureaucrats are held accountable about their action and decisions, i.e. accountability regimes at the street-level. These issues have been empirically addressed in the organisational context of a cantonal Unemployment Insurance Funds having experienced the above mentioned reforms. The organisation has been investigated through an in-depth ethnographic case-study (direct observation of daily work, semi-structured interwiews, documentary analysis) in 2008 and 2009 for approximately six months. The empirical analysis indicates that a) in general, street-level agents do exert low degree of policy discretion; b) the level of discretion is variable from one specific task to another ; c) frontline workers are held accountable to many actors, on various aspects of their work and through different mechanisms of control ; d) NPM and ICT instruments have few impact on the issue of policy discretion but more on the type of street-level accountability which is concretely practised at this level.

Organized vs. competitive corruption

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituencysets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity iscarried out by an external provider, and its realization is supervisedby a bureaucrat. While bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of theconstituency, they can decide to be corrupt and allow providers todeliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe.Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighingoff the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibilityfor the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impacton equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption.To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings:1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individualutility (competitive corruption); 2) An illegal syndicate oversee thecorruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way asto maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). Weshow that, since average corruption payoff is increasing in the activitylevels set by the constituency, and since the latter responds to highlevels of corruption by reducing required activity levels, in equilibriumthe illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total numberof corrupt transactions, so that corruption is lower when it is organizedthan when it is competitive.