In the shadow of the enlightenment : Le Corbusier, Le Faisceau and Georges Valois

On 9 January 1927 Le Corbusier materialised on the front cover of the Faisceau journal edited by Georges Valois Le Nouveau Siècle which printed the single-point perspective of Le Corbusier’s Plan Voisin and an extract from the architect’s discourse in Urbanisme. In May Le Corbusier presented slides of his urban designs at a fascist rally. These facts have been known ever since the late 1980s when studies emerged in art history that situated Le Corbusier’s philosophy in relation to the birth of twentieth-century fascism in France—an elision in the dominant reading of Le Corbusier’s philosophy, as a project of social utopianism, whose received genealogy is Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier. Le Corbusier participated with the first group in France to call itself fascist, Valois’s militant Faisceau des Combattants et Producteurs, the “Blue Shirts,” inspired by the Italian “Fasci” of Mussolini. Thanks to Mark Antliff, we know the Faisceau did not misappropriate Le Corbusier’s plans, in some remote quasi-symbolic sense, rather Valois’s organisation was premised on the redesign of Paris based on Le Corbusier’s schematic designs. Le Corbusier’s Urbanisme was considered the “prodigious” model for the fascist state Valois called La Cité Française – after his mentor the anarcho-syndicalist Georges Sorel. Valois stated that Le Corbusier’s architectural concepts were “an expression of our profoundest thoughts,” the Faisceau, who “saw their own thought materialized” on the pages of Le Corbusier’s plans. The question I pose is, In what sense is Le Corbusier’s plan a complete representation of La Cité? For Valois, the fascist city “represents the collective will of La Cité” invoking Enlightenment philosophy, operative in Sorel, namely Rousseau, for whom the notion of “collective will” is linked to the idea of political representation: to ‘stand in’ for someone or a group of subjects i.e. the majority vote. The figures in Voisin are not empty abstractions but the result of “the will” of the “combatant-producers” who build the town. Yet, the paradox in anarcho-syndicalist anti-enlightenment thought – and one that became a problem for Le Corbusier – is precisely that of authority and representation. In Le Corbusier’s plan, the “morality of the producers” and “the master” (the transcendent authority that hovers above La Cité) is lattened into a single picture plane, thereby abolishing representation. I argue that La Cité pushed to the limits of formal abstraction by Le Corbusier thereby reverts to the Enlightenment myth it first opposed, what Theodor Adorno would call the dialectic of enlightenment.

The Enlightenment Idea of History as a Legitimation Tool of Kemalism in Turkey

The study analyzes the effort to build political legitimacy in the Republic of Turkey by ex-ploring a group of influential texts produced by Kemalist writers. The study explores how the Kemalist regime reproduced certain long-lasting enlightenment meta-narrative in its effort to build political legitimacy. Central in this process was a hegemonic representation of history, namely the interpretation of the Anatolian Resistance Struggle of 1919 1922 as a Turkish Revolution executing the enlightenment in the Turkish nation-state. The method employed in the study is contextualizing narratological analysis. The Kemalist texts are analyzed with a repertoire of concepts originally developed in the theory of narra-tive. By bringing these concepts together with epistemological foundations of historical sciences, the study creates a theoretical frame inside of which it is possible to highlight how initially very controversial historical representations in the end manage to construct long-lasting, emotionally and intellectually convincing bases of national identity for the secular middle classes in Turkey. The two most important explanatory concepts in this sense are di-egesis and implied reader. The diegesis refers to the ability of narrative representation to create an inherently credible story-world that works as the basis of national community. The implied reader refers to the process where a certain hegemonic narrative creates a formula of identification and a position through which any individual real-world reader of a story can step inside the narrative story-world and identify oneself as one of us of the national narra-tive. The study demonstrates that the Kemalist enlightenment meta-narrative created a group of narrative accruals which enabled generations of secular middle classes to internalize Kemalist ideology. In this sense, the narrative in question has not only worked as a tool utilized by the so-called Kemalist state-elite to justify its leadership, but has been internalized by various groups in Turkey, working as their genuine world-view. It is shown in the study that secular-ism must be seen as the core ingredient of these groups national identity. The study proposes that the enlightenment narrative reproduced in the Kemalist ideology had its origin in a simi-lar totalizing cultural narrative created in and for Europe. Currently this enlightenment project is challenged in Turkey by those who are in an attempt to give religion a greater role in Turkish society. The study argues that the enduring practice of legitimizing political power through the enlightenment meta-narrative has not only become a major factor contributing to social polarization in Turkey, but has also, in contradiction to the very real potentials for crit-ical approaches inherent in the Enlightenment tradition, crucially restricted the development of critical and rational modes of thinking in the Republic of Turkey.

Harmonic Monads : Reading Contemporary Scottish Fiction through the Enlightenment

Peer reviewed

Preformations of the Amazonian: Strong Women in German Literature of the Early Enlightenment

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

The digital Dark Ages : a retro-speculative history of possible futures

The Dark Ages are generally held to be a time of technological and intellectual stagnation in western development. But that is not necessarily the case. Indeed, from a certain perspective, nothing could be further from the truth. In this paper we draw historical comparisons, focusing especially on the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, between the technological and intellectual ruptures in Europe during the Dark Ages, and those of our current period. Our analysis is framed in part by Harold Innis’s2 notion of "knowledge monopolies". We give an overview of how these were affected by new media, new power struggles, and new intellectual debates that emerged in thirteenth and fourteenth century Europe. The historical salience of our focus may seem elusive. Our world has changed so much, and history seems to be an increasingly far-from-favoured method for understanding our own period and its future potentials. Yet our seemingly distant historical focus provides some surprising insights into the social dynamics that are at work today: the fracturing of established knowledge and power bases; the democratisation of certain "sacred" forms of communication and knowledge, and, conversely, the "sacrosanct" appropriation of certain vernacular forms; challenges and innovations in social and scientific method and thought; the emergence of social world-shattering media practices; struggles over control of vast networks of media and knowledge monopolies; and the enclosure of public discursive and social spaces for singular, manipulative purposes. The period between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries in Europe prefigured what we now call the Enlightenment, perhaps moreso than any other period before or after; it shaped what the Enlightenment was to become. We claim no knowledge of the future here. But in the "post-everything" society, where history is as much up for sale as it is for argument, we argue that our historical perspective provides a useful analogy for grasping the wider trends in the political economy of media, and for recognising clear and actual threats to the future of the public sphere in supposedly democratic societies.

The digital Dark Ages : a retro-speculative history of possible futures

The Dark Ages are generally held to be a time of technological and intellectual stagnation in western development. But that is not necessarily the case. Indeed, from a certain perspective, nothing could be further from the truth. In this paper we draw historical comparisons, focusing especially on the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, between the technological and intellectual ruptures in Europe during the Dark Ages, and those of our current period. Our analysis is framed in part by Harold Innis’s2 notion of "knowledge monopolies". We give an overview of how these were affected by new media, new power struggles, and new intellectual debates that emerged in thirteenth and fourteenth century Europe. The historical salience of our focus may seem elusive. Our world has changed so much, and history seems to be an increasingly far-from-favoured method for understanding our own period and its future potentials. Yet our seemingly distant historical focus provides some surprising insights into the social dynamics that are at work today: the fracturing of established knowledge and power bases; the democratisation of certain "sacred" forms of communication and knowledge, and, conversely, the "sacrosanct" appropriation of certain vernacular forms; challenges and innovations in social and scientific method and thought; the emergence of social world-shattering media practices; struggles over control of vast networks of media and knowledge monopolies; and the enclosure of public discursive and social spaces for singular, manipulative purposes. The period between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries in Europe prefigured what we now call the Enlightenment, perhaps moreso than any other period before or after; it shaped what the Enlightenment was to become. We claim no knowledge of the future here. But in the "post-everything" society, where history is as much up for sale as it is for argument, we argue that our historical perspective provides a useful analogy for grasping the wider trends in the political economy of media, and for recognising clear and actual threats to the future of the public sphere in supposedly democratic societies.

Alternatives to the behavioural technicist approaches to study skills

The content and approach of study skills courses are critiqued and alternatives are suggested. It is proposed that an approach providing students with knowledge about the cognitive processes involved in mastering complex material would make the study skills teacher an agent of social change aiming for the enlightenment and emancipation of students and lecturers.

A discourse on the non-method

In spite of the activism of professional bodies and researchers, empirical evidence shows that project management still does not deliver the expected benefits and promises. Hence, many have questioned the validity of the hegemonic rationalist paradigm anchored in the Enlightenment and Natural Sciences tradition supporting project management research and practice for the last 60 years and the lack of relevance to practice of the current conceptual base of project management. In order to address these limitations many authors, taking a post-modernist stance in social sciences, build on ‘pre-modern’ philosophies such as the Aristotelian one, specially emphasizing the role of praxis (activity), and phronesis (practical wisdom, prudence). Indeed, ‘Praxis … is the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of the world, but is also a guide to its transformation …’ (Vazquez, 1977:. 149). Therefore, praxis offers an important focus for practitioners and researchers in social sciences, one in which theory is integrated with practice at the point of intervention. Simply stated, praxis can serve as a common ground for those interested in basic and applied research by providing knowledge of the reality in which action, informed by theory, takes place. Consequently, I suggest a ‘praxeological’ style of reasoning (praxeology being defined as study or science of human actions and conduct, including praxis, practices and phronesis) and to go beyond the ‘Theory-Practice’ divide. Moreover, I argue that we need to move away from the current dichotomy between the two classes ‘scholars experts-researchers’ and ‘managers/workers-practitioners-participants’. Considering one single class of ‘PraXitioner’, becoming a phronimos, may contribute to create new perspectives and open up new ways of thinking and acting in project situations. Thus, I call for a Perestroika in researching and acting in project management situations. My intent is to suggest a balanced praxeological view of the apparent opposition between social and natural science approaches. I explore, in this chapter, three key questions, covering the ontological, epistemological and praxeological dimensions of project management in action. 1. Are the research approaches being currently used appropriate for generating contributions that matter to both theory and practice with regards to what a ‘project’ is or to what we do when we call a specific situation ‘a project’? 2. On the basis of which intellectual virtues is the knowledge generated and what is the impact for theory and practice? 3. Are the modes of action of the practitioners ‘prudent’ and are they differentiating or reconciling formal and abstract rationality from substantive rationality and situated reasoning with regards to the mode of action they adopt in particular project situations? The investigation of the above questions leads me to debate about ‘Project Management-as-Praxis’, and to suggest ‘A’ (not ‘THE’) ‘praxeological’ style of reasoning and mode of inquiry – acknowledging a non-paradigmatic, subjective and kaleidoscopic perspective – for ‘Knowing-as-Practicing’ in project management. In short, this is about making a ‘Projects Science’ that matters.

What is a good project manager? Reconceptualizing the “do” : an Aristotelian perspective

In Social Science (Organization Studies, Economics, Management Science, Strategy, International Relations, Political Science…) the quest for addressing the question “what is a good practitioner?” has been around for centuries, with the underlying assumptions that good practitioners should lead organizations to higher levels of performance. Hence to ask “what is a good “captain”?” is not a new question, we should add! (e.g. Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670; Söderlund, 2004, p. 190). This interrogation leads to consider problems such as the relations between dichotomies Theory and Practice, rigor and relevance of research, ways of knowing and knowledge forms. On the one hand we face the “Enlightenment” assumptions underlying modern positivist Social science, grounded in “unity-of-science dream of transforming and reducing all kinds of knowledge to one basic form and level” and cause-effects relationships (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20), and on the other, the postmodern interpretivist proposal, and its “tendency to make all kinds of knowing equivalent” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20). In the project management space, this aims at addressing one of the fundamental problems in the field: projects still do not deliver their expected benefits and promises and therefore the socio-economical good (Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007; Bredillet, 2010, Lalonde et al., 2012). The Cartesian tradition supporting projects research and practice for the last 60 years (Bredillet, 2010, p. 4) has led to the lack of relevance to practice of the current conceptual base of project management, despite the sum of research, development of standards, best & good practices and the related development of project management bodies of knowledge (Packendorff, 1995, p. 319-323; Cicmil & Hodgson, 2006, p. 2–6, Hodgson & Cicmil, 2007, p. 436–7; Winter et al., 2006, p. 638). Referring to both Hodgson (2002) and Giddens (1993), we could say that “those who expect a “social-scientific Newton” to revolutionize this young field “are not only waiting for a train that will not arrive, but are in the wrong station altogether” (Hodgson, 2002, p. 809; Giddens, 1993, p. 18). While, in the postmodern stream mainly rooted in the “practice turn” (e.g. Hällgren & Lindahl, 2012), the shift from methodological individualism to social viscosity and the advocated pluralism lead to reinforce the “functional stupidity” (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, p. 1194) this postmodern stream aims at overcoming. We suggest here that addressing the question “what is a good PM?” requires a philosophy of practice perspective to complement the “usual” philosophy of science perspective. The questioning of the modern Cartesian tradition mirrors a similar one made within Social science (Say, 1964; Koontz, 1961, 1980; Menger, 1985; Warry, 1992; Rothbard, 1997a; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Boisot & McKelvey, 2010), calling for new thinking. In order to get outside the rationalist ‘box’, Toulmin (1990, p. 11), along with Tsoukas & Cummings (1997, p. 655), suggests a possible path, summarizing the thoughts of many authors: “It can cling to the discredited research program of the purely theoretical (i.e. “modern”) philosophy, which will end up by driving it out of business: it can look for new and less exclusively theoretical ways of working, and develop the methods needed for a more practical (“post-modern”) agenda; or it can return to its pre-17th century traditions, and try to recover the lost (“pre-modern”) topics that were side-tracked by Descartes, but can be usefully taken up for the future” (Toulmin, 1990, p. 11). Thus, paradoxically and interestingly, in their quest for the so-called post-modernism, many authors build on “pre-modern” philosophies such as the Aristotelian one (e.g. MacIntyre, 1985, 2007; Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Blomquist et al., 2010; Lalonde et al., 2012). It is perhaps because the post-modern stream emphasizes a dialogic process restricted to reliance on voice and textual representation, it limits the meaning of communicative praxis, and weaking the practice because it turns away attention from more fundamental issues associated with problem-definition and knowledge-for-use in action (Tedlock, 1983, p. 332–4; Schrag, 1986, p. 30, 46–7; Warry, 1992, p. 157). Eikeland suggests that the Aristotelian “gnoseology allows for reconsidering and reintegrating ways of knowing: traditional, practical, tacit, emotional, experiential, intuitive, etc., marginalised and considered insufficient by modernist [and post-modernist] thinking” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20—21). By contrast with the modernist one-dimensional thinking and relativist and pluralistic post-modernism, we suggest, in a turn to an Aristotelian pre-modern lens, to re-conceptualise (“re” involving here a “re”-turn to pre-modern thinking) the “do” and to shift the perspective from what a good PM is (philosophy of science lens) to what a good PM does (philosophy of practice lens) (Aristotle, 1926a). As Tsoukas & Cummings put it: “In the Aristotelian tradition to call something good is to make a factual statement. To ask, for example, ’what is a good captain’?’ is not to come up with a list of attributes that good captains share (as modem contingency theorists would have it), but to point out the things that those who are recognized as good captains do.” (Tsoukas & Cummings, 1997, p. 670) Thus, this conversation offers a dialogue and deliberation about a central question: What does a good project manager do? The conversation is organized around a critic of the underlying assumptions supporting the modern, post-modern and pre-modern relations to ways of knowing, forms of knowledge and “practice”.