Report to the President by the Board of Inquiry [appointed November 22, 1956, under section 206 of the Labor management relations act, 1947] created by Executive order no. 10689. November 24, 1956.

Thomas W. Holland, chairman.

Report of the grand inquest of the State of Maryland into the background, causes and possible ending of the current strike in the Baltimore Transit Company.

Mode of access: Internet.

Report to the President by Board of Inquiry created by Executive order no. 11054 dated October 1, 1962.

Robben W. Fleming, chairman; Vernon H. Jensen and Robert L. Stutz, members.

Report to the President by the Board of Inquiry [appointed October 6, 1959, pursuant to Executive order no. 10842 and section 206 of the Labor-management relations act, 1947.

Guy Farmer, chairman.

Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act : strike three

The Tourism, Racing and Fair Trading (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2002 (“the Act”) which was passed on 18 April 2002 contains a number of significant amendments relevant to the operation of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000. The main changes relevant to property transactions are: (i) Changes to the process for appointment of a real estate agent and consolidation of the appointment forms; (ii) Additions to the disclosure obligation of agents and property developers; (iii) Simplification of the process for commencing the cooling off period; (iv) Alteration of the common law position concerning when the parties are bound by a contract; (v) Removal of the requirement for a seller’s signature on the warning statement to be witnessed; (vi) Retrospective amendment of s 170 of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997; (vii) Inclusion of a new power to allow inspectors to enter the place of business of a licensee or a marketeer without consent and without a warrant; and (viii) Inclusion of a new power for inspectors to require documents to be produced by marketeers. The majority of the amendments are effective from the date of assent, 24 April 2002, however, some of the amendments do not commence until a date fixed by proclamation. No proclamation has been made at the time of writing (2 May 2002). Where the amendments have not commenced this will be noted in the article. Before providing clients with advice, practitioners should carefully check proclamation details.

Compaction control of topography and fault network structure along strike-slip faults in sedimentary basins

Strike-slip faults commonly display structurally complex areas of positive or negative topography. Understanding the development of such areas has important implications for earthquake studies and hydrocarbon exploration. Previous workers identified the key factors controlling the occurrence of both topographic modes and the related structural styles. Kinematic and stress boundary conditions are of first-order relevance. Surface mass transport and material properties affect fault network structure. Experiments demonstrate that dilatancy can generate positive topography even under simple-shear boundary conditions. Here, we use physical models with sand to show that the degree of compaction of the deformed rocks alone can determine the type of topography and related surface fault network structure in simple-shear settings. In our experiments, volume changes of ∼5% are sufficient to generate localized uplift or subsidence. We discuss scalability of model volume changes and fault network structure and show that our model fault zones satisfy geometrical similarity with natural flower structures. Our results imply that compaction may be an important factor in the development of topography and fault network structure along strike-slip faults in sedimentary basins.

Eight dead, 70 missing as flash floods strike Queensland

"Eight people are dead and there are grave fears the toll may rise with at least 70 missing after flash floods swept through southeastern Queensland."

TPP draft reveals surgical strike on public health

On 13 November, WikiLeaks released a secret draft text of the Intellectual Property Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The text reveals substantive proposals for expanded protection in respect of copyright, patent, trade mark and trade secrets law, and intellectual property enforcement.

Nuori konservatiivi : Tuure Junnila ja hänen poliittinen toimintansa vuoteen 1956

Tuure Junnila, PhD (1910-1999) was one of Finland's most renowned conservative politicians of the post-war period. Junnila is remembered primarily as a persistent opponent of Urho Kekkonen, a long-term Member of Parliament, a conspicuous opposition member and a prolific political writer. Junnila's ideologies and political views were conservative, and he is one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the National Coalition Party. Junnila also made an extensive career outside of politics, first as an economist and then as an executive of Finland's leading commercial bank Kansallis-Osake-Pankki. The Young Conservative is a partial biography written using traditional historical research methods, which examines Junnila's personal history and his activity in public life up to 1956. The study begins by investigating Junnila's background through his childhood, school years, university studies and early professional career. It also looks at Junnila's work as an economist and practical banker. Particular attention is paid to Junnila's political work, constantly focusing on the following five often overlapping areas: (1) economic policy, (2) domestic policy, (3) foreign and security policy, (4) Junnila and Urho Kekkonen, (5) Junnila, the Coalition Party and Finnish conservatism. In his economic policy, Junnila emphasised the importance of economic stability, opposed socialisation and the growth of public expenditure, defended the free market system and private entrepreneurship, and demanded tax cuts. This policy was very popular within the Coalition Party during the early 1950s, making Junnila the leading conservative economic politician of the time. In terms of domestic policy, Junnila demanded as early as the 1940s that a "third force" should be established in Finland to counterbalance the agrarian and labour parties by uniting conservative and liberal ideologies under the same roof. Foreign and security policy is the area of Junnila's political activity which is most clearly situated after the mid-1950s. However, Junnila's early speeches and writings already show a striving towards the unconditional neutrality modelled by Switzerland and Sweden and a strong emphasis on Finland's right to internal self-determination. Junnila, as did the Coalition Party as a whole, adopted a consistently critical approach towards Urho Kekkonen between 1951 and 1956, but this attitude was not as bluntly negative and all-round antagonistic as many previous studies have implied. Junnila was one of the leading Finnish conservatives of the early 1950s and in all essence his views were analogous to the general alignment of the Coalition Party at the time: conservative in ideology and general policy, and liberal in economic policy.

A blowfly strike vaccine requires an understanding of host-pathogen interactions

The phase-out of Mulesing by 2010 means the Australian wool industry requires immediate and viable alternatives for the control and prevention of blowfly strike, an economically important parasitic disease of sheep. In this review we have analysed previous research aimed toward the development of a vaccine against blowfly strike and the reasons why the approaches taken were unsuccessful at the time. Close scrutiny has provided new insight into this host-parasite interaction and identified new opportunities for the development of a vaccine. Here we propose that addressing immunosuppression together with the induction of cellular immunity is likely to result in an anti-blowfly strike vaccine, as opposed to the use of "standard" approaches aimed at inducing humoral immunity.

Ranskan rooli ja asema läntisessä liittoutumassa neljännen ja viidennen tasavallan vaihtumakohdassa 1956-1958

The study discusses the position of France as the United States’ ally in NATO in 1956-1958. The concrete position of France and the role that it was envisioned to have are being treated from the point of view of three participants of the Cold War: France, the United States and the Soviet Union. How did these different parties perceive the question and did these views change when the French Fourth Republic turned into the Fifth in 1958? The study is based on published French and American documents of Foreign Affairs. Because of problems with accessibility to the Soviet archival sources, the study uses reports on France-NATO relations of Pravda newspaper, the official organ of the Communist Party of the USSR, to provide information about how the Soviet side saw the question. Due to the nature and use of source material, and the chronological structure of the work, the study belongs methodologically to the research field of History of International Relations. As distinct from political scientists’ field of research, more prone to theorize, the study is characteristically a historical research, a work based on qualitative method and original sources that aims at creating a coherent narrative of the views expressed during the period covered by the study. France’s road to a full membership of NATO is being treated on the basis of research literature, after which discussions about France’s position in the Western Alliance are being chronologically traced for the period of last years of the Fourth Republic and the immediate months of coming back to power of Charles de Gaulle. Right from the spring of 1956 there can be seen aspirations of France, on one hand, to maintain her freedom of action inside the Western Alliance and, on the other, to widen the dialogue between the allies. The decision on France’s own nuclear deterrent was made already during the Fourth Republic, when it was thought to become part of NATO’s common defence. This was to change with de Gaulle. The USA felt that France still fancied herself as a great power and that she could not participate in full in NATO’s common defence because of her colonies. The Soviet Union saw the concrete position of France in the Alliance as in complete dependence on the USA, but her desired role was expressed largely in “Gaullist” terms. The expressions used by the General and the Soviet propaganda were close to each other, but the Soviet Union could not support de Gaulle without endangering the position of the French Communist Party. Between the Fourth and Fifth Republics no great rupture in content took place concerning the views of France’s role and position in the Western Alliance. The questions posed by de Gaulle had been expressed during the whole period of Fourth Republic’s existence. Instead, along with the General the weight and rhetoric of these questions saw a great change. Already in the early phase the Americans saw it possible that with de Gaulle, France would try to change her role. The rupture took place in the form of expression, rather than in its content.

Strategic use of crutching and dicyclanil to protect unmulesed sheep against breech strike

Objective To test strategies for the application of dicyclanil and mid-season crutching to maximise protection of unmulesed sheep against breech strike. Procedure Three hundred and eighty unmulesed Merino weaners were randomly allocated to four groups either left untreated or treated by different strategies with 50 g/L dicyclanil. Treatments included breech treatment alone and breech plus body treatment, with two application times, immediately after shearing and 6 weeks after crutching or shearing. To assess protection, larval implants with newly hatched Lucilia cuprina larvae were applied to 10 different sheep from each group at 3, 4, 5 and 6 months after crutching and shearing and assessed for the development of strike at 48 hours. The concentration of dicyclanil was measured in wool samples clipped from the breeches of the test sheep. Results All dicyclanil treatments gave significant reduction in strike in comparison to controls up until 4 months after crutching but protection in the sheep treated immediately after shearing had waned at 5 months. Treating at 6 weeks after crutching provided significant reduction (P < 0.05) in strike for 6 months. Results for strike incidence immediately after shearing and concentration of dicyclanil in the breech wool also suggested improvements in protection by delaying treatment for 6 weeks. Conclusion In most environments it should be possible to protect unmulesed sheep against breech strike with a carefully planned integrated control program incorporating strategically timed crutching, shearing and dicyclanil application. Delaying treatment with dicyclanil to at least 6 weeks after shearing or crutching increased the protection provided in comparison to treatment immediately after shearing.

Controlling fly strike and louse infections in sheep with tea tree oil

This study aimed to assess the effect of tea tree oil based formulations against two major ectoparasitic diseases in the sheep industry, flystrike and louse infestation, and to provide data to assist the assessment of the commercial feasibility of development of tea tree oil based ectoparasiticides. The results demonstrate insecticidal effects against both sheep lice and blowflies and repellent effects against adult flies and maggots. Dipping sheep in a Tea Tree Oil based formulation appeared to completely eradicate lice and suggests its potential use in sheep dipping formulations. Repellent and insecticidal effects against sheep blowflies, together with previously reported anti-microbial and wound healing properties, suggest significant benefits from the inclusion of tea tree oil in flystrike and wound treatment formulations. These effects occurred at concentrations of Tea Tree Oil that suggest the commercial viability of development of Tea Tree Oil based formulations for sheep parasite control and wound treatment and a potential new market for Tea Tree Oil.