Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

A Convex Optimization Framework for Almost Budget Balanced Allocation of a Divisible Good

We address the problem of allocating a single divisible good to a number of agents. The agents have concave valuation functions parameterized by a scalar type. The agents report only the type. The goal is to find allocatively efficient, strategy proof, nearly budget balanced mechanisms within the Groves class. Near budget balance is attained by returning as much of the received payments as rebates to agents. Two performance criteria are of interest: the maximum ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, and the expected budget surplus, within the class of linear rebate functions. The goal is to minimize them. Assuming that the valuation functions are known, we show that both problems reduce to convex optimization problems, where the convex constraint sets are characterized by a continuum of half-plane constraints parameterized by the vector of reported types. We then propose a randomized relaxation of these problems by sampling constraints. The relaxed problem is a linear programming problem (LP). We then identify the number of samples needed for ``near-feasibility'' of the relaxed constraint set. Under some conditions on the valuation function, we show that value of the approximate LP is close to the optimal value. Simulation results show significant improvements of our proposed method over the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism without rebates. In the special case of indivisible goods, the mechanisms in this paper fall back to those proposed by Moulin, by Guo and Conitzer, and by Gujar and Narahari, without any need for randomization. Extension of the proposed mechanisms to situations when the valuation functions are not known to the central planner are also discussed. Note to Practitioners-Our results will be useful in all resource allocation problems that involve gathering of information privately held by strategic users, where the utilities are any concave function of the allocations, and where the resource planner is not interested in maximizing revenue, but in efficient sharing of the resource. Such situations arise quite often in fair sharing of internet resources, fair sharing of funds across departments within the same parent organization, auctioning of public goods, etc. We study methods to achieve near budget balance by first collecting payments according to the celebrated VCG mechanism, and then returning as much of the collected money as rebates. Our focus on linear rebate functions allows for easy implementation. The resulting convex optimization problem is solved via relaxation to a randomized linear programming problem, for which several efficient solvers exist. This relaxation is enabled by constraint sampling. Keeping practitioners in mind, we identify the number of samples that assures a desired level of ``near-feasibility'' with the desired confidence level. Our methodology will occasionally require subsidy from outside the system. We however demonstrate via simulation that, if the mechanism is repeated several times over independent instances, then past surplus can support the subsidy requirements. We also extend our results to situations where the strategic users' utility functions are not known to the allocating entity, a common situation in the context of internet users and other problems.

Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading cycle algorithm finds the unique core allocation. When preferences are not necessarily strict, we use an exogenous profile of tie-breakers to resolve any ties in individuals' preferences and apply Gale's top trading cycle algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences. We provide a foundation of these simple extensions of Gale's top trading cycle algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences. We show that Gale's top trading cycle algorithm with fixed tie-breaking is characterized by individual rationality, strategy-proofness, weak efficiency, non-bossiness, and consistency. Our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a 'good and simple' rule for the resulting strict preferences. This reinforces the market-based approach even in the presence of indifferences because always competitive allocations are chosen.

The implication of a term of good faith in commercial leases

Much has been written in the past decade on the subject of the implication of a term of good faith in contracts in Australia, particularly since the judgment Priestley JA in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. Except for an early article by Rachael Mulheron, 'Good Faith and Commercial Leases: New Opportunities for the Tenant' (1996) 4 APLJ 223, very little else has been written with respect to the possible application of the doctrine to the commercial leases.With the advent of two later New South Wales Supreme Court decisions Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 and, more recently, Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264, the question of the application of the doctrine in the commercial leasing context has been examined. This article briefly considers the nature and substance of the doctrine against the background of the relationship of lessor and lessee and examines in some depth the Australian decisions on commercial leases where it has been sought, unsuccessfully, to apply the doctrine. The article concludes by suggesting that as a standard commercial lease usually covers the field of agreement between lessor and lessee and as a lessee has a high degree of statutory protection derived from equitable principles, there may be little room for the operation of the doctrine in this legal environment.

The implication of a term of good faith in commercial leases — A brief response

By way of response to Professor Duncan's article,1 this article examines the theoretical basis for the implication of contractual terms, particularly the implication of a term at law. In this regard the recent decision of Barrett J in Overlook v Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17 is considered, to the extent that it provides guidance concerning the implication of an obligation of good faith in the context of a commercial contract. A number of observations are made which may be considered likely to have application to the relationship of commercial landlord and tenant. The conclusion reached is that although the commercial landlord and tenant contractual relationship is highly regulated, this may not deny a remedy to a tenant who is the victim of a landlord's 'bad faith'. Finally, the article concludes by considering the extent to which it may be possible to contractually exclude the implied obligation of good faith.

Inter-agency working : good intentions and interaction dynamics

This paper explores inter-agency working and examines the implications of inter-agency operations for delivering multi-domain service outcomes. Cross-agency collaborative approaches to service delivery are suggested to provide the vehicle for achieving integrated service and policy goals. However, it is argued these need to be crafted ‘fit’ for purpose’ and may not be the requisite approach for all joint purposes. Moreover, some commentators suggest that the optimism about these partnership arrangements and cross-agency actions to resolve complex multi-dimensional problems may be misplaced and propose that further research into the actual rather than desired consequences of these arrangements may find that, at times, partnership working creates negative effects. While collaboration and partnerships are often framed as the way to achieve real breakthroughs in service delivery across agencies, there remain key challenges to interagency working. As more and insistent calls for agencies and other community actors to work together in resolving complex social problems are heeded, the implications of working across organizational boundaries need to be further investigated. This paper investigates cases of inter-agency programmes to understand the dimensions and limitations of inter-agency working. The paper concludes by offering a framework for better inter-agency working that has applicability across all sectors.

Impeding good governance implementation in Indonesian regional government : the effect of a bureaucratic generation gap

The implementation of ‘good governance’ in Indonesia’s regional government sector became a central tenet in governance research following the introduction of the national code for governance in 2006. The code was originally drafted in 1999 as a response to the Asian financial crises and many cases of unearthed corruption, collusion, and nepotism. It was reviewed in 2001 and again in 2006 to incorporate relevant political, economical, and social developments. Even though the national code exists along with many regional government decrees on good governance, the extent of implementation of the tenets of good governance in Indonesia’s regional government is still questioned. Previous research on good governance implementation in Indonesian regional government (Mardiasmo, Barnes and Sakurai, 2008) identified differences in the nature and depth of implementation between various Indonesian regional governments. This paper analyses and extends this recent work and explores key factors that may impede the implementation and sustained application of governance practices across regional settings. The bureaucratic culture of Indonesian regional government is one that has been shaped for over approximately 30 years, in particular during that of the Soeharto regime. Previous research on this regime suggests a bureaucratic culture with a mix of positive and negative aspects. On one hand Soeharto’s regime resulted in strong development growth and strong economic fundamentals, resulting in Indonesia being recognised as one of the Asian economic tigers prior to the 1997 Asian financial crises. The financial crises however revealed a bureaucratic culture that was rife with corruption, collusion, and nepotism. Although subsequent Indonesian governments have been committed to eradicating entrenched practices it seems apparent that the culture is ingrained within the bureaucracy and eradication of it will take time. Informants from regional government agree with this observation, as they identify good governance as an innovative mechanism and to implement it will mean a deviation from the “old ways.” Thus there is a need for a “changed” mind set in order to implement sustained governance practices. Such an exercise has proven to be challenging so far, as there is “hidden” resistance from within the bureaucracy to change its ways. The inertia of such bureaucratic cultures forms a tension against the opportunity for the implementation of good governance. From this context an emergent finding is the existence of a ‘bureaucratic generation gap’ as an impeding variable to enhanced and more efficient implementation of governance systems. It was found that after the Asian financial crises the Indonesian government (both at national and regional level) drew upon a wider human resources pool to fill government positions – including entrants from academia, the private sector, international institutions, foreign nationals and new graduates. It suggested that this change in human capital within government is at the core of this ‘inter-generational divide.’ This divergence is exemplified, at one extreme, by [older] bureaucrats who have been in-position for long periods of time serving during the extended Soeharto regime. The “new” bureaucrats have only sat in their positions since the end of Asian financial crisis and did not serve during Soeharto’s regime. It is argued that the existence of this generation gap and associated aspects of organisational culture have significantly impeded modernising governance practices across regional Indonesia. This paper examines the experiences of government employees in five Indonesian regions: Solok, Padang, Gorontalo, Bali, and Jakarta. Each regional government is examined using a mixed methodology comprising of on-site observation, document analysis, and iterative semi-structured interviewing. Drawing from the experiences of five regional governments in implementing good governance this paper seeks to better understand the causal contexts of variable implementation governance practices and to suggest enhancements to the development of policies for sustainable inter-generational change in governance practice across regional government settings.