Exclusive contracts in bilaterally duopolistic industries

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. With highly differentiated products exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium.

Exclusive contracts with vertically differentiated products

In this paper we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of exclusive contracts in vertically integrated markets where both the upstream and the downstream market are characterized as oligopolies and manufacturers produce vertically differentiated products. We find that firms prefer to deal exclusively with retailers. If the extent of consumers' heterogeneity is small, manufacturers offer exclusive contracts unilaterally. On the other hand, if consumers' valuations differ significantly both manufacturers engage in exclusive contracting.

Benefits of a marketing cooperative in transition agriculture: Mórakert purchasing and service co-operative

The paper analyses the potential benefits of marketing cooperatives in Hungary, employing a transaction cost economics framework. We found that the purchased quantity, the existence of contracts, flexibility and trust are the most important factors farmers consider when selling their products via a cooperative. The most striking result is that diversification has positive influences on the share of cooperatives in farmers’ sale. Furthermore, farmers with larger bargaining power have less willingness to sell their product to the cooperative. Surprisingly, asset specificity has rather negative effects on the share of cooperatives in members’ sales.

Reciprocally Exclusive Contracts and Endogenous Quality

Our paper investigates exclusive dealing and purchasing in successive duopolies. First we show that using a limited set of feasible contracts, exclusive dealing and purchasing is going to be preferred, regardless of the level of product differentiation. In the next step, we make the choice of quality endogenous and derive the equilibrium conditions for qualities under the aforementioned contractual arrangement. Our final proposition shows that in this case the choice of quality depends exclusively on the valuation of the median consumer.

A fundamentális transzformáció és a referenciapont szerepe a hiányos szerződések elméletében (The role of basic transformation and reference point in the theory of incomplete contracts)

A cikk Oliver Hart és szerzőtársai modelljeinek következtetéseit hasonlítja össze Williamson tranzakciós költségekre vonatkozó nézeteivel. Megmutatja, hogy a két irányzat a vállalat vagy piac kérdéskörében más eszközöket használ, de hasonlóan érvel. Megismerkedhetünk Williamson Harttal szemben megfogalmazott azon kritikájával, hogy Hart modelljeiben az alkunak nincsenek tranzakciós költségei, illetve a kritika kritikájával is. Hart elképzeléseit támasztja alá a tulajdonjogi irányzaton belül nemrégiben kialakult referenciapont-elmélet, amely kísérleti lehetőségeket is nyújt a különböző feltételezések igazolására. ____ The article compares the conclusions from the models of Oliver Hart et al. with the views of Williamson on transaction costs. It shows that the two schools use different means on the question of the firm or the market, but similar reasoning. The author covers Williamson's criticism of Hart that there are no transaction costs in his models, and also the criticism of that criticism. Hart's notions are supported by the recently developed theory of reference point within the property-right trend, which offers chances of experimental proof of the various assumptions.

Exclusive contracts with private information in successive differentiated oligopolies

The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufacturers. In contrast with the previous literature, exclusive contracts are shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers selling highly differentiated products, who thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that exclusive contracts decrease both consumer and social welfare.

Az értékesítés és a marketing kapcsolatának piaci tájékozódásban betöltött szerepe és meghatározó tényezői (Role of the sales and marketing relationship in market orientation and its determining factors)

A szerző kutatásában azt vizsgálja, hogy az értékesítés területén dolgozó munkatársak piaci megfigyeléseit milyen mértékben képesek beépíteni a marketingvezetők a menedzsmentmunkába. Az értékesítési munkatársak piaci megfigyelései mindig naprakészek, ráadásul jelentősebb ráfordítás nélkül hozzáférhetők. A marketing- és a sales munkatársak közötti hagyományosan konfliktusokkal terhelt kapcsolat miatt azonban a vállalatok sokszor mégsem aknázzák ki a piaci tájékozódásnak ezt a lehetőségét. A nagyvállalati mintán empirikusan tesztelt modell szerint a menedzserek azon képessége, hogy felhasználják a vállalaton belül rendelkezésre álló információkat, alapvetően nem egyéni, hanem szervezeti képesség. Azok a menedzserek, akik olyan cégeknél dolgoznak, ahol a vállalati továbbképzések során más részlegek munkájába is bekapcsolódhatnak, nagyobb mértékben támaszkodnak a munkatársak piaci megfigyeléseire döntéseik meghozatala során. _____ The author examines in her research that to what extent marketing leaders can build market experience of sales employees into the management activity. Because of the traditionally problematic relationship between marketing and sales employees, companies do not exploit this opportunity of market orientation. According to the model tested on a big corporation sample, the capacity of managers to use information available within the company is basically not an individual but organisational capacity.

Sales-marketing interface and company performance. Is information use the missing link?

Over the last couple of years there has been an ongoing debate on how sales managers contribute to organizational value. Direct measures between sales-marketing interface quality and company performance are compromised, as company performance is influenced by a plethora of other factors. We advocate that the use of sales information is the missing link between sales-marketing relationship quality and organizational outcomes. We propose and empirically test a model on how sales-marketing interface quality affects managerial use of sales information, which in turn leads to enhanced organizational performance. We found that marketing managers rely on sales information if they think that their sales counterpart is trustworthy. Integration between the sales-marketing function contributes to a trust-based relationship.

Quota bonuses as localized sales bonuses

Managerial bonus schemes and their effects on firm strategies and market outcomes are extensively discussed in the literature. Though quota bonuses are not uncommon in practice, they have not been analysed so far. In this article we compare quota bonuses to profit-based evaluation and sales (quantity) bonuses. In a duopoly setting with independent demand shocks we find that under certain circumstances choosing quota bonuses is a dominant strategy. This may explain the widespread use of quota bonuses in situations where incentive problems are relevant.