Research review : searching for a new framework for Thailand's foreign policy in the post-cold war era

Thai foreign policy in the 1990s has been said to be contingent on the government in power, which changes between (or within) these groups and vacillates between pro-democratic reformists/principle-pursuers and the conservatives/profit-seekers. In these studies, Thailand’s Indochinese policy has often been referred to as a typical consequence of politics between the pragmatists and the reformists. However, whether or not domestic oppositional politics is the key determinant of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era still requires further examination, precisely because the model is now facing serious challenges between theory and reality. In this paper, I review the existing arguments concerning Thailand’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War Era and point out their limitations and questions for future study.

Regime survival strategies and the conduct of foreign policy in Egypt

エジプトではムバーラク大統領の国内政策と域内におけるエジプトの影響力低迷が引き金となって、2011年1月25日に抗議運動起こった。抗議運動はエジプト全土に拡がり、18日間の民衆的な反体制運動によってムバーラクは軍に見捨てられ、失脚に追い込まれた。この民衆蜂起によって警察は街頭から撤退し、シナイ半島の警察署は焼き放たれ、ムバーラクが率いていた国民民主党の建物や国内治安機関の本部は襲撃され、国家機関が数ヶ月にもわたって機能不全となり、ムバーラク体制の崩壊は国内的な混乱を招くこととなった。振り返れば、エジプトでの政治的大変動は社会的な革命へと展開することはできなかった。その理由は独裁体制からの移行を先導できる組織化された反体制勢力が存在しなかったためである。民衆による抗議運動は一時的に体制を転覆できても旧体制のエリートを分裂させることはできず、軍の影響下にある体制の復活を防ぐこともできなかった。2011年以降のエジプトは現在まで混乱状態に陥ったままであるが、1カ月に及ぶエジプト軍最高評議会(SCAF)の暫定統治、エジプト史上初の自由な大統領選挙によって選出された文民大統領のムルスィーによる一年余りの統治、そして2013年7月の軍事クーデターによって権力の座に就いたスィースィーの統治といった過程で、民衆蜂起がエジプトの外交関係に及ぼした影響はごく僅かであった。本稿は、現在のエジプトの外交政策が2011年の革命にほとんど影響を受けていないのはなぜか、またエジプトの統治者たちが政権の正統性、体制の強化および政治的な安定性を確保し、国内的な課題に対処するための戦略をいかに策定しているのかを説明することを試みる。本稿での主張は、ムバーラク以降のエジプトが体制の強化と保全のために外交政策を進めており、国内的な混乱によって地域内アクターへの依存度が高まっていることである。

IT Offshoring and India: Some Implications

There has been a large spurt in the offshore outsourcing of Information Technology (IT) recently. India has been a major recipient of such work. There have been loud protests against the "loss" of jobs in the US as work was shifted to India. The large inflow of IT related work has also had major impact on the Indian economy. There are implications on the foreign policy level as well. While the economic implications are well known, we try to see a little of the foreign policy implications in this paper.

The Evolution of the "One China" Concept in the Process of Taiwan's Democratization

This paper investigates how Taiwan's "one China" concept evolved during the democratization process that occurred under the leadership of former President Lee Teng-hui. The author argues that there was a crucial evolution of the "one China" concept and that the transformation of the concept resulted from changes in Taiwan's internal political circumstances. The evolution of the concept creates a real possibility that the "status quo" sought by the ROC in the Taiwan Strait both during and after the Cold War might be destroyed. In addition, any further evolution of the "one China" concept will surely make the "status quo" of Taiwan untenable, in that it would induce Taiwan to seek de jure instead of de facto independence, possibly initiating a conflict between the PRC and the ROC. To prevent such a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the international community must persuade the ROC not to go beyond the "status quo" and to stay within the framework of de facto independence. At the same time, both the PRC and the ROC should be urged to maintain an open conduit of communication for productive talks on the reunification of China.

日中経済関係の今後－「対中ODA中止合意」を超えて

日中間では、外交関係が冷え切っていた時にも経済関係は好調を持続していた。実際、両国間貿易、日本の対中直接投資ともに急増し、かつその内容も高度化の様相を示している。当然さまざまな経済摩擦も発生しているが、問題は、摩擦が経済分野に留まらず2005年春の「反日騒動」に見られたように政治問題化したり、逆に政治問題が経済摩擦をもたらす土壌が両国関係に残っていることだろう。本稿ではまず、両国の経済が相互補完関係を深めている現状を確認し、次に経済摩擦の実態と背景を整理する。そして最後にこうした作業を踏まえて、今後の日中経済関係のあり方を探ってみたい。

The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-55 and U.S.-R.O.C Relations

On September 3, 1954, Chinese artillery began shelling Quemoy (Jinmen), one of the Kuomintang-held offshore islands, setting off the first Taiwan Strait Crisis. This paper focuses on the crisis and analyzes the following three questions: (1) What was the policy the U.S. took towards the Republic of China (R.O.C), especially towards the offshore islands, to try to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? (2) What were the intentions of the U.S. government in trying to end the Taiwan Strait Crisis? And (3) how should U.S. policy towards the R.O.C. which led to solving the Taiwan Strait Crisis be positioned in the history of Sino-American relations? Through analysis of these questions, this study concludes that the position the U.S. took to bring an end to crisis, one which prevented China from “liberating Taiwan” and the Kuomintang from “attacking the mainland,” brought about the existence of a de facto “two-China” situation.

The Confucius institutes and China's soft power

The Confucius Institutes have been established by the Chinese government which operates them in collaboration with foreign universities and educational institutions in order to promote understanding of the Chinese language and culture. The first Confucius Institute opened its doors in Seoul, South Korea in 2004. Within the past seven years, 353 Confucius Institutes and 473 Confucius Classrooms have been established in 104 countries and regions. It is quite unusual for a language school to be able to make progress so rapidly. These developments raise a series of basic questions. First, what are the Confucius Institutes? What are their purpose and function? How have they been able to multiply so quickly? Are Confucius Institutes instruments of China's soft power? This article seeks to answer these questions by analyzing the details behind the establishment of Confucius Institutes, their organizational mechanism, and their activities. This paper concludes that due to insufficiency of cultural content and key concepts which can typify contemporary China, it is hard to see Confucius Institutes as China's soft power.

Japan and the Middle East after the Arab Spring

本稿は、中東における問題や紛争に対する日本の政策を考察し、中長期的な視野に立った日本の国益追求のためにはどのような選択肢が考えられるかを論じる。そのために、イランの核開発問題とシリアの市民戦争をケースとしてとりあげる。戦後の日本は中東での問題や紛争に対して、地域内諸国およびアメリカとの関係を同時に維持するために、双方の均衡を図る政策を打ち出してきたが、冷戦後には米国寄りの傾向が多く見られた。現在中東では、アラブの春の展望は不透明な部分が多い。日本は中東との関係において、問題や紛争の性質によっては負の遺産を抱える欧米とは一線を画した独自の政策とアプローチを打ち出すことが、中東資源国との関係の強化と拡大や中東市場の発展と安定には望ましいと考える。また同時に、今後の米国の中東における国益の変化が考えられることも要因ととらえ、本稿は冷戦期にみられたような、より均衡のとれた立場を打ち出し、より広い概念をもとに基づいた効果的なソフトパワーの行使を提唱する。

Taiwan strait crises and Chiang Kai-shek's strategic thinking : a perspective from the Taiwan's archive

This paper uses Taiwan's archival documents to reexamine the two Taiwan Strait crises and the characteristics of Chiang Kai-shek's strategic thinking. Section 2 examines the oscillation of U.S. policy concerning the ROC's offensive toward mainland China and the defense of the Da-chen islands before and after the initiation of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-1955. Doing so will highlight the contradictory U.S. attitude that contributed to the crisis and weakened its ability to control Chiang. Section 3 focuses on Chiang Kai-shek's strategic vision toward East Asia. In particular, this section focuses on his strategic thinking and tries to assess whether or not he was a "reckless" or "irrational" leader as often described in the previous research on his personality.