Ataques especulativos sobre dívidas e regimes monetários

A tese pretende conhecer de forma profunda a metodologia de ataques especulativos sobre dívidas, desenvolvida por Cole e Kehoe (1996), e tem três objetivos principais: (i) aplicá-la a outros países, além do México, que é feito na versão original; (ii) entender a opção de um país dolarizar, em relação à alternativa de manter sua moeda local, quando a economia depende da entrada de capitais financeiros internacionais; e (iii) estudar a união monetária como uma terceira alternativa de regime monetário, em comparação com a dolarização e o regime de moeda local. O modelo de crises da dívida de Cole-Kehoe é aplicado às economias da Coréia, da Rússia e do Brasil. Modifica-se este modelo para incluir dívida denominada em moeda local, que é totalmente adquirida pelos consumidores nacionais e que dá ao governo a possibilidade de obter receitas por meio da cobrança de um imposto inflacionário sobre estes ativos. As receitas obtidas desta forma podem ser utilizadas para pagar os banqueiros internacionais e evitar uma crise da dívida externa, que ocorreria, em caso contrário. Considera-se também, neste caso, que o banco central possa estar sujeito a pressões de seu governo para gerar estas receitas. Analogamente, para representar um país pertencente a uma união monetária, inclui-se dívida denominada em moeda comum e um governo central no modelo original. A política monetária da união está subordinada à decisão conjunta de todos os países membros. Supõe-se também que o banco central da união possa sofrer pressões políticas de alguns governos nacionais sem disciplina fiscal e dispostos a obter receitas de imposto inflacionário sobre a dívida. Na dolarização, a política monetária está submetida a do banco central do país âncora e, portanto, não há possibilidade de o governo gerar receitas extraordinárias sobre a dívida, a menos que haja forte simetria dos choques que atingem a economia dolarizada e o país âncora. Considerando estas peculiaridades dos três regimes monetários, os níveis de bem-estar são caracterizados e avaliados numericamente para o Brasil. Além disso, obtém-se a política ótima do governo para a dívida em dólar, segundo os três regimes.

As reformas da previdência no Brasil e o equilíbrio e atuarial dos Regimes Próprios de Previdência Social (RPPS), dos entes federados estaduais da Região Sudeste

O desequilíbrio das contas públicas, notadamente em relação à previdência do servidor público no Brasil, tem levado a buscas constantes de soluções para garantir o custeio do modelo em desenvolvimento. As mudanças estabelecidas nas Reformas da Previdência têm contribuído de forma significativa para diminuir o passivo previdenciário acumulado ao longo dos anos, principalmente nos estados, municípios das capitais e dos demais constituídos antes da promulgação da Carta Magna de 1988. Os estados escolhidos para análise demonstraram desacertos, todavia apresentam resultados promissores para o equilíbrio financeiro e atuarial dos RPPS. A utilização de modelos parecidos aos implementados na América do Sul, para o setor público e privado, apresentam-se inadequados no Brasil para os servidores públicos. Precisamos continuar aprimorando os nossos conhecimentos, buscando novas alternativas que garantam a sustentabilidade e viabilidade do sistema, sem comprometer a capacidade de investimentos dos entes federados

Informality in labor market and welfare

The neoclassical growth model with two sectors in production is employed in this paper in order to investigate how a change in the tax structure affects informality and welfare. We calibrate and simulate the model and find that welfare always increases when we reduce the tax rate on the demand for labor and adjust the tax rate on the value added so that the government revenue remains constant.

Um estudo da transição entre regimes de previdência no Brasil: Aspectos Macroeconômicos e custos sociais

Neste trabalho é estudada a trajetória de transição de variáveis macroe- conômicas e os efeitos sobre o bem-estar causados por uma mudança no sistema de previdência social. É utilizado um modelo com incerteza e restrição a crédito, para o qual é desenvolvido um método para simular a transição. Inicialmente é feita uma comparação de steady states para identificar o sistema ótimo no longo prazo. Com a inserção de um fator fixo, terra, na função de produção, é elimi- nada a possibilidade de ineficiência dinâmica e os resultados indicam um sistema de capitalização plena como ótimo. Na transição, a presença do fator fixo gera uma valorização inesperada dos ativos, devido ao preço da terra ser baseado na trajetória futura da renda. Isto vale tanto para uma transição inesperada quanto anunciada. A simulação da transição parte de dois casos extremos: encerrando-se os benefícios inesperadamente e baseando-se no direito adquirido para as gerações vivas. Também são simulados os casos intermediários. Uma contribuição impor- tante deste trabalho é a mensuração e comparação das variações de bem-estar de cada processo de transição através da taxa de desconto social correspondente. Esta taxa seria a necessária para tornar a sociedade indiferente à reforma, o que é medido através de um cálculo de utilidade total. As simulações indicam que a transição que minimiza as perdas sociais é aquela em que os inativos são taxados em 30%.

The trasition from fixed to floating exchange rate regimes: the case of Brazil

This dissertation evaluates macroeconomic management in Brazil from 1994 to the present, with particular focus on exchange rate policy. It points out that while Brazil's Real Plan succeeded in halting the hyperinflation that had reached more than 2000 percent in 1993, it also caused significant real appreciation of the exchange rate situation that was only made worse by the extremely high interest rates and ensuing bout of severe financial crises in the intemational arena. By the end of 1998, the accumulation of internai and externai imbalances led the authorities to drop foreign exchange controls and allow the currency to float. In spite of some initial scepticism, the flexible rate regime cum inflation target proved to work well. Inflation was kept under control; the current account position improved significantly, real interest rates fell and GDP growth resumed. Thus, while great challenges still lie ahead, the recent successes bestow some optimism on the well functioning of this exchange rate regime. The Brazilian case suggests that successful transition from one foreign exchange system to another, particularly during financial crisis, does not depend only on one variable be it fiscal or monetary. In reality, it depends on whole set of co-ordinated policies aimed at resuming price stability with as little exchange rate and output volatility as possible.

Investment in human capital in a macrodynamic framework: redistributive taxation, public debt and welfare

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The welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty in the post-war period

Lucas (1987) has shown the surprising result that the welfare cost of business cycles is quite small. Using standard assumptions on preferences and a fully-áedged econometric model we computed the welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty for the post-WWII era using the multivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition for trends and cycles, which considers not only business-cycle uncertainty but also uncertainty from the stochastic trend in consumption. The post-WWII period is relatively quiet, with the welfare costs of uncertainty being about 0:9% of per-capita consumption. Although changing the decomposition method changed substantially initial results, the welfare cost of uncertainty is qualitatively small in the post-WWII era - about $175.00 a year per-capita in the U.S. We also computed the marginal welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty using this same technique. It is about twice as large as the welfare cost ñ$350.00 a year per-capita.

An ordering of measures of the welfare cost of inflation in economies with interest-bearing deposits

This paper builds on Lucas (2000) and on Cysne (2003) to derive and order six alternative measures of the welfare costs of inflation (five of which already existing in the literature) for any vector of opportunity costs. The ordering of the functions is carried out for economies with or without interestbearing deposits. We provide examples and closed-form solutions for the log-log money demand both in the unidimensional and in the multidimensional setting (when interest-bearing monies are present). An estimate of the maximum relative error a researcher can incur when using any particular measure is also provided.

Welfare and fiscal policy with public goods and infrastructure

We construct and simulate a model to study the welfare and macroeconomic impact of government actions when its productive role is taken into account. The trade-off between public investment and public consumption is also investigated, since public consumption is introduced as a public good that directly affects individuals' well-being. Our results replicate econometric evidence showing that part of the observed slowdown of U.S. productivity growth can be explained by the reduction of investment in infrastructure which also implied a sizable welfare 1085 to the popu1ation. Depending on the methodology used we found a welfare cost ranging from 4.2% to 1.16% of GNP. The impact of fiscal policy can be qualitative and quantitative distinct depending on Whether we assume a higher or smaller output elasticity to infrastructure. If it is high enough, increases in tax rates may stimulate accumulation and production, which is the opposite prediction of standard ncocJassica1 models.

Social welfare analysis in a simple financial economy with risk regulation

In the last years, regulating agencies of rnany countries in the world, following recommendations of the Basel Committee, have compelled financiaI institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements to cover market risk. This paper investigates the consequences of such kind of regulation to social welfare and soundness of financiaI institutions through an equilibrium model. We show that the optimum level of regulation for each financiaI institution (the level that maximizes its utility) depends on its appetite for risk and some of them can perform better in a regulated economy. In addition, another important result asserts that under certain market conditions the financiaI fragility of an institution can be greater in a regulated econolny than in an unregulated one

Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy : macroeconomic impact and welfare computation

In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .

A note on growth, welfare and public policy

In this note the growth anti welfare effects of fiscal anti monetary policies are investigated in three economies where public investment is part of the productive process It is shown that growth is maximized at positive levels of income tax and inflation but that there is no direct relationship between government size, productivity and growth or between inflation and growth. However, unless there are no transfers or public goods in the economy, maximization of growth does not imply welfare maximization and the optimal tax rate and government size are greater than those that maximize growth. Money is not superneutral anti the optimal rate of money creation is below the maximizing rate of growth.

Monetary arrangements for emerging economies

In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.