Social welfare analysis in a simple financial economy with risk regulation
Data(s) |
13/05/2008
13/05/2008
01/09/2007
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Resumo |
In the last years, regulating agencies of rnany countries in the world, following recommendations of the Basel Committee, have compelled financiaI institutions to maintain minimum capital requirements to cover market risk. This paper investigates the consequences of such kind of regulation to social welfare and soundness of financiaI institutions through an equilibrium model. We show that the optimum level of regulation for each financiaI institution (the level that maximizes its utility) depends on its appetite for risk and some of them can perform better in a regulated economy. In addition, another important result asserts that under certain market conditions the financiaI fragility of an institution can be greater in a regulated econolny than in an unregulated one |
Identificador |
01048910 |
Idioma(s) |
en_US |
Publicador |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
Relação |
Ensaios Econômicos;651 |
Palavras-Chave | #Base capital accord #VaR #Banking regulation and social welfare #Economia |
Tipo |
Working Paper |