Exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty: recursive equilibrium and survival

This paper analyses general equilibrium models with finite heterogeneous agents having exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium with the state space consisting of the past aggregate portfolio distribution and the current state of the nature and that it implements the sequential equilibrium. We establish conditions under which the recursive equilibrium is continuous. Moreover, we use the continuous recursive relation of the aggregate variables to prove that if the economy has two types of agents, the one who commits persistent mistakes on the expectation rules of the future endogenous variables is driven out of the market by the others with correct anticipations of the variables, that is, the rational expectations agents.

The optimality of the Friedman rule when some distorting taxes are exogenous

This paper investigates the optimality of the Friedman rule in a two-sector small open economy. That policy prescription is found to be a necessary condition for Pareto efficiency. If a planner can select all conceivable distorting taxes, then, for some initial values of public debt, money balances and foreign assets, it is possible to decentralize a Pareto efficient allocation. If the planner can select only some of these tax rates, then second-best policies may also satisfy the Friedman rule. However, this last result depends on the set of tax instruments the planner can choose from.

Evidence on the relationship between incentives and exogenous risk

Theoretical models on moral hazard provide competing predictions on the incentive-risk relationship. These predictions are derived under the assumptions of homogeneous agents and exogenous risk. However, the existing empirical evidence does not account for risk-aversion heterogeneity and risk endogeneity. This paper uses a well-built database on tenancy contracts to address these issues. Detailed information on cropping activities is used to measure the exogenous risk. Risk-aversion heterogeneity and other self-selection problems are addressed through a portfolio schedule and a subsample of farmers who simultaneously own and sharecrop different farms. This controlled exercise finds a direct relation between incentives and exogenous risk.

Exogenous shocks and misattribution of responsibility for economic performance: results from survey experiments

Recent models of economic voting assume that citizens can discount exogenous factors when assessing government's economic performance. Yet there is evidence that Latin American voters do not behave in such way, and attribute to presidents outcomes that are beyond their control. This paper presents three survey experiments designed to explore mechanisms that could potentially correct such misattribution, and therefore contribute to debiasing individual behavior towards government evaluation. Our results provide individual-level evidence of the misattribution found in aggregate studies of electorate behavior, and reinforce psychologist's skepticism towards prospects of mental decontamination, as we found very scant evidence that providing information, raising awareness, or increasing motivation to correct biases infuenced individual's evaluation of president's performance.