Decision rules and information provision: monitoring versus manipulation

The paper focuses on the organization of institutions designed to resolve disputes between two parties, when some information is not veriable and decision makers may have vested preferences. It shows that the choice of how much discretional power to grant to the decision maker and who provides the information are intrinsically related. Direct involvement of the interested parties in the supply of information enhances monitoring over the decision maker, although at the cost of higher manipulation. Thus, it is desirable when the decision maker is granted high discretion. On the contrary, when the decision maker has limited discretional power, information provision is better assigned to an agent with no direct stake. The analysis helps to rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.

Inequality of opportunity in daycare and preschool services in Brazil

In this paper we measure inequality of opportunity in daycare and preschool services in Brazil. For this purpose, we construct an opportunity index that modifies the human opportunity index proposed in the literature and used in Barros et al. (2009) to measure inequality in basic opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Specifically, we construct an opportunity measure that includes not only attendance but also parental choice not to enroll children in daycare or preschool, using data from a supplementary questionnaire included in the 2006 version of Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). The results show that there are large differences between our opportunity index and the human opportunity index for children aged 0-3 years old and considerably smaller differences for children aged 4-6 years old, which suggests that preschool may be closer to a basic opportunity than daycare.

Decision rules and information provision : monitoring vs manipulation

We analyze the contractual design problem of a principal who delegates decision-making and information provision. The principal faces two tasks: he has to decide the level of discretion to be granted to the decision-maker and to establish who is in charge of supplying the information. We show that these two choices are intrinsically related. When the decision-maker is granted high discretion, information provision is optimally delegated to the parties directly affected by the decision. Conversely, when the decision-maker enjoys little discretion, it is more desirable to rely on a third impartial agent. The paper helps rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.

Payoff interdependence and information externalities

This paper studies entry under information and payoff externalities. We consider a sequential investment game with uncertain payoffs where each firm is endowed with a private signal about profitability. It is shown that both over- and under-investment characterize the equilibria and that under-investment only occurs when investments are complements. Further we find that a reverse informational externality is present.

Emerging information services for digital scholarship

Trabalho apresentado na conferência Os Desafios das Bibliotecas Digitais realizado na Fundação Getulio Vargas em agosto 2014