"We sold a million units": the role of advertising past-sales

In a market where past-sales embed information about consumers’ tastes (quality), we analyze the seller’s incentives to invest in a costly advertising campaign to report them under two informational assumptions. In the …rst scenario, a pooling equilibrium with past-sales advertising is derived. Information revelation only occurs when the seller bene…ciates from the herding behaviour that the advertising campaign induces on the part of consumers. In the second informational regime, a separating equilibrium with past-sales advertising is computed. Information revelation always happens, either through prices or through costly advertisements.

Strategic adoption in a two-sided market : a study of college applications in Brazil

This paper measures the importance of indirect network effects in the adoption by colleges and students of ENEM, a standardized exam for high-school students in Brazil that can be used in college application processes. We estimate network effects and find that they are economically significant. Students are more likely to take ENEM the larger the number of colleges adopting it. Similarly, colleges are more likely to adopt it the larger the number of students taking the exam. Moreover, we find evidence that colleges play strategically and that heterogeneity determines their decisions. A college is less likely to adopt ENEM the larger the number of competitors adopting it. Colleges’ characteristics such as ownership and organization affect adoption decisions. In a counterfactual exercise we compare colleges’ adoption decisions under competition and under joint colleges’ payoffs maximization. Adoption rates are significantly reduced when colleges internalize the competitive effect, i.e., the effect of their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs. On the other hand, they increase when indirect network effects - the effect of students’ response to their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs - are also internalized. Competitive adoption rates are found to exceed joint optimum rates by a small difference. These results suggest that, without considering students’ welfare, adoption rates are excessive, but close to the joint optimum.

Optimal two-sided tests for instrumental variables regression with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors

This paper considers two-sided tests for the parameter of an endogenous variable in an instrumental variable (IV) model with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors. We develop the nite-sample theory of weighted-average power (WAP) tests with normal errors and a known long-run variance. We introduce two weights which are invariant to orthogonal transformations of the instruments; e.g., changing the order in which the instruments appear. While tests using the MM1 weight can be severely biased, optimal tests based on the MM2 weight are naturally two-sided when errors are homoskedastic. We propose two boundary conditions that yield two-sided tests whether errors are homoskedastic or not. The locally unbiased (LU) condition is related to the power around the null hypothesis and is a weaker requirement than unbiasedness. The strongly unbiased (SU) condition is more restrictive than LU, but the associated WAP tests are easier to implement. Several tests are SU in nite samples or asymptotically, including tests robust to weak IV (such as the Anderson-Rubin, score, conditional quasi-likelihood ratio, and I. Andrews' (2015) PI-CLC tests) and two-sided tests which are optimal when the sample size is large and instruments are strong. We refer to the WAP-SU tests based on our weights as MM1-SU and MM2-SU tests. Dropping the restrictive assumptions of normality and known variance, the theory is shown to remain valid at the cost of asymptotic approximations. The MM2-SU test is optimal under the strong IV asymptotics, and outperforms other existing tests under the weak IV asymptotics.

Are one-sided S,s rules useful proxies for optimal pricing rules?

This article is motivated by the prominence of one-sided S,s rules in the literature and by the unrealistic strict conditions necessary for their optimality. It aims to assess whether one-sided pricing rules could be an adequate individual rule for macroeconomic models, despite its suboptimality. It aims to answer two questions. First, since agents are not fully rational, is it plausible that they use such a non-optimal rule? Second, even if the agents adopt optimal rules, is the economist committing a serious mistake by assuming that agents use one-sided Ss rules? Using parameters based on real economy data, we found that since the additional cost involved in adopting the simpler rule is relatively small, it is plausible that one-sided rules are used in practice. We also found that suboptimal one-sided rules and optimal two-sided rules are in practice similar, since one of the bounds is not reached very often. We concluded that the macroeconomic effects when one-sided rules are suboptimal are similar to the results obtained under two-sided optimal rules, when they are close to each other. However, this is true only when one-sided rules are used in the context where they are not optimal.

Uma proposta de modelo para avaliação de websites de comércio eletrônico: aplicação ao varejo de CD'S

A dissertação tem como objeto a investigação das relações entre a o design de um website de comércio eletrônico de CDs e o comportamento do consumidor virtual, com ênfase a sua atitude e intenção de compra. O objetivo principal é mensurar o efeito do design da loja virtual (website) em seu papel de agente de vendas na Internet. A análise do comércio varejista de CDs foi escolhida, pois este produto é um dos principais artigos de venda neste canal. O estudo é apoiado em um referencial teórico, no qual são analisadas as características dos seguintes pontos: i) a Internet atuando como canal de vendas; ii) o comércio varejista de CD no Brasil e iii) o comportamento do consumidor e o seu processo decisório. Ainda no referencial teórico são apresentados os diversos modelos de avaliação de website existentes: baseado em Marketing, Teoria dos Dois Fatores, avaliação da qualidade, avaliação da web (W AM) e aceitação da Tecnologia na Web (T AM). A análise e comparação destes modelos serviu como base para o desenvolvimento da proposta do modelo de avaliação website. O estudo é complementado pelo desenvolvimento de uma pesquisa, com aplicação de questionário via web (websurvey). A coleta dos dados é utilizada como forma de validação estatística das relações existentes no modelo desenvolvido. Isto é feito por meio do uso da ferramenta de análise de Equações Estruturadas (SEM), suportada pelos conceitos e métodos de abordagem descritos no referencial teórico. A ferramenta permite tanto avaliar um modelo de mensuração e um modelo estrutural simultaneamente.

Wald tests for IV regression with weak instruments

This dissertation deals with the problem of making inference when there is weak identification in models of instrumental variables regression. More specifically we are interested in one-sided hypothesis testing for the coefficient of the endogenous variable when the instruments are weak. The focus is on the conditional tests based on likelihood ratio, score and Wald statistics. Theoretical and numerical work shows that the conditional t-test based on the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator performs well even when instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. The conditional approach correct uniformly its size and when the population F-statistic is as small as two, its power is near the power envelopes for similar and non-similar tests. This finding is surprising considering the bad performance of the two-sided conditional t-tests found in Andrews, Moreira and Stock (2007). Given this counter intuitive result, we propose novel two-sided t-tests which are approximately unbiased and can perform as well as the conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) test of Moreira (2003).

The effects of a centralized college admission mechanism on migration and college enrollment: evidence from Brazil

No Brasil, a recente reformulação do Exame Nacional de Ensino Médio (ENEM) e a criação do Sistema de Seleção Unificada (SISU), um mecanismo de admissão centralizado que aloca os alunos às instituições, promoveram mudanças relevantes no Ensino Superior. Neste artigo, investigamos os efeitos da introdução do SISU na migração e evasão dos alunos ingressantes a partir dos dados do Censo de Educação Superior. Para tal, exploramos a variação temporal na adesão das instituições ao SISU e encontramos que a adoção do SISU está associada a um aumento da mobilidade entre municípios e entre estados dos alunos ingressantes em 3.8 pontos percentuais (p.p) e 1.6 p.p., respectivamente. Além disso, encontramos um aumento da evasão em 4.5 p.p. Nossos resultados indicam que custos associados à migração e comportamento estratégico são importantes determinantes da evasão dos alunos.

Two essays on education and governament policies

Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open ques- tion from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness on this type of invest- ment. We slightly deviate from the rest of the literature by allowing for non-linear income taxes in a two period model. This enables us to derive prescriptions that are robust to the risk characteristics of human capital: savings should be discouraged, human capital investments encouraged and both types of investment driven to an e¢ cient level from an aggregate perspective. These prescriptions are also robust to what choices are observed, even though the policy instruments used to implement them are not.

Forecasting accuracy and estimation uncertainty using VAR models with short- and long-term economic restrictions: a Monte-Carlo study

Using vector autoregressive (VAR) models and Monte-Carlo simulation methods we investigate the potential gains for forecasting accuracy and estimation uncertainty of two commonly used restrictions arising from economic relationships. The Örst reduces parameter space by imposing long-term restrictions on the behavior of economic variables as discussed by the literature on cointegration, and the second reduces parameter space by imposing short-term restrictions as discussed by the literature on serial-correlation common features (SCCF). Our simulations cover three important issues on model building, estimation, and forecasting. First, we examine the performance of standard and modiÖed information criteria in choosing lag length for cointegrated VARs with SCCF restrictions. Second, we provide a comparison of forecasting accuracy of Ötted VARs when only cointegration restrictions are imposed and when cointegration and SCCF restrictions are jointly imposed. Third, we propose a new estimation algorithm where short- and long-term restrictions interact to estimate the cointegrating and the cofeature spaces respectively. We have three basic results. First, ignoring SCCF restrictions has a high cost in terms of model selection, because standard information criteria chooses too frequently inconsistent models, with too small a lag length. Criteria selecting lag and rank simultaneously have a superior performance in this case. Second, this translates into a superior forecasting performance of the restricted VECM over the VECM, with important improvements in forecasting accuracy ñreaching more than 100% in extreme cases. Third, the new algorithm proposed here fares very well in terms of parameter estimation, even when we consider the estimation of long-term parameters, opening up the discussion of joint estimation of short- and long-term parameters in VAR models.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction

We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

The brazilian education quality index (Ideb): measurement and incentives upgrades

The increasing availability of social statistics in Latin America opens new possibilities in terms of accountability and incentive mechanisms for policy makers. This paper addresses these issues within the institutional context of the Brazilian educational system. We build a theoretical model based on the theory of incentives to analyze the role of the recently launched Basic Education Development Index (Ideb) in the provision of incentives at the sub-national level. The first result is to demonstrate that an education target system has the potential to improve the allocation of resources to education through conditional transfers to municipalities and schools. Second, we analyze the local government’s decision about how to allocate its education budget when seeking to accomplish the different objectives contemplated by the index, which involves the interaction between its two components, average proficiency and the passing rate. We discuss as well policy issues concerning the implementation of the synthetic education index in the light of this model arguing that there is room for improving the Ideb’s methodology itself. In addition, we analyze the desirable properties of an ideal education index and we argue in favor of an ex-post relative learning evaluation system for different municipalities (schools) based on the value added across different grades

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

Exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty: recursive equilibrium and survival

This paper analyses general equilibrium models with finite heterogeneous agents having exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium with the state space consisting of the past aggregate portfolio distribution and the current state of the nature and that it implements the sequential equilibrium. We establish conditions under which the recursive equilibrium is continuous. Moreover, we use the continuous recursive relation of the aggregate variables to prove that if the economy has two types of agents, the one who commits persistent mistakes on the expectation rules of the future endogenous variables is driven out of the market by the others with correct anticipations of the variables, that is, the rational expectations agents.

Quality change in Brazilian automobiles

In this paper I investigate the quality evolution ofBrazilian autos. To measure the quality evolution of Brazilian autos, I have assembled a data set for Brazilian passenger cars for the period 1960-1994, to which I have applied the hedonic pricing methodology. To the best of my k:nowledge, this is the first time an index of quality change has been constructed for the Brazilian automobile industry. The results presented here have two major implications. They allow a better -- ......... understanding of product innovation in Brazil's auto industry, and they provide a clearer explanation of the behavior of auto prices.