Knowledge disclosure as a weapon in technological change battles: straight shot or backfire?

This work aims at evaluating how effective is knowledge disclosure in attenuating institutional negative reactions caused by uncertainties brought by firms’ new strategies that respond to novel technologies. The empirical setting is from an era of technological ferment, the period of the introduction of the voice over internet protocol (VoIP) in the USA in the early 2000’s. This technology led to the convergence of the wireline telecommu- nications and cable television industries. The Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (also known as the I/B/E/S system) was used to capture reactions of securities analysts, a revealed important source of institutional pressure on firms’ strategies. For assessing knowledge disclosure, a coding technique and a established content analysis framework were used to quantitatively measure the non-numerical and unstructured data of transcripts of business events occurred at that time. Eventually, several binary response models were tested in order to assess the effect of knowledge disclosure on the probability of institutional positive reactions. The findings are that the odds of favorable institutional reactions increase when a specific kind of knowledge is disclosed. It can be concluded that knowledge disclosure can be considered as a weapon in technological changes situations, attenuating adverse institutional reactions to the companies’ strategies in environments of technological changes.

A capacitação de gestão estratégica como um instrumento na avaliação do crédito de curto prazo

Esta dissertação busca introduzir no Modelo de Análise de Crédito dos Bancos Comerciais alguns fatores estratégicos fundamentais para boa avaliação e defElrimento de uma operação de crédito de curto prazo. Para este fim foi elaborado um modelo Rating que tem como objetivo levar em consideração além da análise cadastral, econômico-financeira e das garantias, uma visão de todo o conjunto da empresa, dando um peso fundamental na estratégia de atuélção analisando \a competitividade , o ambiente interno e externo para que se possa chegar a um número que irá determinar o deferimento ou não da operação, dentro de parâmetros de risco definido pela instituição financeira detontora do recurso, cumprindo as normas do Sistema Financeiro Nacional.

Imagens da escola: a informática educativa no Colégio Pedro II

Esta dissertação se propõe responder a uma questão específica: como uma área que propõe uma nova cultura escolar acontece e se estabelece em uma escola secular e com forte tradição humanística? Orientada pelas idéias e escritos do pesquisador, filósofo e teórico chileno José Joaquin Brunner, busquei reflexões sobre a transformação social contemporânea advinda da aproximação da educação com as novas tecnologias da informação e comunicação. Para registrar personagens relevantes e a inserção de práticas culturais centradas no uso das tecnologias da informação e comunicação, em diferentes espaços e tempos da escola, centradas no uso das tecnologias da informação e comunicação optou-se pela investigação realizada com recursos e instrumentos audiovisuais. A partir dos depoimentos de pessoas que participaram direta e indiretamente da implantação dessa nova área, dentro do Colégio Pedro II, apresentamos como parte da pesquisa um documentário de 26 minutos – Imagens da Escola: A Informática Educativa no Colégio Pedro II. Composto por três blocos: primeiros movimentos, espaços e bandeiras e Informática Educativa, espaço em construção

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

The effect of options on coordination

This paper studies how constraints on the timing of actions affect equilibrium in intertemporal coordination problems. The model exhibits a unique symmetric equilibrium in cut-o¤ strategies. The risk-dominant action of the underlying one-shot game is selected when the option to delay effort is commensurate with the option to wait longer for others' actions. The possibility of waiting longer for the actions of others enhances coordination, but the option of delaying one s actions can induce severe coordination failures: if agents are very patient, they might get arbitrarily low expected payoffs even in cases where coordination would yield arbitrarily large returns.

A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game .

Mid-auction information acquisition

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.