Decision rules and information provision: monitoring versus manipulation

The paper focuses on the organization of institutions designed to resolve disputes between two parties, when some information is not veriable and decision makers may have vested preferences. It shows that the choice of how much discretional power to grant to the decision maker and who provides the information are intrinsically related. Direct involvement of the interested parties in the supply of information enhances monitoring over the decision maker, although at the cost of higher manipulation. Thus, it is desirable when the decision maker is granted high discretion. On the contrary, when the decision maker has limited discretional power, information provision is better assigned to an agent with no direct stake. The analysis helps to rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.

Decision rules and information provision : monitoring vs manipulation

We analyze the contractual design problem of a principal who delegates decision-making and information provision. The principal faces two tasks: he has to decide the level of discretion to be granted to the decision-maker and to establish who is in charge of supplying the information. We show that these two choices are intrinsically related. When the decision-maker is granted high discretion, information provision is optimally delegated to the parties directly affected by the decision. Conversely, when the decision-maker enjoys little discretion, it is more desirable to rely on a third impartial agent. The paper helps rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-making.

Payoff interdependence and information externalities

This paper studies entry under information and payoff externalities. We consider a sequential investment game with uncertain payoffs where each firm is endowed with a private signal about profitability. It is shown that both over- and under-investment characterize the equilibria and that under-investment only occurs when investments are complements. Further we find that a reverse informational externality is present.

A recuperação da informação sob a ótica dos usuários: um estudo de caso da base de dados Accessus

Trata das questões de organização e recuperação da informação no caso específico do acervo do Centro de Pesquisa e História Contemporânea do Brasil – CPDOC. Baseia essa análise num estudo de caso do uso do serviço de referência da instituição prestado pela Sala de Consulta e também no utilização da base de dados Accessus. Traça um perfil do usuário do acervo da instituição além de um perfil de pesquisa desses indivíduos ao mapear o comportamento dos usuários diante da ferramenta Accessus. Aborda o contexto da elaboração da base de dados e investiga a criação da linguagem controlada em história e ciências afins que serviu de base para o Accessus. Problematiza as questões de acessibilidade da linguagem a um público não relacionado com a área. Pareia essa problematização com análise dos diferentes perfis de usuários. Discute a forma de indexação do acervo do CPDOC e suscita reflexões sobre esse processo que considere uma relação direta com o perfil dos usuários.