A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

A generalization of judds method of out-steady-state comparisons in perfect foresight models

We show that Judd (1982)’s method can be applied to any finite system, contrary to what he claimed in 1987. An example shows how to employ the technic to study monetary models in presence of capital accumulation.

A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game .

The impact of the 2008 economic recession on three residential property type investments: a case study of five diverse zip codes in Washington DC, USA

There has been 47 recessions in the United States of America (US) since 1790. US recessions have increasingly affected economies of other countries in the world as nations become more and more interdependent on each other. The worst economic recession so far was the “Great Depression” – an economic recession that was caused by the 1929 crash of the stock market in the US. The 2008 economic recession in the US was a result of the burst of the “housing bubble” created by predatory lending. The economic recession resulted in increased unemployment (according to NBER 8.7 million jobs were lost from Feb. 2008 to Feb. 2010); decrease in GDP by 5.1%; increase in poverty level from 12.1% (2007) to 16.0% (2008) (NBER) This dissertation is an attempt to research the impact of the 2008 economic recession on different types of residential investments: a case study of five (5) diverse neighborhoods/zip codes in Washington DC, USA The main findings were that the effect of the 2008 economic depression on the different types of residential properties was dependent on the location of the property and the demographics/socio-economic factors associated with that location.