A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game .

A justiça distributiva como critério fundamental nas políticas públicas: o caso dos jogos panamericanos na cidade do Rio de Janeiro

This dissertation is a project of evaluation of the proposals of the Panamerican Games of 2007, that they will be carried through in the city of Rio De Janeiro. Great events present the possibility of improvement of the urban space and economic development, amongst other chances seen by politics and urban planners well. For this work we search to argue the city as field of specific study, understanding it in the current world-wide scene of globalization and computerization, the relations politics, economic and social existing interns. We search in material literature to study and to evaluate what it would be a ¿good city¿ and studies that had understood the development of the urban space. We also look for to understand the city of Rio de Janeiro as a singular urban space, since the origin of the city as a urban space, passing for the proposals gifts of modification of the carioca space. We dedicate part of the work, inside of the chapter where we understand the city of Rio de Janeiro, the presentation of the project of the Panamerican of 2007, comparing it with great previous events. The vision of technique and politics during the interviews was essential for the best understanding of the proposals of the Games. Finally we evaluate the proposals of modification of the Pan2007 for the city of Rio de Janeiro with the methodology of Kevin Lynch to evaluate the good form of the city" in communion with the proposal of distributive justice of Rawls. The result of this evaluation was that the current proposals of modification of the city for the Pan2007 will be able to generate resulted not deliberate for a considerable parcel of the population and to modify the economic relations harmfully, social and politics inside of the territory of the city. For such we consider measured compensatory satisfactory that they can reach the objectives of an equal citizenship and an equitable equality of chances, starting for the offering of the social minimums of just form. "