Normality under uncertainty

Consider the demand for a good whose consumption be chosen prior to the resolution of uncertainty regarding income. How do changes in the distribution of income affect the demand for this good? In this paper we show that normality, is sufficient to guarantee that consumption increases of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the new distribution with respect to the old is non-decreasing in the whole domain. However, if only first order stochastic dominance is assumed more structure must be imposed on preferences to guanantee the validity of the result. Finally a converse of the first result also obtains. If the change in measure is characterized by non-decreasing Radon-Nicodyn derivative, consumption of such a good will always increase if and only if the good is normal.

Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty

This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).

Forecasting accuracy and estimation uncertainty using VAR models with short- and long-term economic restrictions: a Monte-Carlo study

Using vector autoregressive (VAR) models and Monte-Carlo simulation methods we investigate the potential gains for forecasting accuracy and estimation uncertainty of two commonly used restrictions arising from economic relationships. The Örst reduces parameter space by imposing long-term restrictions on the behavior of economic variables as discussed by the literature on cointegration, and the second reduces parameter space by imposing short-term restrictions as discussed by the literature on serial-correlation common features (SCCF). Our simulations cover three important issues on model building, estimation, and forecasting. First, we examine the performance of standard and modiÖed information criteria in choosing lag length for cointegrated VARs with SCCF restrictions. Second, we provide a comparison of forecasting accuracy of Ötted VARs when only cointegration restrictions are imposed and when cointegration and SCCF restrictions are jointly imposed. Third, we propose a new estimation algorithm where short- and long-term restrictions interact to estimate the cointegrating and the cofeature spaces respectively. We have three basic results. First, ignoring SCCF restrictions has a high cost in terms of model selection, because standard information criteria chooses too frequently inconsistent models, with too small a lag length. Criteria selecting lag and rank simultaneously have a superior performance in this case. Second, this translates into a superior forecasting performance of the restricted VECM over the VECM, with important improvements in forecasting accuracy ñreaching more than 100% in extreme cases. Third, the new algorithm proposed here fares very well in terms of parameter estimation, even when we consider the estimation of long-term parameters, opening up the discussion of joint estimation of short- and long-term parameters in VAR models.

The welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty in the post-war period

Lucas (1987) has shown the surprising result that the welfare cost of business cycles is quite small. Using standard assumptions on preferences and a fully-áedged econometric model we computed the welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty for the post-WWII era using the multivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition for trends and cycles, which considers not only business-cycle uncertainty but also uncertainty from the stochastic trend in consumption. The post-WWII period is relatively quiet, with the welfare costs of uncertainty being about 0:9% of per-capita consumption. Although changing the decomposition method changed substantially initial results, the welfare cost of uncertainty is qualitatively small in the post-WWII era - about $175.00 a year per-capita in the U.S. We also computed the marginal welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty using this same technique. It is about twice as large as the welfare cost ñ$350.00 a year per-capita.

On the differentiability of the consumer demand function

For strictly quasi concave differentiable utility functions, demand is shown to be differentiable almost everywhere if marginal utilities are pointwise Lipschitzian. For concave utility functions, demand is differentiable almost everywhere in the case of differentiable additively separable utility or in the case of quasi-linear utility.

Uncertainty aversion and the optmal choice of portfolio

In this paper we apply the theory of declsion making with expected utility and non-additive priors to the choice of optimal portfolio. This theory describes the behavior of a rational agent who i5 averse to pure 'uncertainty' (as well as, possibly, to 'risk'). We study the agent's optimal allocation of wealth between a safe and an uncertain asset. We show that there is a range of prices at which the agent neither buys not sells short the uncertain asset. In contrast the standard theory of expected utility predicts that there is exactly one such price. We also provide a definition of an increase in uncertainty aversion and show that it causes the range of prices to increase.

The welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty in the post-war period

With standard assumptions on preferences and a fully-fledged econometric model we computed the welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty for post-war U.S. using the BeveridgeNelson decomposition. Welfare costs are about 0.9% per-capita consumption ($175.00) and marginal welfare costs are about twice as large.

On the consistency of arbitrary money-demand functions with the Sidrauski and the shopping-time models

This paper investigates which properties money-demand functions have to satisfy to be consistent with multidimensional extensions of Lucasí(2000) versions of the Sidrauski (1967) and the shopping-time models. We also investigate how such classes of models relate to each other regarding the rationalization of money demands. We conclude that money demand functions rationalizable by the shoppingtime model are always rationalizable by the Sidrauski model, but that the converse is not true. The log-log money demand with an interest-rate elasticity greater than or equal to one and the semi-log money demand are counterexamples.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction

We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Brazil's regulatory framework: predictability or uncertainty?

Este Trabalho Discute as Perspectivas da Regulação Econômica no Brasil. para Tanto, Primeiramente Apresenta-Se a Evolução Histórica da Regulação no País, Discutindo as Principais Questões Relacionadas Às Agências Reguladoras Federais. em Segundo Lugar, os Marcos Regulatórios de Cinco Diferentes Setores (Telecomunicações, Eletricidade, Saneamento Básico, Petróleo e Gás Natural) são Analisados. em Terceiro Lugar, a Questão do Financiamento de Investimentos em Infra-Estrutura é Tratada, Enfatizando o Papel das Parcerias Público-Privadas (Ppps). uma Seção Final Cont~Em um Possível Agenda para a Regulação no Brasil

Práticas e resultados de apreçamento nas empresas brasileiras - 1ª Parte

Este relatório refere-se à primeira parte de uma pesquisa financiada pelo Núcleo de Pesquisas e Publicações (GV-PESQUISA) da EAESP-FGV e apoiada pelo Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq). Trata-se dos determinantes do desempenho de novos produtos, um tema ainda pouco estudado no Brasil, a partir de um modelo integrativo das concepções de INGENBLEEK, DREBUYNE, FRAMBACH & VERHALLEN (2004) e HENARD & SZYMANSKI (2001). Formou-se uma amostra de 109 gerentes de produto e diretores de marketing de empresas estrangeiras atuando no Brasil. O Desempenho do Novo Produto apresentou uma relação significativa e positiva com Orientação para o Mercado e Processo de Desenvolvimento de Novos Produtos. O Desempenho de Mercado do Novo Produto mostrou uma relação significativa e positiva com Características dos Processos da Empresa, Vantagem Relativa do Novo Produto e Características do Mercado. O Desempenho Financeiro do Novo Produto apareceu com uma relação significativa com Características dos Processos da Empresa (positiva), Características Estratégicas da Empresa (positiva) e Incerteza da Demanda (negativa). Ao final, são apontadas e discutidas, de modo preliminar, as limitações, conclusões e implicações da pesquisa.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.