6 resultados para Concavifiability of preferences

em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV


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In this paper we consider strictly convex monotone continuous complete preorderings on R+n that are locally representable by a concave utility function. By Alexandroff 's (1939) theorem, this function is twice dífferentiable almost everywhere. We show that if the bordered hessian determinant of a concave utility representation vanishes on a null set. Then demand is countably rectifiable, that is, except for a null set of bundles, it is a countable union of c1 manifolds. This property of consumer demand is enough to guarantee that the equilibrium prices of apure exchange economy will be locally unique, for almost every endowment. We give an example of an economy satisfying these conditions but not the Katzner (1968) - Debreu (1970, 1972) smoothness conditions.

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In this paper we offer a rationale for the existence of preferences for domestic…rms in government procurement. When the domestic…rm’s probability of completion of a government contract is larger than the foreign …rms probability of completion, the government should favor domestic…rms in order to maximize the expected net bene…tof the project. We compute the…rms’ equilibrium strategies for a lowest offer procurement auction. We also compute numerically the level of preferences that maximizes the government’s net expected bene…t under different parameter values.

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This paper investigates the interaction between endogenous fertility behavior and the distribution of income and wealth arnong farnilies in a competitive market economy. We construct a growth model in which altruistic dynasties are heterogeneous in their initial stocks of physical capital. Dynasties make choices of farnily size along with decisions about consumption and intergenerational transfers. We show that if the rate of time preference is increasing in the number of children and preferences over nurnber of children satisfy a norrnality assumption, all steady states are characterized by equality of capital stocks and consumption arnong families. We also provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the steady state. In order to illustrate these results, we present an example in which preferences over number of children are logarithrnic and the technology is Cobb-Douglas. For this combination of preferences and technology, there exists a unique egalitarian steady state. Moreover, the economy converges to this steady state in only one generation .

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Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

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In 1991 Gary S. Becker presented A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social In uences on Price explaining why many successful restaurants, plays, sporting events, and other activities do not raise their prices even with persistent excess demand. The main reason for this is due to the discontinuity of stable demands, which is explained in Becker's (1991) analysis. In the present paper we construct a discrete time stochastic model of socially interacting consumers deciding for one of two establishments. With this model we show that the discontinuity of stable demands, proposed by Gary S. Becker, depends crucially on an additional factor: the dispersion of the consumers' intrinsic preferences for the establishments.