Como tomadores de decisão experts percebem cenários complexos?

In this thesis, the basic research of Chase and Simon (1973) is questioned, and we seek new results by analyzing the errors of experts and beginners chess players in experiments to reproduce chess positions. Chess players with different levels of expertise participated in the study. The results were analyzed by a Brazilian grandmaster, and quantitative analysis was performed with the use of statistical methods data mining. The results challenge significantly, the current theories of expertise, memory and decision making in this area, because the present theory predicts piece on square encoding, in which players can recognize the strategic situation reproducing it faithfully, but commit several errors that the theory can¿t explain. The current theory can¿t fully explain the encoding used by players to register a board. The errors of intermediary players preserved fragments of the strategic situation, although they have committed a series of errors in the reconstruction of the positions. The encoding of chunks therefore includes more information than that predicted by current theories. Currently, research on perception, trial and decision is heavily concentrated on the idea of pattern recognition". Based on the results of this research, we explore a change of perspective. The idea of "pattern recognition" presupposes that the processing of relevant information is on "patterns" (or data) that exist independently of any interpretation. We propose that the theory suggests the vision of decision-making via the recognition of experience.

Autodeterminação local e desenvolvimento: uma análise da dinâmica social no município de São Roque de Minas

In this thesis, the basic research of Chase and Simon (1973) is questioned, and we seek new results by analyzing the errors of experts and beginners chess players in experiments to reproduce chess positions. Chess players with different levels of expertise participated in the study. The results were analyzed by a Brazilian grandmaster, and quantitative analysis was performed with the use of statistical methods data mining. The results challenge significantly, the current theories of expertise, memory and decision making in this area, because the present theory predicts piece on square encoding, in which players can recognize the strategic situation reproducing it faithfully, but commit several errors that the theory can¿t explain. The current theory can¿t fully explain the encoding used by players to register a board. The errors of intermediary players preserved fragments of the strategic situation, although they have committed a series of errors in the reconstruction of the positions. The encoding of chunks therefore includes more information than that predicted by current theories. Currently, research on perception, trial and decision is heavily concentrated on the idea of 'pattern recognition'. Based on the results of this research, we explore a change of perspective. The idea of 'pattern recognition' presupposes that the processing of relevant information is on 'patterns' (or data) that exist independently of any interpretation. We propose that the theory suggests the vision of decision-making via the recognition of experience.

A estrutura subcognitiva da visão estratégica : um experimento psicológico sobre a natureza dos Chunks

How strategical decisions are taken? The present work consists of a psychological experiment that it aims to search the knowledge about the subcognitive structure of strategical vision of deeper form, investigating its interaction with the cognitives processes of human beings ¿ perception, memory, and learning. We also argue the nature of chunks (pieces or units), that, in opposition to the current theories, we consider to be provided with essence or meanings in detriment of the appearance or superficial features. In this way, we choose as domain for our experiment the chess game, because its dealing with lesser complexity of the one that decisions in the politics or industry. Thus, we shows the importance that the perception of the abstract roles playing in specific chess position, leading to a strategical vision of this. Moreover, after the experiment, was verified that the expert chess players are capable to perceive distinct positions in the appearance as being similar strategically", while that the beginners had gotten greater difficulty. Finally, we present part of an emergent theory that claims that the human being cognition is nothing more than the abstract perception, as well as the replication of this theory in other domains, for example in the management and the real world."

Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.