Markets and microstructure

This document contains three papers examining the microstructure of financial interaction in development and market settings. I first examine the industrial organization of financial exchanges, specifically limit order markets. In this section, I perform a case study of Google stock surrounding a surprising earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009, uncovering parameters that describe information flows and liquidity provision. I then explore the disbursement process for community-driven development projects. This section is game theoretic in nature, using a novel three-player ultimatum structure. I finally develop econometric tools to simulate equilibrium and identify equilibrium models in limit order markets.

In chapter two, I estimate an equilibrium model using limit order data, finding parameters that describe information and liquidity preferences for trading. As a case study, I estimate the model for Google stock surrounding an unexpected good-news earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009. I find a substantial decrease in asymmetric information prior to the earnings announcement. I also simulate counterfactual dealer markets and find empirical evidence that limit order markets perform more efficiently than do their dealer market counterparts.

In chapter three, I examine Community-Driven Development. Community-Driven Development is considered a tool empowering communities to develop their own aid projects. While evidence has been mixed as to the effectiveness of CDD in achieving disbursement to intended beneficiaries, the literature maintains that local elites generally take control of most programs. I present a three player ultimatum game which describes a potential decentralized aid procurement process. Players successively split a dollar in aid money, and the final player--the targeted community member--decides between whistle blowing or not. Despite the elite capture present in my model, I find conditions under which money reaches targeted recipients. My results describe a perverse possibility in the decentralized aid process which could make detection of elite capture more difficult than previously considered. These processes may reconcile recent empirical work claiming effectiveness of the decentralized aid process with case studies which claim otherwise.

In chapter four, I develop in more depth the empirical and computational means to estimate model parameters in the case study in chapter two. I describe the liquidity supplier problem and equilibrium among those suppliers. I then outline the analytical forms for computing certainty-equivalent utilities for the informed trader. Following this, I describe a recursive algorithm which facilitates computing equilibrium in supply curves. Finally, I outline implementation of the Method of Simulated Moments in this context, focusing on Indirect Inference and formulating the pseudo model.

Essays on cooperation and reciprocity

This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.

Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.

Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.

Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.

An economic approach to consumer product ratings

In three essays we examine user-generated product ratings with aggregation. While recommendation systems have been studied extensively, this simple type of recommendation system has been neglected, despite its prevalence in the field. We develop a novel theoretical model of user-generated ratings. This model improves upon previous work in three ways: it considers rational agents and allows them to abstain from rating when rating is costly; it incorporates rating aggregation (such as averaging ratings); and it considers the effect on rating strategies of multiple simultaneous raters. In the first essay we provide a partial characterization of equilibrium behavior. In the second essay we test this theoretical model in laboratory, and in the third we apply established behavioral models to the data generated in the lab. This study provides clues to the prevalence of extreme-valued ratings in field implementations. We show theoretically that in equilibrium, ratings distributions do not represent the value distributions of sincere ratings. Indeed, we show that if rating strategies follow a set of regularity conditions, then in equilibrium the rate at which players participate is increasing in the extremity of agents' valuations of the product. This theoretical prediction is realized in the lab. We also find that human subjects show a disproportionate predilection for sincere rating, and that when they do send insincere ratings, they are almost always in the direction of exaggeration. Both sincere and exaggerated ratings occur with great frequency despite the fact that such rating strategies are not in subjects' best interest. We therefore apply the behavioral concepts of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and cursed equilibrium (CE) to the experimental data. Together, these theories explain the data significantly better than does a theory of rational, Bayesian behavior -- accurately predicting key comparative statics. However, the theories fail to predict the high rates of sincerity, and it is clear that a better theory is needed.

Essays on economics networks

This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest.

In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium.

We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the “global” structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more “local”. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets.

As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions.

Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.

Signal transduction, regulation, and developmental logic of EGFR signalling in C. elegans

RTKs-mediated signaling systems and the pathways with which they interact (e.g., those initiated by G protein-mediated signaling) involve a highly cooperative network that sense a large number of cellular inputs and then integrate, amplify, and process this information to orchestrate an appropriate set of cellular responses. The responses include virtually all aspects of cell function, from the most fundamental (proliferation, differentiation) to the most specialized (movement, metabolism, chemosensation). The basic tenets of RTK signaling system seem rather well established. Yet, new pathways and even new molecular players continue to be discovered. Although we believe that many of the essential modules of RTK signaling system are rather well understood, we have relatively little knowledge of the extent of interaction among these modules and their overall quantitative importance.

My research has encompassed the study of both positive and negative signaling by RTKs in C. elegans. I identified the C. elegans S0S-1 gene and showed that it is necessary for multiple RAS-mediated developmental signals. In addition, I demonstrated that there is a SOS-1-independent signaling during RAS-mediated vulval differentiation. By assessing signal outputs from various triple mutants, I have concluded that this SOS-1-independent signaling is not mediated by PTP-2/SHP-2 or the removal of inhibition by GAP-1/ RasGAP and it is not under regulation by SLI-1/Cb1. I speculate that there is either another exchange factor for RASor an as yet unidentified signaling pathway operating during RAS-mediated vulval induction in C. elegans.

In an attempt to uncover the molecular mechanisms of negative regulation of EGFR signaling by SLI-1/Cb1, I and two other colleagues codiscovered that RING finger domain of SLI-1 is partially dispensable for activity. This structure-function analysis shows that there is an ubiquitin protein ligase-independent activity for SLI-1 in regulating EGFR signaling. Further, we identified an inhibitory tyrosine of LET-23/ EGFR requiring sli-1(+)for its effects: removal of this tyrosine closely mimics loss of sli-1 but not loss of other negative regulator function.

By comparative analysis of two RTK pathways with similar signaling mechanisms, I have found that clr-1, a previously identified negative regulator of egl-15 mediated FGFR signaling, is also involved in let-23 EGFR signaling. The success of this approach promises a similar reciprocal test and could potentially extend to the study of other signaling pathways with similar signaling logic.

Finally, by correlating the developmental expression of lin-3 EGF to let-23 EGFR signaling activity, I demonstrated the existence of reciprocal EGF signaling in coordinating the morphogenesis of epithelia. This developmental logic of EGF signaling could provide a basis to understand a universal mechanism for organogenesis.

A model for energy and morphology of crystalline grain boundaries with arbitrary geometric character

It has been well-established that interfaces in crystalline materials are key players in the mechanics of a variety of mesoscopic processes such as solidification, recrystallization, grain boundary migration, and severe plastic deformation. In particular, interfaces with complex morphologies have been observed to play a crucial role in many micromechanical phenomena such as grain boundary migration, stability, and twinning. Interfaces are a unique type of material defect in that they demonstrate a breadth of behavior and characteristics eluding simplified descriptions. Indeed, modeling the complex and diverse behavior of interfaces is still an active area of research, and to the author's knowledge there are as yet no predictive models for the energy and morphology of interfaces with arbitrary character. The aim of this thesis is to develop a novel model for interface energy and morphology that i) provides accurate results (especially regarding "energy cusp" locations) for interfaces with arbitrary character, ii) depends on a small set of material parameters, and iii) is fast enough to incorporate into large scale simulations.

In the first half of the work, a model for planar, immiscible grain boundary is formulated. By building on the assumption that anisotropic grain boundary energetics are dominated by geometry and crystallography, a construction on lattice density functions (referred to as "covariance") is introduced that provides a geometric measure of the order of an interface. Covariance forms the basis for a fully general model of the energy of a planar interface, and it is demonstrated by comparison with a wide selection of molecular dynamics energy data for FCC and BCC tilt and twist boundaries that the model accurately reproduces the energy landscape using only three material parameters. It is observed that the planar constraint on the model is, in some cases, over-restrictive; this motivates an extension of the model.

In the second half of the work, the theory of faceting in interfaces is developed and applied to the planar interface model for grain boundaries. Building on previous work in mathematics and materials science, an algorithm is formulated that returns the minimal possible energy attainable by relaxation and the corresponding relaxed morphology for a given planar energy model. It is shown that the relaxation significantly improves the energy results of the planar covariance model for FCC and BCC tilt and twist boundaries. The ability of the model to accurately predict faceting patterns is demonstrated by comparison to molecular dynamics energy data and experimental morphological observation for asymmetric tilt grain boundaries. It is also demonstrated that by varying the temperature in the planar covariance model, it is possible to reproduce a priori the experimentally observed effects of temperature on facet formation.

Finally, the range and scope of the covariance and relaxation models, having been demonstrated by means of extensive MD and experimental comparison, future applications and implementations of the model are explored.

Essays in revealed preference theory and behavioral economics

Time, risk, and attention are all integral to economic decision making. The aim of this work is to understand those key components of decision making using a variety of approaches: providing axiomatic characterizations to investigate time discounting, generating measures of visual attention to infer consumers' intentions, and examining data from unique field settings.

Chapter 2, co-authored with Federico Echenique and Kota Saito, presents the first revealed-preference characterizations of exponentially-discounted utility model and its generalizations. My characterizations provide non-parametric revealed-preference tests. I apply the tests to data from a recent experiment, and find that the axiomatization delivers new insights on a dataset that had been analyzed by traditional parametric methods.

Chapter 3, co-authored with Min Jeong Kang and Colin Camerer, investigates whether "pre-choice" measures of visual attention improve in prediction of consumers' purchase intentions. We measure participants' visual attention using eyetracking or mousetracking while they make hypothetical as well as real purchase decisions. I find that different patterns of visual attention are associated with hypothetical and real decisions. I then demonstrate that including information on visual attention improves prediction of purchase decisions when attention is measured with mousetracking.

Chapter 4 investigates individuals' attitudes towards risk in a high-stakes environment using data from a TV game show, Jeopardy!. I first quantify players' subjective beliefs about answering questions correctly. Using those beliefs in estimation, I find that the representative player is risk averse. I then find that trailing players tend to wager more than "folk" strategies that are known among the community of contestants and fans, and this tendency is related to their confidence. I also find gender differences: male players take more risk than female players, and even more so when they are competing against two other male players.

Chapter 5, co-authored with Colin Camerer, investigates the dynamics of the favorite-longshot bias (FLB) using data on horse race betting from an online exchange that allows bettors to trade "in-play." I find that probabilistic forecasts implied by market prices before start of the races are well-calibrated, but the degree of FLB increases significantly as the events approach toward the end.