Skilled labor, unskilled labor, and economic growth

We assess the effects of the imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor on economic growth in a model in which physical capital and skilled labor can be accumulated. It is shown that economies with higher substitutability between skilled and unskilled labor have higher levels of income per capita in the transition and in the long-run equilibrium. Furthermore, these economies have a higher level of skilled labor and a higher level of capital intensity in the long-run equilibrium. For certain parameters values, the speed of convergence depends positively on the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor.

Comparing equilibrium real interest rates : different approaches to measure Brazilian rates

Despite the difficulties involved in the precise determination of equilibrium real interest rates, it seems clear that nominal interest rates has been higher in Brazil than in similar emerging economies. This paper aims to shed light on the possible reasons for this feature of the Brazilian economy. We extend Miranda and Muinhos (2003) one-country study to a sample of 20 countries, using many methods to compare measures of the real interest: (i) extracting equilibrium interest rates from IS curves; (ii) extracting steady state interest rates from marginal product of capital; (iii) capturing relevant variables and the fixed effects having real interest rates as dependent variable in a panel for emerging countries; and (iv) extracting inflation expectation from the spread between fixed rate and inflation-indexed treasure notes.

Sustainable miracles : protection and competition in the Brazilian oil industry

It is often suggested that competition improves productivity, however, the underlying support for this idea is surprisingly thin. This paper presents a case study examining the e ects of a change in the competitive environment on productivity at the Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company. Petrobras had a legal monopoly on production, re ning, transportation and importation of oil in Brazil until it was removed in 1995. Even though Petrobras continues to have a de facto monopoly, the end of legal monopoly labor productivity growth rate more than doubled. A growth accounting of the industry shows that between 1977 and 1993 output growth rate (and productivity growth rate) is explained by the accumulation of capital, while Total Factor Productivity (TFP) decreased. Between 1994 and 2000 labor productivity growth rate is completely explained by the growth rate of TFP. The results suggest that the threat of competition alone is su cient to improve productivity. They also provide evidence that restricting competition help cause Brazil's depression of the 1980s.

Monopoly rights can reduce income big time

We study a two–sector version of the neoclassical growth model with coalitions of factor suppliers in the capital producing sectors. We show that if the coalitions have monopoly rights, then they block the adoption of the efficient technology. We also show that blocking leads to a decrease in the productivity of each capital producing sector and to an increase in the relative price of capital; as a result the capital stock and the production fall in each sector. We finally show that the implied fall in the level of per–capita income can be large quantitatively.

Debt and default in a growth model

This paper presents a small open economy model with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. The optimal debt contract specifies debt relief following bad shocks and debt increase following good shocks and brings first order benefits if the country's borrowing constraint is binding. Countries with less capital (with higher marginal productivity of capital) have a higher debt-GDP ratio, are more likely to default on uncontingent bonds, require higher debt relief after bad shocks and pay a higher spread over treasury. Debt relief prescribed by the optimal contract following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 is more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

Injustiça ambiental: um estudo de caso do bairro do Caju, Zona Portuária do Rio de Janeiro

Desde o final do período monárquico, e já no nascimento da república, o problema social da pobreza e das favelas já impactava a formação da cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Ao longo dos anos, a questão adotou muitas faces e muitos discursos. A partir do momento em que os governos do Estado e do Município, desde os anos de 1950, tornaram as representações populares das favelas parte de suas representações políticas, o poder de discussão, participação e reivindicação dessa parcela da população foi diminuído e disperso. Tal fato abriu caminho para a manipulação de investimentos e políticas públicas que aumentaram a desigualdade social e, por conseguinte, em locais como o bairro do Caju, promoveram políticas de crescimento empresarial tão intensas e predatórias, que criaram, em concomitância aos problemas sociais, graves quadros de injustiça ambiental. Na busca pelo fortalecimento deste palco de debates, esta pesquisa pretende colaborar com a composição do retrato de uma região, pouco visível no município do Rio de Janeiro, que, desde sua ocupação como área de moradia, vem sendo transformada em território utilitário de exploração ambiental. Nela, as desigualdades afloram e aprisionam uma população cada vez maior nos circuitos de risco social e ambiental. O resultado desta pesquisa é a exposição de uma realidade frágil e a discussão mais profunda sobre a situação social e ambiental do bairro do Caju.

Padrões de crescimento econômico e seus impactos sobre a desigualdade

A presente pesquisa investigou a relação entre crescimento econômico e distribuição de renda na América Latina e nos países em desenvolvimento. Ao contrário da literatura sobre o tema, a qual busca estabelecer uma relação causal entre desigualdade e crescimento, a preocupação foi identificar as conseqüências de distintos processos de crescimento econômico sobre a distribuição funcional e pessoal da renda. Como se sabe, o crescimento econômico provêm da acumulação de fatores produtivos e do aumento da produtividade. Nesse sentido, foi possível diferenciar os impactos sobre a distribuição de renda de um crescimento baseado na acumulação de capital daquele baseado em ganhos de produtividade. Esses aspectos deram uma compreensão melhor do processo de crescimento econômico e permitiram avaliar os efeitos de transformações políticas e institucionais sobre o crescimento e a distribuição de renda. A análise empírica centrou foco em dois temas: os efeitos das reformas econômicas na América Latina sobre o crescimento e a distribuição de renda da região; e os efeitos da abertura comercial e financeira mundial sobre o crescimento econômico e a distribuição de renda nas economias em desenvolvimento em seu conjunto.

O desenvolvimento constitucional da pena de morte nos Estados Unidos

Regulamentada desde as legislações mais arcaicas, como o Código de Hamurabi na Babilônia de 4.000 a.C., a pena de morte é um dos institutos mais antigos da humanidade. É também um dos temas mais controvertidos do Direito, cerne de debates que se intensificam na medida na medida em que os direitos humanos são universalizados, principalmente em meados do século XX. Diante disso, a audaciosa manutenção da pena de morte no sistema jurídico norte-americano, o último reduto do instituto no mundo ocidental, é o resultado de longo e árduo processo de desenvolvimento constitucional, orientado principalmente pelos constantes avanços da jurisprudência da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos sobre a pena capital. O presente trabalho tem como escopo apresentar o histórico de tais decisões, bem como fundamentos de cunho criminológico, moral, filosófico e econômico aplicáveis à sistemática da pena de morte, expondo ainda dados sobre a aplicação da pena capital e perspectivas para o futuro da sanção nos Estados Unidos.

Exchange rate management techniques

This briefing note addresses the question: What revisions of financial regulation and financial governance in Brazil are necessary to support Brazilian development? What’s in place and what’s missing? The focus here is a dimension of financial regulation and governance: the regulation of capital flows and of exchange rate operations. The arguments are organized in the following manner. In the next section, we summarize the impacts of th crisis on the emerging-market economies and on the regulation of the international monetary and financial system. The third section discusses the post-crisis dilemmas faced by these economies. Finally, the fourth section presents some policy recommendations for Brazil.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.