Estudo mostra que distribuir ministérios ajuda a evitar crises

No quebra-cabeças em que se transformou a montagem de seu novo ministério, a presidente Dilma Rousseff colheria melhores resultados tanto na relação com o Congresso quanto na avaliação de seu governo se decidisse encaixar as peças da futura equipe a partir do orçamento federal de R$ 1,8 trilhão. Isto é o que indica um estudo inédito da Diretoria de Análise de Políticas Públicas da Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV/DAPP), ao qual O GLOBO teve acesso com exclusividade. Durante mais de um ano, 19 pesquisadores trabalharam no desenvolvimento de uma ferramenta interativa, batizada de Mosaico do Orçamento, que permite a visualização da distribuição dos gastos federais. Ao relacionar a distribuição dos gastos públicos com a indicação política dos ministros entre 2001 e 2014, período que vai do final do segundo mandato do ex-presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso ao primeiro de Dilma, o trabalho concluiu que há maior estabilidade política quando a legenda do presidente divide com os aliados os ministérios mais relevantes, aqueles que realmente têm dinheiro para gastar. O problema é que o PT demonstra grande dificuldade para dividir esse bolo.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages of economic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Debt management in Brazil: evaluation of the Real Plan and challenges ahead

The Brazilian domestic debt has posed two challenges to policy-makers: it has grown very fast and its maturity is extremely short. This has prompted fears that a default or a compulsory lengthening scheme would be imposed. Here, we analyse the domestic public debt management experience in Brazil, searching for policy prescriptions for the next few years. After briefiy reviewing the recent domestic public debt history, we decompose the large rise in federal bonded debt during 1995-2000, searching for its macroeconomic causes. The main culprits are the extremely high interest payments-which, unti11998, were caused by the weak fiscal stance and the quasi-fixed exchange-rate regime; and since 1999, by the impact ofthe currency depreciation On the dollar-indexed and the externai debt-, and the accumulation of assets of doubtful value, much of which may have to be written off in the future. Simulation exercises of the net debt path for the near future underscore the importance of a tighter fiscal stance to prevent the debt-GDP ratio from growing further. Given the need to quickly lengthen the debt maturity, our main policy advice is to foster, and rely more on, infiation-linked bonds.

Public debt management, monetary policy and financial institutions

Despite the large size of the Brazilian debt market, as well the large diversity of its bonds, the picture that emerges is of a market that has not yet completed its transition from the role it performed during the megainflation years, namely that of providing a liquid asset that provided positive real returns. This unfinished transition is currently placing the market under severe stress, as fears of a possible default from the next administration grow larger. This paper analyzes several aspects pertaining to the management of the domestic public debt. The causes for the extremely large and fast growth ofthe domestic public debt during the seven-year period that President Cardoso are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 computes Value at Risk and Cash Flow at Risk measures for the domestic public debt. The rollover risk is introduced in a mean-variance framework in Section 4. Section 5 discusses a few issues pertaining to the overlap between debt management and monetary policy. Finally, Section 6 wraps up with policy discussion and policy recommendations.

Reservas internacionais e dívida soberana: uma análise de simulação sob a ótica da sustentabilidade da dívida

Este trabalho analisa, sob a ótica da sustentabilidade da dívida, os efeitos de se manter um elevado nível de reservas internacionais juntamente com um elevado estoque de dívida pública. Busca-se o nível ótimo de reservas para o Brasil através de uma ferramenta de gestão de risco, por simulações de Monte Carlo. Considerando as variáveis estocásticas que afetam a equação de acumulação da dívida, e entendendo a relação entre elas, pode-se estudar as propriedades estocásticas da dinâmica da dívida. Da mesma forma, podemos analisar o impacto fiscal de um determinado nível de reservas ao longo do tempo e verificar quais caminhos se mostram sustentáveis. Sob a ótica da sustentabilidade da dívida, a escolha que gera a melhor relação dívida líquida / PIB para o Brasil é aquela que utiliza o máximo das reservas internacionais para reduzir o endividamento local. No entanto, como há aspectos não capturados nesta análise, tais como os benefícios das reservas em prevenir crises e em funcionar como garantia para investimentos externos, sugere-se que as reservas não excedam os níveis reconhecidos pela literatura internacional que atendam a estes fins. A indicação final deste estudo é que as reservas internacionais funcionam como um instrumento de proteção ao país quando o endividamento e o custo dele não são tão expressivos, como são atualmente no Brasil.

Debt maturity determinants in Brazil: evidence from private and public corporate borrowings

This study provides an empirical investigation of the determinants of long-term debt maturity in Brazil. We built a unique database that includes privately placed debt and public debt for 308 publicly traded, non-financial Brazilian companies, from 2009 to 2013. We perform GMM panel analyses using as dependent variables the amount of long-term debt payable in more than one, three, and five years for total debt, BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank) debt and corporate bonds. The results show that the BNDES finances less risky firms, i.e., those that are larger, older, more tangible and more transparent. We also find support for information asymmetry theories, as companies with higher transparency levels have similar leverage levels relative to others but higher proportions of long-term debt in their capital structures. Regarding debt levels, we find that more levered companies are larger, less profitable, more tangible and have fewer growth opportunities. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to address the determinants of long-term debt maturity in Brazil that uses various specifications of long-term debt and that examines different types of debt.

Implied Hazard Rates Analysis Through Brazilian Corporate Debt

No Brasil, o mercado de crédito corporativo ainda é sub-aproveitado. A maioria dos participantes não exploram e não operam no mercado secundário, especialmente no caso de debêntures. Apesar disso, há inúmeras ferramentas que poderiam ajudar os participantes do mercado a analisar o risco de crédito e encorajá-los a operar esses riscos no mercado secundário. Essa dissertação introduz um modelo livre de arbitragem que extrai a Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita nos preços de mercado. É uma forma reduzida do modelo proposto por Duffie and Singleton (1999) e modela a estrutura a termo das taxas de juros através de uma Função Constante por Partes. Através do modelo, foi possível analisar a Curva de Perda Esperada Neutra ao Risco Implícita através dos diferentes instrumentos de emissores corporativos brasileiros, utilizando Títulos de Dívida, Swaps de Crédito e Debêntures. Foi possível comparar as diferentes curvas e decidir, em cada caso analisado, qual a melhor alternativa para se tomar o risco de crédito da empresa, via Títulos de Dívida, Debêntures ou Swaps de Crédito.

Deregulation and The 2007-2008 Housing/Debt Crisis Analysis of the Housing/Debt Crisis of 2007-2008 and its impact on the Financial Strength and Vulnerability of the United States and Global Economy

One looming question has persisted in the minds of economists the world over in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 American Housing and Debt Crisis: How did it begin and who is responsible for making this happen? Another two-part question is: What measures were implemented to help end the crisis and what changes are being implemented to ensure that it will never happen again? Many speculate that the major contributing factor was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 that prompted a virtual feeding frenzy among the banking community when new calls from Capitol Hill encouraged home ownership in America as well as the secondary mortgage market which skyrocketed thereafter. The Glass-Steagall Act will be among many of the topics explored in this paper along with the events leading up to the 2007-2008 housing/debt crisis as well as the aftermath.

The Limits of political compromise: debt ceilings and political competition

We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political competition in an economy where political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same. In contrast to the received literature, we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political-economy distortions by rendering a political compromise unsustainable. This tends to happen when political competition is limited. Conversely, a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome when political competition is vigorous, saving the economy from immiseration. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.

Social media crises in the organization: exploring management strategies through cases from France and Brazil

The aim of this Master’s thesis has been to shed light on the response strategies that organizations are implementing when facing a crisis created on or amplified by social media. Since the development of social media in the late 1990s, the interplay between the online and the offline spheres has become more complex, and characterized by dynamics of a new magnitude, as exemplified by the wave of “Twitter” Revolutions or the Wikileaks scandal in the mid 2000s, where online behaviors deeply affected an offline reality. The corporate world does not escape to this worldwide phenomenon, and there are more and more examples of organizational reputations destroyed by social media “fireballs”. As such, this research aims to investigate, through the analysis of six recent cases of corporate crises (2013-2015) from France and Brazil, different strategies currently in use in order to identify examples of good and bad practices for companies to adopt or avoid when facing a social media crisis. The first part of this research is dedicated to a review of the literature on crisis management and social media. From that review, we were able to design a matrix model, the Social Media Crisis Management Matrix, with which we analyzed the response strategies of the six companies we selected. This model allows the conceptualization of social media crises in a multidimensional matrix built to allow the choice, according to four parameters, of the most efficient (that is: which will limit the reputational damage) response strategy. Attribution of responsibility for the crisis to the company by stakeholders, the origin of the crisis (internal or external), the degree of reputational threat, and the emotions conveyed online by stakeholders help companies determining whether to adopt a defensive response, or an accommodative response. The results of the analysis suggest that social media crises are rather manichean objects for they are, unlike their traditional offline counterparts, characterized by emotional involvement and irrationality, and cannot be dealt with traditionally. Thus analyzing the emotions of stakeholders proved to be, in these cases, an accurate thermometer of the seriousness of the crisis, and as such, a better rudder to follow when selecting a response strategy. Consequently, in the cases, companies minimized their reputational damage when responding to their stakeholders in an accommodative way, regardless of the “objective” situation, which might be a change of paradigm in crisis management.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How to manage macroeconomic policies to foster growth and employment and prevent financial and external crises

My presentation focuses on the implementation of a macroeconomic policy regime which, I believe, is capable of simultaneously attaining several targets, including the promotion of growth and employment and the prevention of external and financial crises.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.