63 resultados para TRANSFERS
Resumo:
This paper considers model worlds in which there are a continuum of individuaIs who form finite sized associations to undertake joint activities. We show that if there are a finite set of types and the commodity space contains lotteries, then the c1assicaI equilibrium results on convex economies can be reinterpreted to apply. Furthermore, in this lottery economy deterministic aIlocations (that is, degenerate lotteries) are generally not Pareto optimal, nor are they equilibria. In the interests of making the model seem more "natural," we show that the set of equilibria in a decentraIization in which individuaIs first gamble over vaIue transfers and then trade commodities in a deterministic competitive market economy are equivalent to those of our competi tive economy with a lottery commodity space.
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This paper investigates the interaction between endogenous fertility behavior and the distribution of income and wealth arnong farnilies in a competitive market economy. We construct a growth model in which altruistic dynasties are heterogeneous in their initial stocks of physical capital. Dynasties make choices of farnily size along with decisions about consumption and intergenerational transfers. We show that if the rate of time preference is increasing in the number of children and preferences over nurnber of children satisfy a norrnality assumption, all steady states are characterized by equality of capital stocks and consumption arnong families. We also provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the steady state. In order to illustrate these results, we present an example in which preferences over number of children are logarithrnic and the technology is Cobb-Douglas. For this combination of preferences and technology, there exists a unique egalitarian steady state. Moreover, the economy converges to this steady state in only one generation .
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This paper has two purposes. First, to construct efficiency scores in tax collection for Brazilian municipalities in 2004, taking into consideration two outputs: amount of per capita local tax collected -tax revenue- and the size of local informal economy- tax base. This methodology eliminates the price- effect of tax collection. Second, using the rules established on the Brazilian Constitution in 1988 to transfer unconditional funds among municipalities as instrument, to estimate the relationship between intergovernmental transfers and efficiency in tax collection. We conclude that transfers affect negatively the efficiency in tax collection, leading to a reinterpretation of the flypaper effect.
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This thesis aims to identify how teams of at job municipality Natividade influence in raising funds through projects. Was employed research descriptive, explanatory literature and content analysis focused on a qualitative approach, which led to the interpretation of elements detected in field research, aligning them with researched theoretical material . The survey results indicate that the municipal administrators in their departments work of non-integrated form, complicating and compromising the execution of agreements and contracts and causing delays in the progress of processes. It was found that it is necessary investment in technical training, preventive actions and daily monitoring, targeting the correct fulfillment of the requirements for capturing public resources. It is essential to adopt the merit of legitimacy organizational as a mechanism to be able to retain, develop, attract and motivate city officials to work in Project Teams. The main contributions of this study are to provoke reflections on the dynamics of raising public resources for development projects and programs. Was identified a lack of trained technicians and municipal managers to present suitable projects, to identify problems in the implementation of agreements and correct irregularities pointed out in the Ancillary Service Information for Voluntary Transfers - Cauc. It was found that managerial failure causes impacts both in teams of job, as in the progress of the municipality. Keywords: work teams, fundraising, projects.
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We studied the effects of changes in banking spreads on distributions of income, wealth and consumption as well as the welfare of the economy. This analysis was based on a model of heterogeneous agents with incomplete markets and occupational choice, in which the informality of firms and workers is a relevant transmission channel. The main finding is that reductions in spreads for firms increase the proportion of entrepreneurs and formal workers in the economy, thereby decreasing the size of the informal sector. The effects on inequality, however, are ambiguous and depend on wage dynamics and government transfers. Reductions in spreads for individuals lead to a reduction in inequality indicators at the expense of consumption and aggregate welfare. By calibrating the model to Brazil for the 2003-2012 period, it is possible to find results in line with the recent drop in informality and the wage gap between formal and informal workers.
Resumo:
We studied the effects of changes in banking spreads on distributions of income, wealth and consumption as well as the welfare of the economy. This analysis was based on a model of heterogeneous agents with incomplete markets and occupational choice, in which the informality of firms and workers is a relevant transmission channel. The main finding is that reductions in spreads for firms increase the proportion of entrepreneurs and formal workers in the economy, thereby decreasing the size of the informal sector. The effects on inequality, however, are ambiguous and depend on wage dynamics and government transfers. Reductions in spreads for individuals lead to a reduction in inequality indicators at the expense of consumption and aggregate welfare. By calibrating the model to Brazil for the 2003-2012 period, it is possible to find results in line with the recent drop in informality and the wage gap between formal and informal workers
Resumo:
From a methodological point of view, this paper makes two contlibutions to the literature. One contribution is the proposal of a new measure of pro-poor growth. This new measure provides the linkage between growth rates in mean income and in income inequality. In this context, growth is defined as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if there is a gain (or loss) in the growth rate due to a decrease (or increase) in inequality. The other contribution is a decomposition methodology that explores linkages between three dimensions: growth pattems, labour market performances. and social policies. Through the decomposition analysis, growth in per capita income is explained in terms of four labour market components: the employment rate. hours of work, the labour force participation rate. and productivity. We also assess the contribution of different nonlabour income sources to growth patterns. The proposed methodologies are then applied to the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD) covering the period 1995-2004. The paper analyzes the evolution of Brazilian social indicators based on per capita income exploring links with adverse labour market performance and social policy change, with particular emphasis on the expansion of targeted cash transfers and devising more propoor social security benefits.
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In this paper we investiga te the impact of initial wealth anel impatience heterogeneities, as wcll as differential access to financia! markets on povcrty anel inequality, anel cvaluate some mechanisms that could be used to alleviate situations in which these two issues are alarming. To address our qucstion we develop a dynamic stochastic general cquilibrium modo! of educational anel savings choicc with heterogeneous agents, where individuais differ in their initial wealth anel in their discount factor. We find that, in the long run, more patient households tend to be wealthier anel more educated. However, our baseline model is not able to give as much skewness to our income distribution as it is rcquircd. We then propose a novel returns structure based on empírica! observation of heterogeneous returns to different portfolios. This modification solves our previous problem, evidencing the importance of the changes made in explaining the existing levels of inequality. Finally, we introducc two kinds of cash transfers programs- one in which receiving thc benefit is conditional on educating the household's youngster (CCTS) anel one frec of conditionalities (CTS) - in order to evaluate the impact of these programs on the variables of concern1 Wc fine! that both policies have similar qualitativo rcsults. Quantitatively, howcvcr, the CCTS outperforms its unconclitional version in all fielcls analyzecl, revealing itself to be a preferable policy.
Resumo:
Esta tese teve o intuito de analisar como os estados se organizaram para o enfrentamento dos problemas fiscais decorrentes da guerra fiscal que atinge seu principal imposto, o Imposto sobre Operações Relativas à Circulação de Mercadorias e sobre Prestações de Serviços de Transporte Interestadual, Intermunicipal e de Comunicação (ICMS), e da redução da receita do Fundo de Participação dos Estados (FPE). Além disso, procurou-se identificar os instrumentos utilizados pelos estados para fazerem a advocacy federativa de seus interesses junto à União. Buscou-se, ainda, analisar os modelos de coalisão estabelecidos, a trajetória e o comportamento das instituições para compreender a dinâmica das relações intergovernamentais, o grau de cooperação obtido diante de um quadro de heterogeneidade socioeconômica dos governos subnacionais e o impacto no processo de coordenação vertical. Partiu-se da hipótese de que a heterogeneidade dos governos estaduais dificulta a evolução do processo de cooperação e coordenação federativa, reduzindo o poder dos governos subnacionais de estabelecerem a advocacy de seus interesses com a União, além da construção de soluções para os problemas fiscais de forma coletiva. Visando entender a dinâmica federativa, o estudo analisou as tentativas fracassadas de reforma tributária do ICMS - principalmente para a eliminação da guerra fiscal - e a aprovação, em 2013, da nova lei que rege as transferências do FPE, a partir da atuação do Conselho Nacional de Política Fazendária (CONFAZ) e do Congresso Nacional. Essas são arenas selecionadas por serem estratégicos no conjunto da estrutura governamental, sendo o primeiro o órgão criado com o objetivo de harmonização do ICMS diante de um quadro de competitividade entre os estados e de confronto e pouca coordenação do Governo Federal; e o segundo, responsável, principalmente, pela aprovação de leis e pela fiscalização do Estado brasileiro. De forma a iluminar o caso brasileiro e identificar algumas soluções inovadoras foram apresentadas, também, experiências internacionais dos países Estados Unidos da América (EUA), Canadá e Austrália, que já avançaram na instituição de arranjos interestaduais, por meio de Conselhos de Governadores - chefes dos Poderes Executivos estaduais - que promovem políticas de atuação e decisões coletivas para a defesa de seus interesses junto aos governos centrais. Concluiu-se que, em que pesem as tentativas de reforma do ICMS e a reforma do FPE, cuja mudança representativa se dará aproximadamente em 400 anos, as estratégias, as formas de atuação adotadas pelos estados precisam ser revistas e o governo federal precisa resgatar o seu papel de coordenador de politica pública. Além disso o fortalecimento das instituições de advocacy federativa, presentes nas experiências internacionais, podem de forma incremental mudar o caso brasileiro contribuindo para a construção de um federalismo cooperativo e para a melhoria das relações intergovernamentais.
Resumo:
Esta tese teve o intuito de analisar como os estados se organizaram para o enfrentamento dos problemas fiscais decorrentes da guerra fiscal que atinge seu principal imposto, o Imposto sobre Operações Relativas à Circulação de Mercadorias e sobre Prestações de Serviços de Transporte Interestadual, Intermunicipal e de Comunicação (ICMS), e da redução da receita do Fundo de Participação dos Estados (FPE). Além disso, procurou-se identificar os instrumentos utilizados pelos estados para fazerem a advocacy federativa de seus interesses junto à União. Buscou-se, ainda, analisar os modelos de coalisão estabelecidos, a trajetória e o comportamento das instituições para compreender a dinâmica das relações intergovernamentais, o grau de cooperação obtido diante de um quadro de heterogeneidade socioeconômica dos governos subnacionais e o impacto no processo de coordenação vertical. Partiu-se da hipótese de que a heterogeneidade dos governos estaduais dificulta a evolução do processo de cooperação e coordenação federativa, reduzindo o poder dos governos subnacionais de estabelecerem a advocacy de seus interesses com a União, além da construção de soluções para os problemas fiscais de forma coletiva. Visando entender a dinâmica federativa, o estudo analisou as tentativas fracassadas de reforma tributária do ICMS - principalmente para a eliminação da guerra fiscal - e a aprovação, em 2013, da nova lei que rege as transferências do FPE, a partir da atuação do Conselho Nacional de Política Fazendária (CONFAZ) e do Congresso Nacional. Essas são arenas selecionadas por serem estratégicos no conjunto da estrutura governamental, sendo o primeiro o órgão criado com o objetivo de harmonização do ICMS diante de um quadro de competitividade entre os estados e de confronto e pouca coordenação do Governo Federal; e o segundo, responsável, principalmente, pela aprovação de leis e pela fiscalização do Estado brasileiro. De forma a iluminar o caso brasileiro e identificar algumas soluções inovadoras foram apresentadas, também, experiências internacionais dos países Estados Unidos da América (EUA), Canadá e Austrália, que já avançaram na instituição de arranjos interestaduais, por meio de Conselhos de Governadores - chefes dos Poderes Executivos estaduais - que promovem políticas de atuação e decisões coletivas para a defesa de seus interesses junto aos governos centrais. Concluiu-se que, em que pesem as tentativas de reforma do ICMS e a reforma do FPE, cuja mudança representativa se dará aproximadamente em 400 anos, as estratégias, as formas de atuação adotadas pelos estados precisam ser revistas e o governo federal precisa resgatar o seu papel de coordenador de politica pública. Além disso o fortalecimento das instituições de advocacy federativa, presentes nas experiências internacionais, podem de forma incremental mudar o caso brasileiro contribuindo para a construção de um federalismo cooperativo e para a melhoria das relações intergovernamentais.
Resumo:
In this paper we study the e ects of conditional cash transfers in school enrolment and tackling child labour. We develop a dynamic heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model, where households face a set of tradeo s while allocating their children's time in leisure activities, schooling and working. We calibrate the model using data from the Brazilian survey PNAD, before the policy was implemented, in order to quantify the e ects of a conditional transfer. We then evaluate the results of a policy experiment that implements a conditional cash transfer scheme similar to the Brazilian Bolsa Fam lia. Our results suggest that the program, in the long term, is able to substantially increase school registration and reduce child labour and poverty. In addition, we nd out that a progressive conditional cash transfer results is even more e ective in tackling child labour and increasing school enrolment.
Resumo:
Neste trabalho, estudamos os impactos de transfer^encias condicionais de renda sobre o trabalho e a educa c~ao infantis. Para tanto, desenvolvemos modelo din^amico de equil brio geral com agentes heterog^eneos, onde as fam lias enfrentam tradeo s com rela c~ao a aloca c~ao de tempo das crian cas em atividades de lazer, em escolaridade e em trabalhar. O modelo e calibrado usando dados da Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra em Domic lios, de modo que podemos quanti car os efeitos de uma pol tica de transfer^encia de renda. Finalmente, avaliamos o impacto de um pol tica semelhante ao atual Bolsa Fam lia. Nossos resultados sugerem que o programa, no longo prazo, e capaz de induzir um aumento substancial na escolaridade, al em de ser efetivo na redu c~ao do trabalho infantil e da pobreza. Al em disso, mostramos que um programa progressivo de transfer^encia condicional de renda resulta em benef cios ainda maiores.
Resumo:
Government transfers to individuals and families play a central role in the Brazilian social protection system, accounting for almost 14 per cent of GDP in 2009. While their fiscal and redistributive impacts have been widely studied, the macroeconomic effects of transfers are harder to ascertain. We constructed a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 2009 and estimated short-term multipliers for seven different government monetary transfers . The SAM is a double-entry square matrix depicting all income flows in the economy. The data were compiled from the 2009 Brazilian National Accounts and the 2008/2009 POF, a household budget survey. Our SAM was disaggregated into 56 sectors, 110 commodities, 200 household groups and seven factors of production (capital plus six types of labor, according to schooling). Finally, we ran a set of regressions to separate household consumption into ‘autonomous’ (or ‘exogenous’) and ‘endogenous’ components. More specifically, we are interested in the effects of an exogenous injection into each of the seven government transfers outlined above. All the other accounts are thus endogenous. The so-called demand ‘leaks’ are income flows from the endogenous to exogenous accounts. Leaks—such as savings, taxes and imports—are crucial to determine the multiplier effect of an exogenous injection, as they allow the system to go back to equilibrium. The model assumes that supply is perfectly elastic to demand shocks. It assumes that the families’ propensity to save and consumption profile are fixed—that is, rising incomes do not provoke changes in behaviour. The multiplier effects of the on GDP corresponds to the growth in GDP resulting from each additional dollar injected into each transfer seven government transfers. If the government increased Bolsa Família expenditures by 1 per cent of GDP, overall economic activity would grow by 1.78 per cent, the highest effect. The Continuous Cash Benefit, comes second. Only three transfers— the private-sector and public servants’ pensions and FGTS withdrawals—had multipliers lower than unity. The multipliers for other relevant macroeconomic aggregates—household and total consumption, disposable income etc. —reveal a similar pattern. Thus, under the stringent assumptions of our model, we cannot reject the hypothesis that government transfers targeting poor households, such as the Bolsa Família, help foster economic expansion. Naturally, it should be stressed that the multipliers relate marginal injections into government transfers to short-term economic performance either real growth, or inflation if there is no idle capacity which is also useful to analyze. In the long term, there is no doubt that what truly matters is the growth of the country’s productive capacity.
Resumo:
Brazilian public policy entered in the so-called new social federalism through its conditional cash transfers. States and municipalities can operate together through the nationwide platform of the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP), complementing federal actions with local innovations. The state and the city of Rio de Janeiro have created programs named, respectively, Renda Melhor (RM) and Família Carioca (FC). These programs make use of the operational structure of the BFP, which facilitates locating beneficiaries, issuing cards, synchronizing payment dates and access passwords and introducing new conditionalities. The payment system of the two programs complements the estimated permanent household income up to the poverty line established, giving more to those who have less. Similar income complementation system was subsequently adopted in the BFP and the Chilean Ingreso Ético Familiar, which also follow the principle of estimation of income used in the FC and in the RM. Instead of using the declared income, the value of the Rio cash transfers are set using the extensive collection of information obtained from the Single Registry of Social Programs (Cadastro Único): physical configuration of housing, access to public services, education and work conditions for all family members, presence of vulnerable groups, disabilities, pregnant or lactating women, children and benefits from other official transfers such as the BFP. With this multitude of assets and limitations, the permanent income of each individual is estimated. The basic benefit is defined by the poverty gap and priority is given to the poorest. These subnational programs use international benchmarks as a neutral ground between different government levels and mandates. Their poverty line is the highest of the first millennium goal of the United Nations (UN): US$ 2 per person per day adjusted for the cost of living. The other poverty line of the UN, US$ 1.25, was implicitly adopted as the national extreme poverty line in 2011. The exchange of methodologies between federal entities has happened both ways. The FC began with the 575,000 individuals living in the city of Rio de Janeiro who were on the payroll of the BFP. Its system of impact evaluation benefited from bi-monthly standardized examinations. In the educational conditionalities, the two programs reward students' progress, a potential advantage for those who most need to advance. The municipal program requires greater school attendance than that of the BFP and the presence of students’ parents at the bimonthly meetings held on Saturdays. Students must achieve a grade of 8 or improve at least 20% in each exam to receive a bi-monthly premium of R$50. In early childhood, priority is given to the poor children in the program Single Administrative Register (CadÚnico) to enroll in kindergarten, preschools and complementary activities. The state program reaches more than one million people with a payment system similar to the municipal one. Moreover, it innovates in that it transfers awards given to high school students to savings accounts. The prize increases and is paid to the student, who can withdraw up to 30% annually. The total can reach R$3,800 per low-income student. The State and the city rewarded already education professionals according to student performance, now completing the chain of demand incentives on poor students and their parents. Increased performance is higher among beneficiaries and the presence of their guardians at meetings is twice compared to non beneficiaries; The Houston program, also focuses on aligning the incentives to teachers, parents and students. In general, the plan is to explore strategic complementarities, where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The objective is to stimulate, through targets and incentives, synergies between social actors (teachers, parents, students), between areas (education, assistance, work) and different levels of government. The cited programs sum their efforts and divide labor so as to multiply interactions and make a difference in the lives of the poor.
Resumo:
A partir da disseminação do conhecimento sobre voto econômico no meio político, o incremento da renda real criado pelo Bolsa Família pode criar incentivos para que os governantes aumentem o valor dos repasses ou ampliem a base de famílias cadastradas com intuito de aumentar suas chances de reeleição. A hipótese testada nesse trabalho foi de que o governo influencia os gastos do Programa Bolsa Família e os aumentam anormalmente em períodos pré-eleitorais. Para testar essa hipótese, foram usadas as séries temporais de gastos mensais com o programa e de número de famílias beneficiárias desde janeiro de 2004 até dezembro de 2014. Para isso foram utilizados modelos estatísticos para identificar se estes gastos aumentam anormalmente em períodos que antecedem eleições, controlados por outros fatores que podem influenciar os gastos do programa, tais como PIB Nacional, Receitas e Despesas do Tesouro Nacional, Inflação e Desemprego. Os resultados sugerem a ocorrência de ciclos eleitorais nas eleições presidenciais, nos quais há uma aceleração no número de famílias inscritas no Bolsa Família nos três meses anteriores à campanha com a consequente aceleração dos gastos do programa no mesmo período, porém não há redução no número de famílias inscritas após as eleições e, por fim, que não existem efeitos no período das eleições locais.